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East Timor Motion Before EEC-ACP Assembly

BK1903070990 Hong Kong AFP in English 0636 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Port Moresby, March 19 (AFP)—A draft resolution demanding that Indonesia investigate reports of human rights abuses in East Timor was put before an assembly here Monday [19 March] of the European Economic Community (EEC) and its African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) partners.

The resolution, proposed by Dutch Socialist Maartje Van Putten, highlighted reports of disappearances and detentions of political dissidents in the former Portuguese colony, annexed by Indonesia in December 1975.

Asking Jakarta to give clear instructions to its security forces on the rights of peaceful demonstrators, it called for a full investigation of reports that a peaceful demonstration in Dili was brutally put down in January, leaving at least one person dead and three people seriously injured.

A second resolution on East Timor, proposed by Maria Belo, a Portuguese Socialist, called for condemnation of Indonesia's "occupation" of East Timor where, it said, hundreds of political prisoners were subject to frequent torture and summary execution.

It also condemned Australia for its agreement with Indonesia on exploitation of oil deposits in the Timor Sea, "in violation of the very principles of international law."

The draft resolutions are to be considered during an EEC-ACP joint assembly meeting which opened here Monday.

Five Power Defense Arrangement Exercise Begins

BK1303064690 Kuala Lumpur International Service in English 0600 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Text] Air and naval forces of Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and Britain are taking part in a four-day exercise from today. The exercise is under the Five Power Defense Arrangement.

A Malaysian Defense Ministry statement said the exercise is held annually within the airspace of Malaysia and Singapore.

Commanders Watch Exercise

BK1503115190 Singapore Domestic Service in English 1100 GMT 15 Mar 90

[Text] The armed forces commanders of member countries from the Five Power Defense Arrangement arrived in Singapore today. They observed the Australian, New Zealand, Malaysian, and Singapore Air Force detachments at Paya Lebar Airport. It is part of the four-day air defense exercises, naval and army.

The armed forces chiefs nad earlier visited the military detachments of the member countries at Butterworth.

Japan

LDP Leaders Interviewed About Trade Friction

OW1803183490 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 0000 GMT 18 Mar 90

[From the first installment of a two-part program entitled "Political Party Interviews—Questions About Policies Concerning the Consumption Tax and Japan-U.S. Friction"; interviews with LDP General Secretary Ichiro Ozawa and Mutsuki Kato, chairman of the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council, by commentator Naoki Tanaka; Eiko Shinozuka, an assistant professor at Ochanomizu University; and Kazuo Okamoto, who also moderated the program—program recorded at an NHK studio on 16 March]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Okamoto] General Secretary Ozawa, you have mentioned the economic frictions between Japan and the United States. In this connection, I would like to ask Chairman Kato of the Policy Affairs Research Council some questions.

The Structural Impediments Initiative [SII] talks are at the very last stages, and we can wait no longer. The interim evaluation or report will have to be submitted at the beginning of next month. First of all, I think the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] will have to consult with the government, but as far as the LDP is concerned, how do you plan to deal with it?

[Kato] Basically, the U.S. side has brought up six issues, while our side has indicated seven issues. Those issues will be studied comprehensively, and solutions will be worked out in accordance with the interests of the peoples of our two nations. That is the basic idea. And what underlies that idea is that both Japan and the United States will conduct talks while maintaining the position that our two nations will take responsibility for managing the global economy and that Japan-U.S. relations are the significant basis for Japan's existence and survival in the world.

Those ideas are the basic concept. More often than not I have explained my views using other expressions. When I hear people cry that the worst has happened or ask what will become of us, I tell them [laughs] that no boars larger than mountains will ever appear [problems are never as serious as they appear]. Basically, the issues will be settled in accordance with the interests of the peoples of both Japan and the United States. And I say that no boars larger than mountains will ever appear.

However, at long last, full-scale and thorough deliberations and examinations of individual items will be held, on concrete terms, beginning next week. We would like to work out the interim report first, and then efforts will be made to handle what has to be dealt with and by improving what has to be corrected in the final report.

[Tanaka] Originally, the Japan-U.S. SII talks were started because the U.S. Congress put pressure on the administration, holding that there are nations that the United States should deal with using a more severe approach and that negotiations should be held by first selecting priority items for talks. Therefore, the Office of the U.S. President picked three items as applicable to the Super 301 Article last May. And viewed from the broader trend of the times, the U.S. Congress has requested that the administration take political measures to change Japan's structural impediments.

To maintain continuity in administration, it is felt that it is best to continue doing was done before. That is particularly true of Japanese administration. And in accordance with the Japanese structure, it will be difficult for the Japanese administration to take measures to make any changes. That is why some practices have long remained as structural impediments. To change that structure, political intervention will be required. That is why the SII talks were started—so that the impediments would be removed in a positive way.

However, in Japan's case, whenever a policy task has been brought up, it has been assigned to certain government departments. For example, the Large-Scale Retail Store Law issue is assigned to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry [MITI], and the public works projects issue is assigned to the Ministry of Finance. In short, politicians think that once the task is assigned to some administrative department, they have fulfilled their duty. I think the deadlock at the Japan-U.S. SII talks can be attributed to the fact that this practice has continued to date.

In your capacity as chairman of the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council, Mr. Kato, do you feel that politicians should assume the responsibility of settling various issues? In other words, don't you think that the problem lies in the fact that those issues that politicians should shoulder are assigned to administrative departments and they are instructed to somehow come up with some measures?

[Kato] You see, even in Japan there is a wall like the Berlin Wall. We must first admit that the wall exists, and then do something about it. And that can only be done by politicians. I am well aware of that, and we are fully aware of a series of events that took place in May last year, to which you have just referred. We realize why the SII talks came into being, and that ultimately there must be political decisions. We clearly understand that these are not problems that can be solved by telling public officials or public offices to do this or that. But I also think that when there are administrative offices charged with operations concerning these matters, it should be natural that they are entrusted with studying such things.

[Okamoto] Ms. Shinozuka, do you have something to say?

[Shinozuka] The Japan-U.S. SII talks basically concern the issue of market openness. And our position is that if the market in Japan is opened, we will benefit a great deal. We certainly hope that this will come about. Now

as a matter of principle, how would you explain the relationship of that issue to the LDP's closed way of thinking about agriculture—the thinking that not a grain of rice will be permitted from overseas? Japan, facing the Japan-U.S. SII talks in a positive manner, is moving toward opening its market as much as possible, but that position is, after all, quite contradictory to the position it is taking about rice.

[Kato] The rice issue is not referred to either in the SII talks or in the Super 301 provision. There are reasons for that. There is an agreement between the Japanese Government and the U.S. Government that the rice issue should be subject to discussions in the Uruguay Round. Now, I would like to recall that I have always said it is nonsensical to argue over whether even a grain of rice can be imported or not.

[Shinozuka, interrupting] Oh?

[Kato] In fact, Japan has imported 30,000 to 50,000 tons of rice for production of Awamori liquor in Okinawa every year for the past several decades. And travelers returning home are free to bring up to 100 kgs each. Consequently, the talks about not importing even a grain of rice are only symbolic. Now, with regard to rice, as the general secretary noted earlier, there are resolutions from both the House of Representative and the House of Councillors, and under the resolutions, Japan cannot import even a grain of rice. The Diet is the supreme organ regarding resolutions, and the only legislative organ. As to Diet resolutions, I really don't know what would happen if those resolutions were breached by the government. There has never been an instance of a resolution having been breached or ignored. However, our understanding of the importance of Diet resolutions is that it would at least lead to an immediate dissolution of the Diet. There are many other factors surrounding rice. But to bring up the rice problem now, when we are talking about the immediate issues of the SII talks and the Super 301 provision, could confuse the overall discussion. I would like to ask you to view the issues separately. I have always said that the issues of the SII talks, the Super 301 provision, and the various issues that influential people in the U.S. Congress talk about should be classified into three separate groups taken up separately and calmly, but boldly. When the issues become lumped together, confusion will arise. I would like to have your understanding on that.

[Okamoto] Mr Kato, rice may not be a bilateral issue and should be dealt with through the Uruguay Round. Now to confine our topic to the SII talks we are facing now, we must say that things are at a delicate stage. For instance, in a cabinet meeting last week, a minister spoke about the Large Retail Store Law. His remarks were to the effect that improved operation of the law will not solve the problem, but that the law should be abolished. On the question of increased investment in public works projects, the United States reportedly is asking Japan to raise its investment to the level of 10 percent of GNP, even though more recent reports state that the request has been lowered somewhat. Or there is the question of raising the tax on farmland in urban areas to a level applicable to housing sites. There are some other issues, like the Anti-Monopoly Law. What views do you, as chairman of the Policy Research Council of the governing party, now hold about those issues?

[Kato] There are various formal offices within our party. In addition, there are what we call Article 84 committees, divisions dealing with foreign affairs, construction and so forth, and research commissions. All issues are seriously studied by people there, and forwarded up the ladder for further review. As far as the SII talks are concerned, full discussions will be held and an agreement will be reached among the four executives of the party. We will tackle the issues in complete cooperation. We have come to a very delicate stage.

[Okamoto, interrupting] I can see that.

[Kato] We regret, indeed, that we have not yet reached the stage of mentioning the content or the level of progress achieved. But we are aware that we must somehow make a success of the SII talks, because they will greatly affect the basis of Japan-U.S. ties and the world economy. We are resolved to do that.

[Tanaka] I would like to ask Mr Ozawa a question. I personally feel that the subjects being dealt with in the Japan-U.S. SII talks cannot compromise with the way the LDP has conducted its politics in the past. Let us take, for instance, the issue of precoordinated bidding [dango] in the construction industry, or the question of very strict government regulations on industries here, which even hinder the participation in the industries of new Japanese companies, not to mention foreign companies. I think that in fact the politics of the LDP is intertwined in all these. Some LDP Diet members, in the process of growing up within the party, are asked to become lobbyists for certain industries when they join a faction in the party. In other words, they are put into a lobbyist group. However, when they become lobbyist Dietmen, they have a difficult choice between whether to identifying their interests with the interests of the industries for which they lobby, or to take the position of standing aloof from any such possible gain. Either way, they and the industries are identified with each other. In the end, they get votes as well as money from the people associated with the industries. Doing so, they also build up a stable political foundation. That is the actual course the LDP Diet members have taken so far.

As a result, complaints about the problem of the structure itself are now being heard in Japan from those who have been prevented from initially joining the industries. They do not come only from the United States. That is the present situation. The LDP is now saying that it will face the SII talks with responsibility, but my question is this: Does the LDP understand that the party is being questioned about its way of running the party including its way of educating new men, raising money, and collecting votes.

[Ozawa] Japanese society as a whole, rather than just the LDP, has grown up under such circumstances. I think society has come to be what it is now because it has found good points in the system and has made good use of them. However, now I think we have entered an age when the system can no longer gain understanding, domestically as well as internationally, and the system can no longer can be actively pursued.

Not only the LDP, as you said, but the entire society is built on that structure. We realize that we can no longer go on without doing something about it. I think that where major policy decisions made by the government and the party are concerned, there will be almost no decision that will be welcomed with applause from all the people. Interests are diverse and, hence, are bound to conflict. To take finance an an example, we will have to cover some sector's problem with measures concerning expenditures or taxes, and our decision will mean sacrifice by some people. That is the way I view the matter. On the SII talks, as the Policy Research Council chairman noted, we are not yet at the stage of disclosing what measures will be taken on individual issues, but everything possible will have to be done. As you said, domestically there are regulations that act as impediments. I think we should take such points into consideration in making decisions.

[Kato] Mr Tanaka spoke about lobbying Dietmen. I would like to explain a little about that. In the recent election, 51 new men were elected from our party. They will be assigned to three divisions, and research commissions will have eight of them. They will not become lobbyists. The term for division chiefs will be one year. The term as a reserach commission chief will not exceed three years. Some of the divisions will not allow one to serve concurrently as a deputy chief and a Diet committee representative. To serve concurrently as a deputy general secretary and as a deputy research commission chief will not be allowed, either. That regulation will be strictly enforced...

[Tanaka] [interrupting] What you just said becomes effective when?

[Kato] That was deicded recently. It will be carried out as part of the political reform plan. We have abolished 13 research commissions from under the Policy Affairs Research Council, despite objections. That major decision is to remove walls within the party step by step. It was done after consultations among the four executives of the party. I would like to have your understanding on that point.

[Okamoto] The improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union—being lauded as an end to the Cold War—is truly remarkable. However, I am very concerned about the future of Japanese-U.S. relations, in view of what is happening now. The U.S. trade deficit is decreasing. Japan's trade surplus also is decreasing, but the imbalance between Japan and the United States is not. The imbalance stood at some 45 percent last year. I would like to know if the friction between the two countries will remain as long as the imbalance is not righted. Another point: I think the general secretary, as a way of dealing with the agricultural products issue, some time ago spoke about containing the exports of industrial products. Don't you think that will mean going toward trade restrictions?

(Ozawa) I had the opportunity to hold talks with Secretary Mosberger and Senator Danforth just today. It is said that basic problems can be settled through the SII talks. However, in the final analysis, the most important issue is the balance of trade. In more concrete terms, they demand that they be given more chances to participate and compete. Those are the facts.

At this point, we have no other choice but to tackle the SII talks. However, at the very beginning, when the talks started, I expressed my opposition. It is only natural that the structures are different. After further impartial investigation is made into the issue, the conclusion will arise that Japanese society is strange [okashii], that Japanese culture is strange, and that the Japanese people are strange.

We should point out that it is not true. We should indicate where the problems really lie. We should say that chances for participation would be duly provided. In other words, imports will be increased and trade will be balanced. Another problem is that, although financial markets are said to have been liberalized, the fact as viewed from the U. S. side is that there are actually no chances at all for their participation. Unless we handle such practical problems properly, the United States will continue to insist on its official position, even if the SII talks or other consultations are held.

I think we have to tackle those issues brought up at the SII talks now. However, the problems cannot be resolved unless the government takes all of the problems as a whole into due consideration, coordinating with the industrial sector, and improving what has to be corrected. Because it is never a good solution to shift to controlled trade or bureaucratic controls, we must do our best not resort to such measures. Nevertheless, I feel that now is the time for all those connected with the economic sector to take all those facts into consideration and take drastic action to resolve the problems.

[Okamoto] Mr. Tanaka, go ahead, please.

[Tanaka] It seems that all the issues picked up on by the United States, based on its Super 301 Article, can easily be dealt with by the Japanese Government. Once the government decides on its approach, the U.S. side will surely demonstrate its understanding. That is true of the timber industry, customs rates, financial law, satellites, or supercomputers issues. In that way, the United States has actually selected items for negotiation, and only then talks have been held. Do you think that it has brought about good results? Or do you think the problems have become very much distorted or that they might become distorted? Or do you think that, because the United

States has brought up the issues, the situation will become more favorable than before if and when proper measures are taken? I think that is a very important point.

[Kato] Well, favorable.... [changes thought] Well, I have just said that our basic concern is the interests of both Japan and the United States. But, when the issues are viewed from the immediate short-term or medium- and long-term standpoints, I think there will be differences. Concerning the three issues just mentioned, our position is that we shall never take any action if a dagger is pointed at our heart. Our position is very clear on that point. That is, we shall never yield to threats. In other words, our only concern is the interests of both Japan and the United States.

Concerning the issues you have just mentioned, including supercomputers, timber, and satellites, sacrifices in some aspects cannot be avoided in solving each of the issues, particularly in settling the issue concerning timber. The resolutions will certainly demand sacrifices. However, resolutions must be worked out in such a way that they will benefit Japan's general medium- or long-term intersts. Well, if such resolutions are termed clear-cut [sukkiri-to-shita], we might feel rather embarrassed [komaru]. After all, we would like to tackle the issues from a position that our people will, later on, express their gratitude, saying that the resolutions benefit the interests of the Japanese people.

[Tanaka] Mr. Kato, you have just mentioned that it would be embarrassing to have a dagger pointed at our heart. It would be embarrasing if someone thought a dagger was necessary. You are quite right there. Then, w[illegible] is it that the Japanese Government or the Japanese Di[illegible] will never make any moves unless someone points a dag[illegible] at the opponent's weakest point? What do you think?

[Kato] Concerning that point, as the general secretary has just mentioned, Japan, after all, has its customs, way of living and thinking, and many other long-term patterns. The problem is that we have to continue while promoting self-reform or self-revolution so to speak. That is the reason we also have to take measures at home that can be recalled later on as good measures that should have been taken when viewed from the medium or long term. It will not do merely to correct immediate or short-term problems because they have been pointed out as impediments or unfair practices. It certainly will not do merely to correct such issues. We would like to resolve the issues so that they could be favorably incorporated into the global economy as a whole and also the national economy of Japan.

[Okamoto] Ms. Shinozuka, do you have any questions?

[Shinozuka] Yes. The first problem brought up at the talks concerns the high savings rate in Japan. Now, it is understood that it will drop in the future. With workers who have worked very industriously growing older, we cannot expect the younger generation to work as they have done. The situation will become very different then. Currently, Japan is being denounced merely because it has a high savings rate. However, when the future changes in Japan's demographics are taken into consideration, it should be noted that Japan may face a very critical economic situation in the next five or 10 years. In that connection, I don't think it will do merely to listen to what the United States has to say. Since the savings rate, investment, and trade surplus have been reduced, I feel that we should say more about our situation to our protagonist, but that we should not merely listen to what they have to say.

[Kato] We did say quite a lot. That is the reason we say the United States has deficits, not only in trade and finance, but also in income. They have deficits in consumption, too. [laughs] We told them that the deficit in consumption should be corrected.

[Shinozuka, interrupting] Yes. As to consumption, the market has been opened so that we, the consumers, can buy commodities of high quality in conditions favorable to us.

[Kato] That is true. Therefore, the United States should correct its financial deficit and the Gramm-Rudman Act should be administered more explicitly and steadily.

[Shinozuka, interrupting] Yes. Both our two nations should pay attention to that matter.

[Kato, continuing] It is bad that the United States has a low savings rate. We suggested to the U.S. side that maybe they should reinstitute the tax-free small-savings system, which has been abolished in Japan. In reponse, they said that it is now being considered. They are now considering reinstituting it. Our two sides have said a lot about what each has to say. Concerning the preparations to greet the coming of the aging society, we are now taking that matter into serious consideration. [passage omitted]

Japan To Participate in California G-7 Talks

OW1603234690 Tokyo KYODO in English 2321 GMT 16 Mar 90

[By Shiro Yoneyama]

[Text] Washington, March 16 KYODO—Top aides to leaders of Group of Seven (G-7) member countries will meet in California on March 23-25 to discuss "political coordination" for Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and other global issues, KYODO news service has learned.

Japanese and U.S. sources said subcabinet-level deputies of the United States, Japan, West Germany, France, Italy, Britain, and Canada will gather at a San Francisco hotel to pave the way for the Houston summit to be held on July 9-11. The participants include Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Hisashi Owada and Robert Kimmitt, U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs.

An American official characterized the meeting as part of a "political coordination" process. It will be held separately from a meeting of high-ranking economic "sherpas" for the G-7 presidents and prime ministers, also to be held in San Francisco, according to U.S. and Japanese sources.

The G-7 countries have adopted the practice of refusing to publicly confirm or deny the economic and political meetings of behind-the-scenes players. "Eastern Europe will be the dominant topic," one U.S. source said, speaking on condition of anonymity. Other major topics for discussion include the Soviet Union, economic aid to Latin American countries such as Nicaragua and Panama, Asian security and a U.S.-Japan-Europe "trialogue" concept advanced by President George Bush during his Palm Springs meeting with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu.

"We have for several years agreed with your government that it would be very useful to increase the dialogue between Japan and Europe," a senior U.S. official said, "and we thought we just might as well have a trialogue and let us see what enhanced mechanism we already have."

U.S. officials said France initially opposed the San Francisco meeting of Kimmitt, Owada and other top political policy planners, but later agreed relented. "We host the Houston summit," a U.S. source said, adding both Japan and Britain strongly supported the political session. Japanese diplomats said the U.S. has pushed hard for the economic summit in Texas, home state of both Bush and Secretary of State James Baker.

Japanese and U.S. sources said the deputy economic ministers, like their political counterparts, will address developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and ways to assist Eastern bloc economic reform. The subcabinet-level deputies will also discuss the war on drugs, the Third World debt crisis and the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks, the sources said.

The economic meeting will be attended by Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Koji Watanabe, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs Richard McCormack and their German, French, Italian, British, and Canadian counterparts. They last met in Key West, Florida in January. An American official said there will be "two or three more" sherpas' meetings before the Houston summit. The official said the Houston summit will be "the last chance" for the G-7 leaders to put political momentum into the Uruguay Round before its scheduled completion at the end of this year.

'Unofficial' SII Talks With U.S. Slated

OW1903161290 Tokyo KYODO in English 1339 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Tokyo, March 19 KYODO—Japan and the United States will hold "unofficial" working-level talks in the United States Tuesday over an April report on their talks on structural barriers to bilateral trade, government sources said Monday. The sources, however, declined to provide details such as the place and schedule of the meeting.

The meeting, followed by a fourth round of so-called Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks slated for April 3 and 4 in Washington, is expected to provide a chance for the Japanese to explain measures they will include in an interim report due out early April on the SII talks.

The government and ruling Liberal Democratic Party are now working on a package of reforms aimed at responding to U.S. charges in the SII talks, involving a law limiting the opening of large retail stores and an antitrust law. Washington has urged the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law be abolished to allow foreign firms to open large stores in Japan and increase the number of large Japanese stores, which are likely to sell more imports than small ones. U.S. negotiators also have called on Japan to revise the Antimonopoly Law for more penalties on illegal cartels.

As for the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law, the draft package calls for flexible enforcement of the law in lieu of scrapping it, a measure which is likely to prompt U.S. irritation at the unofficial meeting.

Observers said if the unofficial talks end with tougher U.S. calls for structural reforms in Japan, the Japanese Government will have to take further action to make the SII talks successful. SII talks are to end in July with a final report.

Government Presents SII Draft Plan to LDP

OW1603183490 Tokyo KYODO in English 1506 GMT 16 Mar 90

[Text] Tokyo, March 16 (KYODO)—The Japanese Government presented to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for consideration Friday a draft package of measures to reduce barriers to bilateral trade and investment in response to U.S. demands. The package of proposals, which includes a revision of the large-scale retail stores law, was submitted to the LDP's top four executives and other senior party officials. Japan and the U.S. are scheduled to publish an interim report in April on the trade talks, known as the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII).

Responding to U.S. allegations of exclusionary business practices in Japan, the draft called for revision of the antitrust law to permit its stiffer enforcement, including higher fines against violators. But the plan, as expected, did not bend to U.S. demands to scrap the retail stores law. Proponents of the law said its relaxed application is preferable rather than its abolition.

As stopgap measures, however, the government proposed limiting the period needed to set up a shop to a maximum of two years instead of more than 10 years

sometimes needed currently, and strengthening control over regional regulations governing store openings. The draft also envisages greater public spending on infrastructure aimed at improving Japan's living standard. In addition, the government expressed its intention to increase farmland taxes, ease regulation of foreign investment, and seek lower consumer prices.

Top-ranking LDP officials, meanwhile, severely criticized the draft package. "It is far from drastic and concrete—this would only provoke Washington," one of the party's four top executives said. The remarks reiterated the LDP's view that the package does not go far enought to satisfy the U.S. The government plans to revise the draft plan, depending on the LDP's reaction to it. A final draft is expected Monday.

In a related development, LDP Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa expressed the LDP's determination to proceed with reforms for improved trade relations with the U.S. despite resistance from opposing interest groups. "There is no such decision that is welcome by everybody," Ozawa said in an interview with the public network NHK. "The government will do as much as possible, even if its decision leads to hurt some interest group." He also said the government will make up for possible damages suffered by domestic interests from the planned structural reforms through relaxed taxation and spending increases.

U.S. Pressures Government To Revise Retail Law

OW1903053590 Tokyo KYODO in English 0405 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Tokyo, March 19 KYODO—The Japanese Government is considering easing legal restrictions on the opening of new large-scale retail stores under persistent U.S. pressure for removal of barriers to bilateral trade, government sources said Monday. Japan plans to include an offer to revise the controversial Large-Scale Retail Stores Law in Fiscal 1992 in an interim report to be published in early April under the ongoing Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks with the United States, the sources said.

Previously, Japan hoped to resolve the dispute by offering to simply relax application of the law, such as speeding up the process of opening new stores to a maximum two years from more than 10 years sometimes necessary at present. But in the face of calls from within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party for sweeping action in favor of better bilateral ties, the government is inclined to revamp the law in response to U.S. demands, the sources said. The U.S. is demanding eventual abolition of the law on the grounds that free opening of new stores would permit more imports of foreign products.

The planned revision of the law is expected to be among a package of measures Japan will pledge to take to allow the U.S. easier access to Japanese markets and help improve the bilateral trade imbalance. Another measure to be contained in the package will be increased spending on public works projects to improve Japan's infrastructure such as parks, sewerage, and housing, the sources said.

The U.S. urged Japan in previous rounds of SII talks to boost public spending to 10 percent of the nation's Gross National Product (GNP), or total output of goods and services, from the present level of around 7 percent. The U.S. has reportedly lowered the target to 8 percent, but Japan has refused to make such a specific commitment, saying it would risk inflation and deprive the government of flexibility with which it controls public spending according to economic activity.

Among other measures in the package will be revision of the Antimonopoly Law aimed at ensuring fair competition, the sources said. This will include increased fines against violators of the law, as suggested by the U.S., they added.

Former Ambassador to U.S. Downplays Friction

OW1803062090 Tokyo KYODO in English 0556 GMT 18 Mar 90

[Text] Yokosuka, Kanagawa Pref., March 18 KYODO—Former Japanese Ambassador to Washington Nobuo Matsunaga downplayed growing tensions over stalled Japan-U.S. trade talks Sunday telling graduating cadets here that the world and U.S. markets had enabled Japan to prosper.

Matsunaga used the occasion of the 34th graduation ceremony of Japan's National Defense Academy to stress the importance of U.S.-Japan ties to the students and an audience of more than 1,000, including Japanese dignitaries and senior U.S. military personnel. The former envoy also said Japan should make a greater contribution to the 6 billion dollar yearly cost of some 50,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan in the interest of averting protectionism.

Japan's present status as an economic superpower, he said, had been built on purchases of the "world and especially U.S. market." "We mustn't forget this," he said.

Matsunaga dismissed recent criticism on both sides as unrepresentative of the majority opinion adding that the strong bilateral ties benefited the world as well as both countries. He said Japan will assume a greater responsibility in future cooperation in development aid, enviromental conservation and free market initiatives in the Uruguay Round of world trade talks.

Tensions surrounding the current Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks have mounted as the April date for interim report on their progress approaches. Matsunaga's statement follows those of Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu urging his top ministers to produce concrete suggestions for the report to avert a U.S. congressional backlash. Kaifu and Defense Agency Director

General Yozo Ishikawa also attended the graduation ceremony for some 424 future officers of the Self-Defense Force.

Okinawan Mayor 'Shocked' at Exercise Resumption

OW1803032390 Naha RYUKYU SHIMPO in Japanese 17 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Text] The U.S. Marine Corps [USMC] in Okinawa held various types of training exercises at the shooting and bombing range on Ie Island on the afternoon of 16 March. The exercises included training exercises by AV-8B Harrier-II attack planes in providing close support to ground forces. It was observed that four Harrier aircraft, only a small part of the Harrier unit, took part in the exercises. The shooting and bombing range is equipped with ground-to-air guided missiles, an improved version of the Hawk, and with various related communications equipment. During the complex training exercises, Marines were seen readying portable Stinger ground-to-air guided missiles. Meanwhile, staff members of the Ie Village Office had been stationed in the village to monitor the exercises, while staff members of the prefectural government and Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau measured noise levels. Because the Harriers flew at low altitudes, a noise level of 90 phons was recorded at the Maja District civic auditorium located near the shooting and bombing range.

Regarding the resumption of the Harrier training exercises, which had been suspended because of a crash accident in January, Ie Village Mayor Seitoku Shimabukuro indicated the awkward position he was in by saying, "Our position in approving the training exercises has not changed," but adding that "the resumption of the training exercises before the cause of the accident has been clarified is a shock" and that "we can only pray that no incident or accident will occur."

Some 20 people attended the protest meeting sponsored by the Ie Villagers Association Against the Harrier Base Project in front of the shooting and bombing range in the morning.

On 16 March, two Harriers flew over the shooting and bombing range at low altitude, one at 1420 and another two at 1427 in the afternoon, but no take-off and landing training exercises were conducted.

However, an OV-10 Bronco reconnaisance aircraft repeatedly circled the area over the shooting and bombing range. In the meantime, an operational exercise to load and unload Hawk missiles at their launching pads was conducted before and after the Harriers' arrival, with the missiles loaded at the launching pads being set and aimed in several directions. Meanwhile, after the Harriers, UH-1 Cobra attack helicopters arrived at the range, repeatedly changing directions and hovering over several locations at low altitude.

The training exercise seemed to be rather complex as one helicopter, assigned to a two-star commanding general, stood by near the communications equipment at the shooting and bombing range.

According to the noise measurements conducted by the prefectural government, a maximum noise level of 90 phons created by the Harriers' low-altitude flights was recorded at the Naja civic auditorium, and a maximum noise level of 77 phons at the Nishizaki civic auditorium. The USMC is scheduled to hold training exercises on Ie island on 19 and 22 March. In view of that the prefectural government will install automatic noise measuring equipment at the Naja civic auditorium to measure noise levels during the week so that a comparison can be made between noise levels on days no training exercises are held and on those days training exercises are held.

U.S. Compound 'Central Issue' in Zushi Election

OW1803144390 Tokyo KYODO in English 1151 GMT 18 Mar 90

[Text] Yokosuka, Kanagawa Pref., March 18 KYODO—A total of 31 candidates kicked off a weeklong municipal assembly election campaign in the city of Zushi near Tokyo on Sunday in which the central issue will be the possible construction of a housing compound for U.S. military personnel and their families.

The municipal election will be held on March 25 following the expiration of the office term of assembly members. The candidates, who notified their candidacies to the municipal election administration committee, comprise 15 who support the construction of the 850 housing-unit compound and 15 who oppose it. One other neutral candidate also is running in the election.

Assembly members against the construction have tended to dominate since Mayor Kiichiro Tomino, who also opposes the plan, assumed office six years ago. But in the 1986 election, 14 of 26 Zushi City assembly members who supported the construction of the housing units, which are undergoing preparatory construction before full-scale construction, were elected. Mayor Tomino and the assembly have accordingly clashed in the assembly over municipal fiscal budgets including those related to the construction.

Tomino has been opposed to the construction of the housing compound on the 290-hectare site based on a plan proposed in 1982 by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency to the Kanagawa Prefecture and the Zushi municipal government.

Emperor Congratulates Gorbachev on Presidency

OW1703054690 Tokyo KYODO in English 0519 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Tokyo, March 17 KYODO—Emperor Akihito sent a message on Saturday to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, congratulating him on assuming the post.

Gorbachev was sworn in as the Soviet Union's first executive president Thursday after being elected in parliament.

KYODO Says Minister Received Recruit Funds

OW1703135290 Tokyo KYODO in English 1340 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Tokyo, March 17 KYODO—Posts and Telecommunications Minister Takashi Fukaya regularly received donations from Recruit Co. while its stocks-for-favor scandal rocked the country's political world, KYODO news service investigations showed Saturday. Fukaya, 54, declined comment on the report.

Recruit Co., an information, telecommunications and real-estate business conglomerate, paid at least 20,000 yen every month until December 1988 to Fuyama's political support organization, the KYODO investigations showed. The Recruit stocks-for-favor scandal was first reported by the country's mass media in June 1988. However, it is not known when Recruit began providing the regular donations to Fukaya. Fukaya has denied any involvement with the Recruit scandal since he joined the cabinet of Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu on February 28.

At least 17 politicians from both the conservative and opposition camps, and their secretaries and relatives are identified as buyers of low-priced, prelisted shares of Recruit Cosmos Co., the real-estate subsidiary of Recruit. Among those involved were former Prime Ministers Noboru Takeshita and Yasuhiro Nakasone, former Finance Ministers Kiichi Miyazawa and Michio Watanabe, former Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe, and former Democratic Socialist Party leader Saburo Tsukamoto.

Prosecutors have arrested and indicted two politicians, three Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp. officials, two Labor Ministry officials, one Education Ministry official and six senior Recruit executives on suspicion of bribery and violation of securities transaction regulations.

Mongolia

Batmonh Congratulates Gorbachev on Presidency

OW1803123290 Ulaanbaatar International Service in English 1200 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Mongolian President Jambyn Batmonh has greeted Mikhail Gorbachev on his election to the post of president of the Soviet Union. He expressed confidence that the traditional Mongol-Soviet friendship and all-round cooperation will further develop in the name of our common cause.

Ochirbat, Soviet Envoy Discuss Party Ties

OW1803111390 Ulaanbaatar International Service in English 1200 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] General Secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Gombojabyn Ochirbat met with Soviet Ambassador to Mongolia Vasiliy Sitnikov. The two men discussed the matters relating to traditional friendship and cooperation between the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the Soviet Communist Party and bilateral economic relations.

Mongolian-Chinese Joint Commission Begins Work

OW1803105790 Ulaanbaatar International Service in English 1200 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] An intergovernmental Mongol-Chinese commission on trade, economic, scientific, and technological cooperation started its first sitting in Ulaanbaatar. The sides briefed each other on the two countries' national economic situation and considered issues of further development of bilateral economic, trade, scientific, and technological cooperation. Particular significance was given to bilateral trade.

Ochirbat Meets Press; Views Informal Parties

OW1703024190 Ulaanbaatar International Service in English 0910 GMT 16 Mar 90

[Text] Mr. Ochirbat, newly elected general secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, speaking at a press conference in Ulaanbaatar said that openness and democracy [words indistinct] in Mongolian society. Mongolia has [words indistinct] of stagnation. In the past years, the expectations of the people have not been justified, and this was the cause of a series of [words indistinct] and complicated political situation in the country, he said.

Mr. Ochirbat characterized as normal the formation of informal parties and movements. He said that the past month witnessed the lack of experience in the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [words indistinct].

Ochirbat Delivers National Address 17 Mar

OW1903132690 Ulaanbaatar International Service in English 1200 GMT 19 Mar 90

["Gist" of speech by Gombojabyn Ochirbat, newly elected general secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, over the national TV and radio on 17 March]

[Text] Reconstruction and elevation of the living standard of the Mongolian people are on the top priority of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party's policy. Pluralism of views in all spheres of social life and recognition of the right of the Mongolian citizens to found their own public organizations are coanchors of

the democratic transformation in Mongolia, said Ochirbat. He expressed the hope that the people will remain practical in the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.

Touching upon the role of the ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, he went on to say that the party must be deeply aware of its high historical mission in renouncing its leading and guiding role in society; it will have to prove its vanguard role by concrete deeds.

Mr. Ochirbat criticized the fifth party plenum on which much hope was pinned. Though it passed decisions and other [words indistinct] renovation of society, the Politburo and the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party didn't take decisive steps toward democratization and renewal, he said.

The promises to renovate the party were not implemented. The slow pace of work in the party and government and as well as lack of articles of consumption were the main reasons of discontent of society, he said. The present situation implies unity of the nation.

Mr. Ochirbat voiced the preparedness of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party to cooperate with other political forces for the well-being of the people, stability, and national unity in accordance with the Constitution and laws.

Dwelling on the immediate tasks of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Mr. Ochirbat said that it must renew itself first of all. And according to him, the forthcoming extraordinary party congress must play a decisive role in it.

Regarding the international relations of the party, Mr. Ochirbat said that the mainteinance of the good-neighborly relations with two countries—the Soviet Union and China—meets national interest of the Mongolian people. He expressed the confidence that the Mongol-Chinese ties will achieve the same level as the Mongol-Soviet relations.

In concluding his speech, Mr. Ochirbat said that the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party will also try to develop mutual beneficial relations with the rest of the world's nations.

Opposition Parties Hold News Conference

OW1803092790 Ulaanbaatar International Service in English 1200 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] The Social Democratic Movement and the Social Democratic Party sponsored a press conference in Ulaanbaatar for Mongolian and foreign journalists. Speakers there defined a slow rate of perestroyka as the basic reason of aggravated political situation in the country. They blamed the Politburo of the party Central Committee in not drawing a concrete conclusion from the emerged situation that has resulted in its resignation.

At the press conference, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party Batbayar said that his party pursues the aim to build a humane, just, and highly developed democratic society in Mongolia using all means and methods of peaceful political struggle.

Mr. Batbayar said that they will not strive for practicing a ready-made model of social development.

Politburo Meets With Party, State Executives

OW1803103090 Ulaanbaatar International Service in English 1200 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Newly elected Politburo of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, led by party General Secretary Ochirbat, has met with party and the state executives and shared views on the implementation of the decisions of the eighth party plenary meeting and preparations for an extraordinary party congress. At its first working meeting, the newly elected Politburo passed decisions on reduction in the party Central Committee apparatus and party press [as heard], separation of party and state press organs, and self-financing of the party. Alongside this, related departments were instructed to set up (?bureaus) for contact with other parties, unions, and associations and on studying the public opinion.

Politburo Member Oold Interviewed on Renewal

OW1703024290 Ulaanbaatar International Service in English 0910 GMT 16 Mar 90

[Text] Mr. Oold, new Politburo member of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] Central Committee, chairman of the party auditing committee at the Party Central Committee, has been interviewed by the correspondent of Mongolian Radio. Mr. Oold said that the party's renewal will begin with the separation of party and state by (defection). From now the party will [words indistinct] organizational and educational (world) exclusively. The party apparatus will be reduced in certain (departments of) the Central Committee, and production [word indistinct] sectors will be eliminated at all party committees, said Mr. Oold.

He said [words indistinct] at the forthcoming (extraordinary) party congress will be [word indistinct] in realizing these plans.

Mr. Oold [word indistinct] plenum of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee has approved the document on suggestions and amendments in the constitutional provisions of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. The plenum has considered as expedient to submit these suggestions for consideration in the People's Great Hural. The Constitution defines the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party as the leading and guiding social and state force in Mongolia.

Revolutionary Youth League Elects New Leader

LD1803132990 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0708 GMT 18 Mar 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar (ADN correspondent)—The Central Committee of the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League [MRYL] elected the nonparty Daschdorshijn Mandach as its first secretary during the weekend. A Central Committee plenum in Ulaanbaatar will convene for 4 April a special congress of the organization to clear up fundamental questions of the existence of the league.

The former Central Committee office recently deprived former party and state leader Yumjaagiyn Tsendenbal and his wife Anastasia Filatova of honorary membership and decorations from the association. However, at the same time, in a draft program it wishes to continue to regard as its guiding principle the agreement with the ideology and strategy of the [Mongolian] People's Revolutionary Party. At the beginning of March a working group was formed in the league's Central Committee to prepare the special congress. This group in fact paralyzed the old office. Grass-roots functionaries accused it of being incapable of renewing the league's work and continuing to stick to the bureaucratic style.

From this day forward, the youth newspaper DZALUU-CHUUDYN UNEN has a new face. The newspaper which has appeared for 66 years is no longer the organ of the Central Committee and has called on its readers to make proposals for a new name for the newspaper by next Sunday.

North Korea

KCNA Criticizes, Reports on 'Team Spirit'

'Aggressive' 16 Mar Maneuvers

SK1603112790 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1045 GMT 16 Mar 90

["Joint River-Crossing Exercise To Invade North"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang March 16 (KCNA)—The U.S. imperialists who have gone over to an all-out attack operation in the adventurous "Team Spirit 90" joint military exercises directed against the North, staged a large-scale joint river-crossing drill on the South Han River with the mobilization of the U.S. Second Infantry Division and the "nodo" [surging waves] unit of the puppet army on March 15 and 16, according to a report.

At dawn on March 16, more than 2,000 troops on board 100 odd landing crafts staged the river-crossing exercise in the South Han River under the cover of artillery units and planes.

Following the infantrymen more than 200 tanks and various military vehicles crossed the river.

The river-crossing drill of the U.S. imperialist aggression troops and the puppet army fully revealed its undeniable aggressive and offensive nature.

U.S. Simulating 'Nuclear Strike'

SK1703152490 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1514 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 17 (KCNA)—The U.S. imperialists who have gone over to a general attack stage in the on-going "Team Spirit 90" manoeuvres brought three Guam-based strategic "B-52" bombers to the sky above the operational zone of South Korea at around 17:00 Thursday and staged a bomb-dropping exercise simulating a surprise nuclear strike at main targets in the central area of the northern half of Korea, according to military sources.

On the same day the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets staged a joint air strike exercise targeted against the North with the mobilisation of some 90 war planes of various types including scores of formations of "F-16" and "F-15" fighter-bombers and several formations of "A-6" assault planes.

Early warning and electronic jamming planes were involved in the aerial manoeuvres.

On the 16th and 17th of March the U.S. imperialists brought the extra-large nuclear-powered carrier "Carl Vinson" and its flotilla to the waters 60 to 70 miles east of Pohang of Korea and let the carrier-based aircraft fly above the operational zone for surprise strike exercises.

On the 16th they brought submarines, destroyers and dozens of battleships to the waters off Pusan and Pohang to stage a frantic naval attack exercise.

Besides, the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets staged "commando" dropping and river-crossing operations in areas similar to the terrain of the northern half of Korea with the mobilisation of huge ground forces, special units, motorised units and flying corps.

This clearly shows that the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets are driving the situation on the Korean peninsula to the brink of war.

U.S. Helicopter Crash Viewed

SK1903103090 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1023 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 19 (KCNA)—A helicopter belonging to the U.S. imperialist aggression forces crashed on the night of March 15 in flight in the aggressive "Team Spirit 90" joint military exercises, according to a report.

The helicopter based in Uijongbu, Kyonggi Province, plunged into a hill while flying in the air above Umsong county, North Chungchong Province, wounding three U.S. officers.

Those who like fire are bound to be burnt. The fate of the U.S. imperialist aggressors hell bent on the war game cannot be otherwise.

Military Analyst on Maneuvers

SK1703110990 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1026 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 17 (KCNA)—Military analyst Kim Su-hyon in an article contributed to NODONG SINMUN today strips bare the aggressive purpose of the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises. He demands that the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppet clique act prudently and promptly stop the war game.

He says:

This year, too, the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean ruling quarters are staging nuclear war exercises to invade the North, invariably pursuing the policy of confrontation and war. This is an open challenge to the entire fellow countrymen and the world peaceloving people desirous of peace in Korea and her reunification.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song said:

"The 'Team Spirit' joint military exercises which the United States has carried out in South Korea every year since 1976, like an annual function, are a preliminary war and a nuclear test war aimed at 'first-strike' attack against the northern half of our Republic."

To swallow up the whole of Korea with South Korea as the forward base and, furthermore, dominate whole Asia is the general aim of the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises.

From the political point of view, the "Team Spirit" is motivated by the criminal purpose to threaten the North and stifle the anti-American forces for independence and reunification in South Korea and thus turn back the general trend of the situation on the Korean peninsula directed toward national reunification. From the military point of view, it is focused on completing the preparations for an attack on the northern half of Korea and other socialist countries in Asia by bringing together the U.S. satellites and puppets in the Asia-Pacific region and ignite a war when an opportunity presents itself. This is proved by the detailed course of the war game.

The U.S. imperialists, above all, regard the "Team Spirit" as a lever for rounding off the U.S.-Japan-South Korea three-way military alliance.

They seek through it to realise a unified command of the armed forces of the United States, Japan and South Korea and strategic and tactical coordination.

Judging from its content, the "Team Spirit" is aimed at unleashing a war on the Korean peninsula.

In the exercises primary attention is paid to a massive and quick deployment of overseas aggression forces on the Korean peninsula.

Through the "Team Spirit" manoeuvres the U.S. imperialists have steadily increased the airlifting and shipping capacities to swiftly deploy their aggression forces in South Korea and its surroundings by bringing them from Okinawa of Japan, Guam, Hawaii and other intermediary operational lines.

The U.S. imperialists and the puppets use the theatre of the "Team Spirit" exercises as a lever of testing weapons of latest types and their buildup in South Korea. To cite typical examples, the U.S. imperialist aggressors tested the "lance" missile in 1978, the fighter-bomber "F-15" in 1979, the fighter-bombers "F-16" and "F-4G" in 1982, an anti-tank guided missile in 1985, an armored car for quick attack in 1986 and the nuclear war commanding plane "EA-4B," vertical take-off and landing planes and so on from 1987.

Noteworthy is it that nearly all the tested weapons are nuclear-capable aircraft and other means of nuclear delivery and launching. This is an irrefutable proof that the U.S. imperialists intend to ignite a nuclear war with South Korea where more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear arms are deployed as a forward base.

The U.S. schemes to make a surprise attack on the North while staging war exercises, and this is one of the main purposes sought in the "Team Spirit."

The period of the "Team Spirit" joint maneuvers staged by the U.S. imperialists also reveals their scheme for a surprise attack. As is known, they stage the "Team Spirit" from the end of January to the close of April. It is a dry season in our country favorable for the movement of motorized units. No wonder the Yankees who suffered from a biting cold during the Korean war and from the rainy season in the Vietnamese war later intend to start a war at a time favorable for the action of their units.

They are now resorting to petty tricks to conceal the aggressive and offensive nature of the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises with the claim that it is "a drill for defence" and "annual manoeuvres." They, however, cannot cover up the sinister aspects of the "Team Spirit" as a test nuclear war and preliminary war aimed to invade the North.

NODONG SINMUN Cited

SK1703050990 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0448 GMT 17 Mar 90

["Reckless War Game of Warmaniacs"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang March 17 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today comments on the frantic "Team Spirit 90" joint military exercises of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets.

The news analyst says:

On the 14th of March the U.S. imperialists brought some one hundred fighter planes of various types to the sky above the operational areas of South Korea from their overseas bases in the Pacific region and staged hysteric bomb-dropping exercises for surprise strikes at targets in areas similar to the terrain of the northern half of Korea.

Next day they deployed the carrier "Carl Vinson" and its flotilla in the waters 60 miles east of Pohang and sent the carrier-based aircraft continuously to the air above the operational zone for provocative aerial war exercises. On the same day the U.S. imperialists let the units which had landed in Pohang move to the operational zone and stage a river-crossing exercise aimed at northward invasion for many hours.

The "Team Spirit" exercises have turned South Korea into a virtual battlefield with never-ceasing gun reports in the sky and the ground and on the sea with powder smell hanging in the air.

It is only too clear that this war gamble is fraught with the danger of developing into a total war against the north any moment.

While talking noisily about "detente" and "peace," the U.S. imperialists are in actuality seeking a war against the North on the Korean peninsula.

If the enemy ventured a war against the North, they will face a hundred-fold, a thousand-fold retaliation by the Korean people.

Statement Denounces Tunnel 'Smear Campaign'

SK1903050090 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0451 GMT 19 Mar 90

["Statement of the KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY"—KCNA subhead]

[Text] Pyongyang March 19 (KCNA)—The Korean Central News Agency, on authorisation, issued a statement on March 18 denouncing the criminal nature and unfoundedness of the so-called "fourth tunnel" incident, an anti-DPRK smear campaign launched by the South Korean puppets in conspiracy with the U.S. imperialists.

The statement reads:

As already reported, at the 455th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission on March 14, our side proposed a prompt full-scale and scientific joint investigation into the socalled "fourth tunnel" incident over which the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets were raising a hue and cry.

Our proposal showed a very urgent and reasonable way for confirming the truth about the "fourth tunnel" incident and responsibility for it and easing the situation on the Korean peninsula that has been made more acute by this incident.

There could be no reason or excuse for the U.S. side to refuse to accept this proposal of our side because it itself had proposed a "joint investigation" into the "fourth tunnel."

Our side, truth to tell, did not need to go out of its way to make an investigation, since the facts disclosed alone were enough to prove that the "fourth tunnel" incident was a drama to hurl slanders at the DPRK. But, it proposed a prompt and overall joint investigation because the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets shamelessly continued their anti-North confrontation row over this incident. Our side's proposal was a clear manifestation of its sincere efforts and generous attitude for a fair solution of the "tunnel" problem.

The U.S. side, nevertheless, turned down this proposal without any justifiable reason, setting to naught our principled and sincere efforts to properly probe into the "fourth tunnel" incident which presented itself as an acute problem of confrontation on the Korean peninsula today and set right the trend of the situation taking a turn for the worse.

This, in the final analysis, meant that the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets themselves admitted that the "fourth tunnel" incident is a prearranged drama for calumniating our Republic and the "tunnel" in question is not our "tunnel for southward invasion" but their own "tunnel for northward invasion."

If not so, why did they refuse to accept our reasonable and just proposal to make a prompt joint investigation into the "tunnel"?

It is they who claimed their discovery of the "fourth tunnel," they who are raising an anti-North confrontation row over it and they again who proposed a "joint investigation" first. If they were right in all this, they would not have failed to respond to our proposal to go to the spot quickly and investigate and verify it together.

Were there really the "tunnel for southward invasion" and were they really willing to make a joint investigation into it, there would be nothing to be disguised or concealed and, accordingly, no time would be needed. What they should do would be to show it as it is. Should there be nothing to be shunned, there would be no need to take issue with the number of investigation personnel or examine the date of investigation.

The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets persistently evaded a joint investigation into the "tunnel" because they had guilty conscience and something shady. They failed to respond to the joint investigation as their intrigue was maladroit and they were afraid of the exposure of the truth. They virtually refused joint investigation because they knew well that it might throw a revealing light on the seamy side of the "tunnel" incident and on their criminal act.

They talked about "joint investigation" not because they were innocent but because they had an evil intention.

They had brought forward the question of "joint investigation" to forestall our possible proposal of joint investigation. That, however, was a speculation destined to failure. They ridiculously flung down the gauntlet only to find themselves facing a formidable blow.

We sternly denounce the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets who maliciously slandered our republic by staging the drama of misrespresenting their own tunnel to invade the North as our "tunnel for southward invasion" and ignored and fooled public opinion at home and abroad by refusing even a joint investigation into the "fourth tunnel."

What the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets have done about the "tunnel" this time clearly proves that not only the "fourth tunnel" incident but also all their previous anti-DPRK smear campaigns were clumsy dramas of their own making.

The puppet defence minister of South Korea in a "statement" on the "fourth tunnel" said that this "tunnel" was made public after "a final confirmation" so as not to "give the upperhand of counter propaganda offensive to the North" as was the case with the first, second and third "tunnels." His utterances are, in other words, a confession that the South Korean puppets have failed to achieve the desired end by making public without confirmation the "tunnels" which they had claimed to have been found and, at the same time, mean that the "fourth tunnel" is an effective "shocking remedy" because they opened it to the public after confirming that it is "tunnel for southward invasion" on the basis of "irrefutable evidences," unlike the previous cases.

That is why the traitor No Tae-u himself, timing to coincide with the announcement of the latest incident, got overheated in maliciously slandering us, making much ado about the "newly found tunnel for southward invasion," as if he was a hunter who caught a tiger.

Since it has been made clear that the "fourth tunnel" which was made public after a careful calculation and preparations is false and faked one, the South Korean puppets could not respond to a joint investigation. Such being the case, is there any need to argue about the fiction of the first, second and third "tunnels" in the past?

Not only the "tunnel" incidents but also the "spying case," "kidnapping case," "KAL incident" and the like they had brought forward whenever they faced a crisis in their rule were no more than cheap political cartoons which they invented out of necessity.

Reception furnishes a clue to the discovery. The falsehood of the anti-DPRK smear campaign of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets can no longer be concealed and, accordingly, it does not work.

Now their anti-North plot is like lifting an axe only to bring it down on their own toes.

The false propaganda campaign of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets has gone completely busted. They made with much ado about "threat from the North" while running riot to attack the DPRK with a massive nuclear war game involving large forces and sophisticated mass destruction weapons which are enough to wage a total war, and raised outcries over the "tunnel for southward invasion" while watching for a chance of aggression on the ground and sea and in the air and even underground by digging tunnels for northward invasion.

The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets must clearly know that they have lost face to make such a noise over the "tunnel" incident any more.

We can never pardon the South Korean puppets who have rendered the situation on the Korean peninsula more strained, aggravated mistrust and confrontation between the North and the South and threw a wet blanket over the desire of all the fellow countrymen and the world peaceloving people for national reconciliation and unity and for the peace and peaceful reunification of Korea by launching a smear campaign against us over the fabricated "fourth tunnel" incident with the backing of U.S. imperialism.

The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets should frankly admit that they dug out the tunnel for northward invasion in the demilitarized zone of the Military Demarcation Line in gross violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement and that the "fourth tunnel" incident is a ridiculous anti-North plot which was framed up to slander the North like in all the previous "tunnel" incidents. And they should apologize to our nation and give up at once their base row of confrontation against the DPRK.

The South Korean puppets should not resort to the anti-national crime of faking up groundless incidents at the bidding of U.S. imperialism and going against the peace and peaceful reunification of the country but pull down their concrete wall, a symbol of confrontation and division, stop the "Team Spirit 90" joint military exercises and take a step for an unconditional withdrawal of the U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea.

If the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets continue the anti-DPRK smear campaign in defiance of our warnings, it will result in precipitating their own destruction.

Papers Condemn ROK 'Piratic Act' Against Cuba

SK1803085990 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0831 GMT 18 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 18 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN and MINJU CHOSON Sunday denounce the piratic act of a warship of the South Korean puppet clique which threatened the Cuban cargo ship "Congreso No. 13" in international waters, demanding it to change its course and obstructing its navigation.

This is a wanton violation of the international law on the free navigation of ships in the international waters and a malicious infringement on the sovereignty of Cuba, declares NODONG SINMUN in a signed commentary.

The news analyst says:

This act of the South Korean puppets in the international waters was a repetition of the aggressive outrage of the U.S. imperialists, their master, who attacked and attempted to search the Cuban ship "El Herman" in the Gulf of Mexico.

It is not accidental that the two incidents of the U.S. imperialists and their puppets are identical with each other in their aspects and criminal nature.

It is too clear that the two incidents are part of the U.S. anti-Cuba moves and the anti-socialist offensive of the U.S. imperialists and world reactionaries.

The U.S. imperialists mobilize puppets in their anti-socialist manoeuvrings, while directly committing them.

The South Korean puppets talk about "peace" quite often. But this is nothing but a deception to cover up their despicable nature as executors of the imperialist policy of aggression and the anti-socialist reactionary offensive, and win people's favour.

The anti-socialist moves of the South Korean puppets will only precipitate their isolation and destruction.

MINJU CHOSON in a signed commentary stresses: If the South Korean puppets, together with the U.S. imperialist masters, continue infringing upon the sovereignty of other peoples, they will make themselves a target of fiercer denunciation.

White Paper Blames Failed Sports Talks on South

SK1903020490 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 0000 GMT 15 Mar 90

[White Paper issued by the North side's delegation to the North-South sports talks on 14 March 1990—read by announcer]

[Text] The North side's delegation to the North-South sports talks to discuss the question of sending a single team to the 11th Asian Games has issued a while paper:

Participating in international games, including the Olympic Games, as a single North-South team is the ardent desire of all fellow countrymen and sportsmen who want to demonstrate unified national strength and resourcefulness to all nations of the world. By all means, in order to settle the question of participating in international games in the 1990's as a North-South single team, on 21 December 1988 we proposed to hold talks to negotiate the question of participating in the 11th Asian Games as a North-South single team. And, because the South side agreed to this proposal, North-South sports talks were held.

Until now, since the first sports talks held on 9 March, 1989, nine rounds of full-dress talks and six rounds of contacts of working delegates have been held between the North and the South. Nevertheless, the North-South sports talks, after many ruptures, are facing a grave crisis, despite having entered their final stage where it seemed possible to declare the birth of a single team. The North side's delegation to the North-South sports talks acknowledge that it is necessary to demonstrate to all fellow countrymen and the world the truth about who should be held responsible for bringing the talks, which had been held for nearly a year in an effort to form a single team, to a rupture in the final stage.

1. The basic stand of the South side toward the North-South sports talks was to unilaterally bring the talks to a rupture. The South side did this under the pretext that there was no time for the talks, after deliberately delaying the discussion of this question. This is clearly proven by the fact that the Standing Committee of the South Korean Olympic Committee on 11 November 1989 adopted a resolution that the talks should be called off if no conclusion was made before year's end.

A newspaper in South Korea, HANGYORE SINMUN, reported on 17 November 1989 that the South side adopted a resolution that the talks should be called off if no conclusion was reached by the deadline set by the Beijing Organization Committee for the Asian Games and thus drew a Maginot Line in the sports talks. Proceeding from an insincere attitude from the beginning, the South side did not yield on even one of its demands at the bargaining table. Furthermore, it continued to come out with new questions whenever talks were held. Still worse, the South side used delaying tactics of overturning the points which were already agreed upon. And, outside the talks, the South side continued to openly proclaim its intention to reject a single team and to participate in the games separately.

At the first talks, the South side submitted a plan for a single team, which was composed of 10 articles and 35 paragraphs. The contents were very unilateral and insufficient, including the claim that the name of the single team should be written in foreign languages as the South side has thus far done in international sports games.

By comparison, the plan put forward by our side for the formation of a single team consisting of 12 articles and 52 paragraphs was a fair one which the South side could also accept without any problems. Therefore, the two sides agreed at the first round of talks to make the song of the single team Arirang, a song sung in our country in the 1920's, and the two sides were able to narrow the difference in their views as to the issue of the flag of the single team.

Then the South side tried to engage in unnecessary argument over the issue of the priorities in the order of discussing the issues. Under such circumstances, our side proposed, to avoid complications in the discussion of issues, that the plans for the formation of a single team

be unified into 10 articles based fundamentally on the plan put forward by the South side at the second round of talks.

The South side could not reject our broad-minded proposal and this laid the basis for smoothly discussing the plan for the formation of a single team. At the second round of talks, however, the South side made a so-called compromise proposal consisting of 10 articles and 42 paragraphs, an enlargement from the 10 articles and 35 paragraphs that had been proposed for the plan for the formation of a single team, and delayed the discussion of issues by making no concessions, not even on one letter, on the plan for the formation of a single team which the South side had prepared to its one-sided advantage.

The South side's maneuvers to delay the talks were also apparent as it attempted to deliberately set a later date for the talks under an absurd pretext. At the third round of talks held on 20 October last year, our side, concluding the talks, proposed that the date for the fourth round of talks be set for around 2 November, in an effort to expedite the discussion of issues for the formation and participation of the single team. However, the senior delegate of the South side proposed, putting forward a personal reason, that the fourth round of talks be held on 22 November, or, if this was rather late, not earlier than 15 November, thus insisting on putting off the talks until very late. Hence, the date for the fourth round of talks was set for 16 November, as long as two weeks later than we proposed.

The assertion of our side calling for the date for the talks as early as possible and the unjust attitude of the South side insisting on postponing the date for the talks to discuss the important matter for the nation for a personal reason plainly showed the distinctly different positions of the two sides over the North-South sports talks. Therefore, all the reporters who watched the process of the talks on that day commented that they saw once again the attitude of the South side lacking desire for the formation of a single team. The reporters from the South side even told the senior delegate of their side that they felt embarrassed when he tried to postpone the date for the talks.

The South side did not hesitate to openly overturn the agreements that had already been made, to delay the talks. In connection with the name of the single team, our side made a major concession at the second round of talks in an effort to conclude the discussion by any means and agreed to the spelling of the foreign term Korea, accepting the South side's proposal. At the fourth round of talks, our side made an epochal counterproposal that the name of the single team be made Korea in our alphabet as well so the pronunciation in our language would be Korea [korea], the same as in English.

At this, the South side, while saying that it respected our side for accepting the South side's proposal, avoided agreeing on the issue of the name of the single team, and, making an issue of a matter of no significance, insisted at the talks on that day that the spelling of the pronunciation of Korea [korea] in our alphabet be made Koria rather than Korea proposed by our side. At this, our side showed our broad-mindedness and accepted the South sides's proposal, thereby completely concluding, in fact, the discussion of the issue of the name of the single team.

Meanwhile, in the fifth round of the sports talks, the South side, suddenly claiming that an agreement should be made on the issue of Chinese spelling of the name of a single team, came up with a farfetched and unreasonable proposal that the two sides agree on the Chinese spelling of Korea as Karyea or Karyia and send it to the Organizing Committee of the Games, while doggedly insisting that other issues cannot be discussed without reaching an agreement on this issue first. We could not but regard this as a scheme to delay the sports talks, because the Chinese spelling is solely the right of the host country of the Asian Games, and because of the fact that it was proposed as a new issue after the discussions of the issue of the name of the single team were completely concluded.

However, despite the fact that such a proposal by the South side was unwarranted and unreasonable, proceeding from our desire to expedite the formation of a single team, in the sixth round of talks we put forward a proposal to decide the Chinese spelling of Korea as Koria or Koriya in Chinese characters which sounds similar to the intonation of Korea in English. However, the South side unconditionally rejected our reasonable proposal and refused to further discuss it in the talks. Thus, the South side intentionally evaded agreement on this issue while saying that it would study it after returning home.

Such being the situation, our side agreed to decide the Chinese spelling of Korea as Karia as called for by the South side in order not to delay the talks any longer. However, the South side insisted in using Karyea. When we agreed to this, showing generosity again, the South side tried to evade agreeing on this issue, babbling that it needed further studies on this and so forth.

Even in the discussion of the issue of selecting athletes, the South side assumed a very insincere attitude. When our side put forward a detailed proposal related to the selection of athletes in conformity with the characteristics of sports events in the first round of talks, the South side's senior delegate said that the South side's stand on the issue of selecting athletes was to discuss and to agree on only principle matters in the talks and to refer detailed matters to the joint organizations.

Proceeding from our desire to make progress in the talks we agreed the South side's demand for referring detailed matters on the selection of athletes to the joint committee for further discussion. However, the South side reversed its demand. In the fourth round of the talks the South side put forward a new revised proposal containing the various complicated ways of selecting athletes which included 18 paragraphs. In the new revised

proposal, the South side said: A concrete decision should be made on the issue of the selection of athletes in the full-dress talks. This is because, if the issue is not decided in a clear-cut manner, time will be wasted in discussing the issue in detail at the joint committee and the joint secretariat. Therefore, to make it easier to discuss the issue at the joint organizations, a concrete decision should be made on the issue of the selection of players at the full-dress talks.

The South side also insisted that the issue on the selection of athletes should be discussed at the full-dress talks, not at the joint committee. Like a thief crying stop thief, the South side preposterously tried to find fault with us, insisting that we failed to come up with a concrete proposal related to the selection of athletes.

The South side's insincere attitude was revealed most unscrupulously in the sixth round of talks, which was held on 20 December last year. At the talks, our side broad-mindedly consented to the South side's assertions on all of the issues which had been left unsettled, and, consequently, a complete agreement could be reached on the 10-point basic principle for the formation of a single team. So, when our side proposed to make public this fact to the world the South side was very embarrassed by this and doggedly insisted that no agreement had been concluded. The South side went so far as to perpetrate the act of picking a quarrel with us about the fact that our side fully accepted the South side's proposal for the formation and steering of the joint committee for a North-South single team, saying: Why does your side agree on it without reviewing it? What is the real purpose of agreeing on it so rapidly?

In this regard, our side's delegates questioned the South side, saying: Do you mean that our side's having accepted your side's proposal intact is a good thing? Or do you mean that it is a bad thing? At that time, acting like a man who has lost reason, the South side's chief delegate said: It is neither good nor bad. This made the site of the talks a scene of boisterous laughter.

Despite these persistent obstructionist maneuvers by the South side and as a result of our side's sincere efforts and unilateral concessions, a complete agreement was reached on the 10-point basic proposal for forming a single team and on the detailed rules for organizing and operating a joint committee for single team at the sixth talks on 22 December last year. Also, the two sides agreed that they would hold working-level contacts to draft the letter of agreement. They also agreed they would sign this letter at the seventh talks on 18 January this year, and that they would declare the birth of a single team to the world.

2. An agreement was reached on all the issues at the sixth talks. This was an unprecedented, significant event in the approximately 30-year history of the North-South sports talks. All fellow countrymen and all sportsmen in the North and South were happy over this, believing that the North and South would be able to form a single team and to participate in the 11th Asian Games as a North-South single team.

However, while feeling very uneasy when it failed to carry out its plan to break up the North-South sports talks late last year, the South side impudently and openly tried to openly break up the sports talks. At a press conference on 8 February, the chairman of the South Korean Olympic Committee said that a North-South single team would do more poorly in the games than if South Korea alone participated in the games. He also said that the formation of a single team may pose an obstacle to the South's goal of finishing second again in the Asian Games. This was reported by South Korea's HANGYORE SINMUN on 9 January 1990.

This is what the chairman of the South Korean Olympic Committee meant when he said that the formation of a single team could pose an obstacle. He said this two days before the fourth contact of working-level delegates, the first of the new year. What he said clearly shows that the South side did not think it was a good thing to form a single team. What he said is tantamount to instructions to the South side to break up the North-South sports talks at all costs. At his instruction, the South side put forth supplementary rules containing 37 clauses, which were not discussed at full-dress talks, at the fourth contact of working delegates on 10 January, a week before the seventh full-dress talks in which the two sides were scheduled to sign the letter of agreement and to declare the birth of single team at home and abroad. The South side also said that unless this was discussed first, no letter of agreement could be drafted and signed. This was an open maneuver to break up the sports talks.

All of the clauses in the supplementary rules, which the South side put forth, were not issues that had anything to do with the formation of a single team or that the two sides had agreed to discuss at a joint committee. In the supplementary rules, the South side put forth the issues of exchanging goodwill games and exchanging facility inspection teams. In reality, both issues are issues concerning North-South sports exchanges and have nothing to do with the formation of a single team. However, the South side insisted that such sports exchanges take place before a joint committee for a single team is formed. The South side previously proposed forming and operating a joint committee before 15 February. Meanwhile, the exchange of goodwill games and facility inspection teams and other forms of sports exchanges have not taken place at all. However, the South side proposed that goodwill games and facility inspection teams be exchanged within a month. This proposal could in no way be fulfilled.

Almost all of the other clauses in the supplementary rules, including schedules for joint training; ratio of athletes; how and when tryouts will be held; the issue of exchanges of spectators, reporters, and suite members for tryouts; and means of transportation for athletes and spectators, are issues that it had been agreed would be discussed at the joint committee after this committee is

organized. This is a fact that the delegates of the South side previously admitted, too.

A delegate of the South side said at the eighth talks: The issue of mechanism to guarantee the implementation of the agreement is not an issue that can be discussed in the full-dress talks but must be discussed at the joint committee. Because the issue of meeting a schedule, contained in the supplementary rules, is also mentioned in the detailed rules on the operation of the joint committee, this issue can be discussed in the joint committee. Therefore, this issue is not important.

Moreover, the supplementary rules, which the South side put forth, contains a proposal that a letter be sent to the 11th Asian Games Organizing Committee and the Olympic Council of Asia that says that the two sides will participate in the games as separate teams if it is difficult to form a single team because of unavoidable circumstances. The South side advanced this proposal in the belief that the talks on the formation of a single team would break down. In this way, the South side made a mockery of the talks. This is also a betrayal of fellow countrymen's earnest desire for a single team.

In the other words, the so-called supplementary rules that the South side came up with at the fourth round of working-level delegate contact as the precondition for arranging the text of a written agreement were not the guarantee mechanism for the implementation of agreements as the South side asserted, but the guarantee mechanism for the nonimplementation of agreements. They were also not practical steps to show the will of the South side to form a single team, but were a damping mechanism to frustrate the formation of a single team. In this connection, logically refuting the South side's unwarranted supplementary rules our side urged the South side to withdraw the rules at once and to immediately start arranging not only the text of a written agreement on the 10-point basic principle for the formation of a single team, but also the text of a written agreement for the formation of a joint body for the promotion of a single team and the detailed procedures for steering the body as already agreed upon by the two sides.

However, the South side persistently urged discussing the supplementary rules first, slandering the 10-point agreement—the basic agreement for the formation and participation of a single team, which was agreed upon after more than 10 months of discussion and the spending of much time and effort. The South side did this by babbling that the agreement was an empty agreement and so forth.

South Korean reporters, who witnessed such an attitude on the part of the South Korean delegates toward the sports talks in Panmunjom, wrote articles criticizing them. Their articles said: The South side is taking pains over how long it should continue the sports talks. It has been put into in a serious dilemma in deciding on how long it should continue the talks, that is to say, until the time when a written agreement is signed, the time when a joint committee is formed, or the time when the joint training of athletes is started.

Even people from all walks of life in South Korea raised their voices in protest and condemnation against the South side delegates for having tried to apply the brakes to the sports talks for forming a single team under the pretext of the supplementary rules.

The South side, which frustrated two rounds of full-dress sports talks, later more unscrupulously laid bare to the world its real intention to break up the talks. Two days after the eighth round of talks, on 31 January the South Korean sports minister, in an official briefing session, stressed that South Korea would participate in the Asian Games in September as a separate team and would make all efforts to win the second place in the games. Moreover, as Radio Seoul reported on 31 January 1990, the highest person in authority of South Korea supported this.

Such remarks by the high-ranking official who is said to be in charge of sports in South Korea were the reflection of the stand of the South side which no longer wanted to hold the talks for forming a single team and were tantamount to a virtual open declaration of the rupture of the North-South sports talks for the formation of a single team.

All of these facts showed that, unless the unwarranted stand of the South side which does not want to form a single team changes, no more progress can be expected in the talks. Proceeding from a desire to promote the deadlocked North-South sports talks and to form a single team at any cost, our side put the following three-point demand of principle to the South side at the ninth round of talks on 7 February:

First, the two sides confirm and declare at home and abroad that they would never go to the 11th Asian Games as separate teams but participate in the games as a single team under no matter what the circumstances.

Second, the South side admits that it has delayed the formation of a single team by coming up with issues which have nothing to do with the talks and issues which the two sides agreed to discuss at the joint committee and totally withdraw the supplementary rules.

Third, the remarks of sports officials of the South side that they would go to the 11th Asian Games as a separate team be revoked.

This three-point demand of principle of our side was a reasonable demand which could have been met easily by the South side, if it had been willing to form a single team. The South side, however, categorically rejected our just demand and, consequently, the ninth round of talks had to end without setting the date of the next round of talks. As soon as the ninth round of talks ended the South side, as if it had been waiting for its rupture, held a press conference in Panmunjom and quickly

declared the rupture of the talks. On 8 February the chairman of the South Korean Olympic committee declared the rupture of the talks as an established fact.

Later, far from affirmatively responding to the telephone messages that our side sent on 12 February and 19 February urging it to correct its wrong stand and attitude and to return to the road of forming a single team, the South side still stopped at nothing to evade responsibility for the rupture of the talks. The sports talks, having been driven to a crisis of rupture, and the formation of a single team, having met the danger of frustration in the final stage where the birth of a single team could have been declared, have been hindered solely because of the maneuvers of the South side's delegates. These delegates, since the first stage of the sports talks, have consistently attempted by all means to frustrate the formation of a single team following the directions of the South Korean authorities, none of whom want to form a single team.

The reason is clear why the South side intends to bring the talks to a rupture by opposing the formation of a single team and to go to the 11th Asian Games as a separate team. It is because the delegation of the South Korean Olympic Committee follows the wrong policy of the people in authority in South Korea—people who have opposed national reunification, sought a permanent division of the country, and tried to create a favorable conditions for the two Koreas plot through the northern policy.

The formation of a single team between the North and the South and the participation in international sports games as a single team is a way for national unity and reconciliation and is directly related to national reunification. If a single team is formed, the misunderstanding and distrust which have accumulated between the North and the South almost over half a century can be eliminated, a new era of genuine reconciliation and unity can be opened, and the spirit of reunification can be enhanced among the South Korean people.

The people in authority of South Korea who do not want this strictly instructed the South Korean Olympic Committee to continue the sports talks but not to agree on the formation of a single team and, thus, maneuvered behind the scenes the delegation of the South side all along. Despite strong protest and condemnation from the nation and sportsmen, the delegation of the South Korean Olympic Committee has advanced along the road of bringing the sports talks to a rupture and frustrating the formation of a single team in accordance with the criminal two Koreas policy of the South Korean authorities.

By frustrating the formation of a single team according to the instructions of the authorities the South Korean Olympic Committee has committed the crime of violating the sacred sportsmanship and the Olympic Charter and involving insidious politics in sports.

The formation of a single team between the North and the South and their joint participation in the 11th Asian Games is the urgent desire of all the nation and sportsmen. Also, it is the lofty national task that sportsmen in the North and the South have shouldered.

We will make sincere and patient efforts to form a single team until the last day before the 11th Beijing Asian Games are opened. The problem is that the South side should not follow the South Korean authorities' two Koreas policy, should return to the intrinsic stand of sports, and, thus, should assume the sincere attitude of trying to form a single team.

The South side should immediately accept the three-point demand of principle which we raised at the ninth round of full-dress talks and come to the 10th round of talks, if it is really interested in the formation of a single North-South team. If the South side persistently continues to advance along the road of frustrating the formation of a single team despite our side's repeated demands and the strong protest and condemnation of people at home and abroad, it will have to bear all consequences that arise therefrom and will not be able to escape the justice of history.

We express the firm belief that the peace-loving people of the world, sports organizations of all countries, and international sports organizations will, as ever, positively support our just position and efforts for the formation of a single North-South team.

[Dated] 14 March 1990, Pyongyang

No's Reunification Remarks 'Absolute Baloney'

SK1703041590 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0409 GMT 17 Mar 90

["Foolish Blast of Anti-Reunification Element"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang March 17 (KCNA)—The traitor No Tae-u, speaking at a "luncheon" on March 14, blared that reunification is "by no means a question to be solved with illusion and passion alone" and one should "not hastily try to solve it," according to a report.

This is an absolute baloney of the anti-reunification element for throwing a wet blanket over the entire fellow countrymen's ardent desire for reunification.

This balderdash going against the desire of the entire fellow countrymen who want to achieve national reunification at an early date brings to full light the traitor No's true color as a rare-to-be-seen traitor and anti-reunification element.

No wonder such anti-reunification outbursts roll off the tongue of the enemy of the nation who does not want reunification as a dyed-in-the-wool flunkeyist traitor clinging to the coattails of his U.S. imperialist master to prolong his remaining days.

No's Remarks on Labor Disputes Denounced

SK1703050190 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0425 GMT 17 Mar 90

["Outburst To Stifle Labor Movement"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang March 17 (KCNA)—The traitor No Tae-u was reported to have said at a function in "Chongwadae" attended by top officials of the subsidized "General Federation of Trade Unions" of South Korea on March 15 that he would "daringly deal with unlawful and violent acts and interference in labour-management disputes by outside forces."

This reveals his sinister intention to browbeat the workers into giving up their complaints and resistance against his group's harsh misrule and stifle the ever-growing labor movement in South Korea.

It is also a threat and blackmail to justify his group's fascist crackdown on the patriotic forces advocating independence, democracy and reunification and block the solidarity struggle of the broad democratic forces and the workers under the pretext of "prevention of the interference of outside forces."

The fascist group intends to intensify suppression of the workers by shifting the blame for economic crisis on to the workers. In this it seeks to prolong its dirty remaining days by ensuring conditions to American and other transnational enterprises and comprador capitalists for larger profits.

ROK Cabinet Changes Termed 'Tricky Drama'

SK1803084590 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0810 GMT 18 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 18 (KCNA)—The traitor No Tae-u Saturday carried out the first "Cabinet reshuffle" after the emergence of the grand conservative alliance through the merger of three parties under the manipulation and patronage of the U.S. imperialists, according to a radio report from Seoul.

He replaced "heads" of 15 ministries and agencies including the puppet deputy prime minister and minister of the economic planning board, leaving the others in their posts.

As for those who took the posts of "ministers" through the reshuffle, they are all faithful vassals of the traitor No Tae-u or those who had played roles in maintaining the puppet regime in the past.

Newly-appointed "Home Minister" An Ung-mo had made himself infamous with man-killing in the police and the "Security Planning Board" and "minister of justice" Yi Chong-nam had punished many patriotic people on false "charges" during his office as "prosecutor general."

New "minister of unification board" Hong Song-chol had thrown himself with enthusiasm into the suppression of the patrioic forces aspiring after independence, democracy and reunification and into the scheme to create "two Koreas" as "home minister" in the period of "Yusin" and as "chief secretary of the president" of late.

What is something rare in the "reshuffle" is that he granted such secondary posts as "minister of agriculture, forestry and fisheries" and "minister of public health and social welfare" to the Kim Yong-sam group, and "minister of power and resources" to the Kim Chong-pil group, in recognition of their "feats" in the grand conservative alliance.

It is nothing but a scheme to seek "stability" within the "Democratic Liberal Party" which consists of sundry factions and, further, maintain "power security" on this bases.

In a nutshell, facts show that the traitor No Tae-u's "Cabinet shake-up" is no more than a tricky drama for strengthening the long-term office structure through the one-party fascist dictatorship.

Dailies Comment on No's Cabinet Reshuffle

SK1903064090 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0556 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 19 (KCNA)—Papers in Pyongyang describe the first "Cabinet reshuffle" in South Korea following the "political restructuring" through the merger of three parties as a farce to strengthen the dictatorial system.

This "Cabinet shake-up" is, in essence, part of the moves to save the serious political and economic crisis the dictatorial "regime" is facing like the previous "reshuffles" carried out by the traitor No Tae-u on several occasions, a news analyst of NODONG SINMUN says, and continues:

The "reshuffle" is nothing but a stopgap measure to win public favour by changing some "ministers" in charge of economic affairs, shifting the blame for the present economic crisis on those removed and pretending to do something to boost the economy facing bankrupcy.

A few persons from the defunct "Reunification Democratic Party" and "New Democratic Republican Party" are among the "new ministers." This is intended to create the impression that the "Democratic Liberal Party regime" has some new aspects and bind to the dictatorship mechanism the political charlatans who have been drawn into it through the three-party merger. In a nutshell, the "reshuffle" clearly shows that there is no change in the pro-American, fascist and splittist nature of the No Tae-u "regime" and, accordingly, there is nothing to be expected from it.

A signed commentary of MINJU CHOSON sunday writes that the puppets' attempt to describe the "shake-up" as a measure to tide over the economic crisis is an

artifice to mislead public opinion at home and abroad by replacing some "ministers" with others and shifting on to them the blame for the hopeless crisis of the South Korean economy.

ROK National Assembly Session Criticized

SK1803084990 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0815 GMT 18 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 18 (KCNA)—The 148th extraordinary session of the puppet National Assembly, which opened on February 20 with the opposition "assemblymen" walking out, closed on March 16 also in their absence, according to reports from Seoul.

The opposition walk-out is attributable to the one-party show of the grand conservative coalition.

The No Tae-u military fascist clique which framed up the "Democratic Liberal Party" (DLP) by absorbing the Kim Yong-sam and Kim Chong-pil factions turned the "extraordinary National Assembly" session into a lever for cementing their fascist dictatorial system.

At the session they put aside major disputed problems regarding the "National Security Law" and the Kwangju problem and forcibly passed package "bills" aimed at strengthening the structure of fascist one-party dictatorship.

For example, they railroaded through the "defence committee" of the "National Assembly" by surprise, in disregard of objection by the opposition party side, a "bill on the amendment to the law on the ROK army organization" aimed at using the puppet army more effectively as cannon fodder of U.S. imperialism for aggression and at reducing it further to a tool of fascist suppression. On the last day of the plenary session of the "National Assembly" they unilaterally passed 20 "laws," motions and "resolutions" after the opposition "assemblymen" left the hall.

This arbitrariness suggests how blatantly the No Tae-u military fascist clique will turn the "National Assembly" into an appendage to the structure of one-party dictatorship in the future.

ROK's Party Coalition Reportedly in 'Crisis'

SK1903101890 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1003 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 19 (KCNA)—The "Democratic Liberal Party" (DLP) made up of the "Democratic Justice Party" of No Tae-u, the "Reunification Democratic Party" of Kim Yong-sam and the "New Democratic Republican Party" of Kim Chong-pil with No's party as its core finds itself in a crisis in the face of the strong opposition of the people, stresses NODONG SINMUN in a signed article today.

The article reads in part:

If the "DLP" is to mitigate the opposition of the people, if only a little, it should pursue a policy in compliance with the demand of the people for independence, democracy and reunification. But, it is taking the opposite road behind the facade of "democracy, prosperity and reunification."

At a recent meeting with brasshats of the U.S. military, the traitor No Tae-u opposed even the cutback of the U.S. troops, not to speak of their withdrawal, and begged for a permanent occupation of South Korea by them. This shows that the "DLP" ignores the national demand of the people, interested only in maintaining the U.S. colonial domination.

No Tae-u, Kim Yong-sam and Kim Chong-pil, bosses of the "DLP," agreed to leave intact the "National Security Law," the notorious anti-communist fascist law, and harshly repress the labour movement under the pretext of "industrial peace."

As far as the reunification question is concerned, the "DLP" is carrying forward the separatist policy of the "Democratic Justice Party."

While talking about "free travel" and "opening" they do not utter a word about the removal of the concrete wall. They are bent on painting South Korea, a colony, as an "independent state" and having "two Koreas" legitimized internationally by winning the "recognition" of socialist countries through their "northern policy."

The future of the "DLP" is gloomy with an intra-party strife for the helm of the party and for power.

It is foreseen that after the "constitutional revision," the factional strife within the "DLP" will get more acute surrounding the posts of "prime minister" and "president" under the "parliamentary cabinet system."

No Tae-u, Kim Yong-sam and Kim Chong-pil, the scum of history, got aboard the same boat and heaved up the anchor for greater power, but their prospect is dark.

Radio Reports Jiang Zemin's Message of Thanks

SK1603124490 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 1200 GMT 16 Mar 90

[Message of thanks from General Secretary Comrade Jiang Zemin to the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song after the former left the DPRK]

[Text] Pyongyang.

To the respected Comrade Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea:

While successfully ending my goodwill visit to your country, I, on behalf of myself and all the Chinese comrades who accompanied me, express lofty thanks to you and through you to your party Central Committee and to the fraternal Korean people.

The enthusiastic and grand welcome and kind hospitality your party and people accorded us during our first visit to Korea have left unforgettable impressions upon me and made us deeply feel once again the profound sentiments of friendship of the Korean party and people toward the Chinese people.

I am convinced that the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between China and Korea are sure to be further consolidated and developed by the joint efforts of our two sides.

I sincerely wish the Korean people continued fresh success in the socialist construction and in the struggle for the independent and peaceful reunification of the country.

[Signed] Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CPC

[Dated] 16 Mar 1990

NODONG SINMUN Lauds Jiang Zemin's Visit

SK1803050590 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 0010 GMT 18 Mar 90

[NODONG SINMUN 17 March editorial: "The Peoples of the Two Countries of Korea and China Will Struggle Together Under the Banner of Socialism"]

[Text] Invited by the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Workers Party of Korea Central Committee, Comrade Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, made an official friendship visit to our country 14-16 March.

Esteemed Comrade Jiang Zemin came to our country on his first trip abroad after assuming the heavy responsibility as the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee thanks to the lofty trust that the CPC members and people have in him. As an expression of the exceptional trust and friendship of the CPC and Chinese people toward our party and people, the visit demonstrated the firm and unwavering will and determination of Comrade Jiang Zemin and the CPC to value and to keep in bloom the Korean-Chinese friendship, which the leaders of the two countries have arranged and cultivated together.

Our people warmly welcomed Comrade Jiang Zemin, who came with the fraternal Chinese people's warm friendship in his heart. This was a beautiful painting that showed how deep our people's trust in the CPC and Chinese people is. It also showed how wonderfully the Korean-Chinese friendship, which is being inherited from generation to generation, blossoms and develops.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song and esteemed Comrade Jiang Zemin held talks on many occasions. In the talks, which were held in a comradely, serious, and cordial atmosphere, the two leaders discussed how to further strengthen and develop the traditional Korean-Chinese friendship and matters of mutual concerns.

During his stay in our country, Comrade Jiang Zemin inspected plants, cultural institutions, and facilities and met with our country's party and state leaders. Comrade Jiang Zemin's visit to our country was successfully carried out. It served as an important opportunity for furthering the amity and friendly ties between the party and state leaders of Korea and China, and it helped expand and develop the friendship between the two parties and two peoples to new heights.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has stated: The peoples of Korea and China have long identified their fate with that of the other, have shared life and death, well-being and hardships in the struggle against their common enemies, and they have cherished their sense of obligation and deepened their comradely friendship as revolutionary comrades-in-arms. Korea and China are close neighbors standing with a river between them, and the peoples of the two countries are the class brothers and revolutionary comrades-in-arms who have thrown their lot with each other for victory of the socialist cause.

As demonstrated by the modern history of the two peoples, the revolutionaries and peoples of our two countries have fought together on the soil of China and Korea. In addition, they have fought together against the Japanese and U.S. imperialists. They also have maintained close mutual support and cooperation in the struggle for socialist construction.

The Korean-Chinese friendship is one that has been sealed in blood in the flames of grave revolutionary struggles. This indomitable friendship, with its unyielding and firm roots, has overcome ordeals of historical proportions. In particular, it is a noble friendship that has been provided and is being inherited from generation to generation by the leaders of the two countries. Thus, the rays of Korean-Chinese friendship emanate as an everlasting friendship—a friendship that becomes more solid and stronger with each passing day without wavering in the face of adversity.

This time around, the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song and esteemed Comrade Jiang Zemin expressed great satisfaction with the Korean-Chinese friendship. They empshasized that this valuable friendship, which is blossoming and developing with each passing day, needs to be further strengthen and developed in a way that suits the common aspirations and desire of the peoples of the two countries, as well as the demands of the socialist cause and the cause of peace. This infinitely pleases the peoples of the two countries of Korea and China.

Our people highly value the fact that the fraternal Chinese people have been successfully pressing ahead with the building of modernized socialism. The Chinese people, under the leadership of the CPC with Comrade Jiang Zemin at the center, have maintained the four cardinal principles and carried out reforms and openness. Our people wholeheartedly wish the Chinese people new success in their struggle to implement the decisions made at the 13th CPC Congress and the fifth

and sixth plenary meetings of the 13th party Central Committee. At the same time, our people fully support the Chinese people in their struggle to reunify the entire country according to the one-state-two-system policy.

The Chinese people sincerely rejoice over the great successes our people have made in socialist construction under the wise leadership of the party and by firmly rallying around the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song. The Chinese people fully support our respected and beloved leader's new proposal for reunification,as well as his call on the United States to withdraw all of its troops and military facilities from South Korea and to discontinue committing acts that may exacerbate the tense situation on the Korean peninsula.

Mutual support and solidarity as such is a powerful manifestation of the might of the Korean-Chinese friendship.

Comrade Jiang Zemin's current visit to our country was made at a time when the peoples of Korea and China are invariably and vigorously advancing along the socialist path under the leadership of their parties, while resolutely defending the socialist principles.

From their life experiences, the peoples of Korea and China are fully convinced that only socialism can firmly ensure the popular masses' position as the genuine masters of the nation and society and bring them true happiness and a rewarding life. Motivated by this, the peoples of the two countries are now firmly defending and safeguarding socialism, which they have chosen freely and which they have defended in blood in the face of all manner of vicious slander and detraction by the reactionaries. While continuing to defend socialism, the people of the two countries vigorously blaze the socialist trail on the basis of their overflowing conviction and rosy view of the world. As stated by the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song and esteemed Comrade Jiang Zemin, the peoples of the two countries of Korea and China will keep advancing along the socialist path without the slightest hesitation, no matter how complicated or grave the situation.

The great successes attained in revolution and construction by the Chinese and Korean peoples, who maintain a firm faith in socialism, are a great encouragement to revolutionary people desire socialism. These successes also serve as a telling blow to the imperialist reactionaries, who intensify subversion and aggressive maneuvers while maliciously belittling socialism.

Indeed, the meaningful meeting the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song just held with esteemed Comrade Jiang Zemin in Pyongyang, following the former's heartwarming meeting last year in Beijing with the Chinese party and state leaders, is an event of historical significance. The meeting is important in the ceaseless consolidation and development of the Korean-Chinese friendship along with the energetic advance of the peoples of the two countries. It also is important for supporting and developing the people's anti-imperialist and pro-socialist cause, as well as their desire for independence.

Forever, our people, united around the party and leader as one, will struggle and advance hand in hand with the fraternal Chinese people for the implementation of their common cause against imperialism and for socialist construction. The fraternal friendship and unity between the parties and peoples of Korea and China will be eternal and invincible.

Provincial Delegates Depart on Visit to PRC

SK1603113490 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1034 GMT 16 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 16 (KCNA)—A friendship delegation of North Pyongan Province headed by Yom Chae-man, chairman of the North Pyongan Provincial Administration and Economic Guidance Committee, left today to visit Liaoning Province of China.

Delegations Head to USSR, Bulgaria, Sri Lanka

SK1903104290 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1033 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 19 (KCNA)—A delegation of the hydro-meteorological service of the DPRK headed by its director, Yi Kon-il, left here today for a visit to the Soviet Union, a delegation of the Korean Buddhists Federation headed by Chairman of its Central Committee Pak Tae-ho to Sri Lanka and a delegation of the Korean Medical Association headed by Vice-Chairman of its Central Committee Hong Song-kap to Bulgaria.

Yang Hyong-sop Congratulates USSR's Lukyanov

SK1903060090 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0538 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 19 (KCNA)—Yang Hyong-sop, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, sent a message of greetings to Anatoiy Ivanovich Lukyanov upon his election as president of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The message expresses the belief that the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation existing between the supreme power organs of the two countries will further strengthen and develop.

Soviet Reception Marks Agreement's Anniversary

SK1703041390 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0407 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 17 (KCNA)—A reception was given at the Soviet Embassy here Friday on the occasion of the 41st anniversary of the signing of the agreement on economic and cultural cooperation between the USSR and the DPRK.

Kim Tal-hyon, chairman of the External Economy Commission, Yi Chong-yul, minister of public health and

chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean-Soviet Friendship Society, Choe Su-hon, vice-minister of foreign affairs, Kwon Hyok-pong, vice-minister of culture and art, O Mun-han, vice-chairman of the committee for cultural relations with foreign countries, and other officials concerned were present on invitation.

Charge d'affaires ad interim of the Soviet Embassy Boris Morozov and embassy officials were on hand.

Speeches were exchanged at the reception.

A film show and a cocktail party were hosted by the Soviet consulate general in Chongjin on the occasion.

Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam Heads to Namibia

SK1703112790 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1047 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 17 (KCNA)—Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam left here today to attend the independence function of Namibia as a special envoy of the great leader President Kim Il-song.

He was seen off at the airport by First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok-chu and Chinese Ambassador to Korea Wen Yezhan.

Kim Il-song Sends Message to Tunisia's Ben Ali

SK1903103690 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1030 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 19 (KCNA)—President Kim Il-song of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on March 19 sent a message of greetings to Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, president of the Republic of Tunisia, on the occasion of the national day of Tunisia.

Expressing the belief that the friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries will grow stronger, the message sincerely wishes the Tunisian president greater success in his work for the democratic development and prosperity of the country.

Kim Chong-il Sends Replies to Foreign Leaders

SK1603113990 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1009 GMT 16 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 16 (KCNA)—Dear Comrade Kim Chong-il sent messages to foreign party and state leaders in reply to their messages of greetings on his birthday.

He sent reply messages to His Royal Highness Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, president of Kampuchea; Mohamed Abdelaziz, president of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic and secretary general of the Polisario Front; Yasir 'Arafat, president of the state of Palestine and chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization; Muhammad Husni Mubarak, president of the Arab Republic of Egypt; Didier Ratsiraka, president of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar; Blaise Compaore, chairman of the People's Front, head of state and head of the government of Burkina Faso; France Albert Rene, president of the Republic of Seychelles; and Mengistu Haile-Mariam, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia and president of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

In his messages, Comrade Kim Chong-il expressed deep thanks to the party and state leaders of different countries for their warm and kind messages of greetings.

Expressing the belief that the friendly and cooperative relations between the parties and peoples of Korea and the above-said countries will grow stronger and develop in the future, he wished them great success in their work.

He also sent reply messages to Raul Castro Ruz, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba; Rif'at al-Mahgub, speaker of the People's Assembly of the Arab Republic of Egypt; Celestino Rocha Da Costa, prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe; and Jose Ramon Fernandez, vice-president of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba.

Korean Democratic Women's Union Meeting Held

SK1503110390 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1024 GMT 15 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 15 (KCNA)—The 12th plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Korean Democratic Women's Union (KDWU) was held here over March 13-14.

Discussed at the meeting were tasks facing the KDWU organizations in vigorously pushing forward an all-people movement to increase production and practice economies at maximum in the same fighting spirit as was displayed in the period of the grand chollima upsurge and thus effecting a great revolutionary upswing once again in socialist construction, in hearty response to the New Year address of the great leader President Kim Il-song and the decisions of the 17th plenary meeting of the Sixth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea.

LSWYK Plenary Meeting Held in Pyongyang

SK1403101090 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0959 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 14 (KCNA)—The 16th plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Socialist Working Youth of Korea [LSWYK] was held in Pyongyang on March 12 and 13.

Discussed at the meeting were tasks of LSWYK organisations to improve and strengthen the organisational and ideological life of its members and the question of strengthening the ideological education of the youth and students by enhancing the function and role of the university organisations of the LSWYK.

The meeting noted that officials of the LSWYK must keep to the organisational and ideological work of the league and closely combine economic activities with the work.

Stressing that what is important in conducting the ideological education of the league members in a substantial way is to prepare the youths as dependable young vanguards of the Workers' Party of Korea firmly armed with the chuche idea, the revolutionary idea of our party, the meeting presented concrete measures to this end.

The meeting pointed out that the political and ideological education should be strengthened among students in order to bring them up as genuine revolutionary personnel devotedly struggling for the party and the revolution, for the homeland and people.

Relevant resolutions were adopted at the meeting.

Thermal Power Plant Construction Progressing

SK1703043890 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0417 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang March 17 (KCNA)—The construction of the December thermal power plant is progressing at a fast speed.

It will supply power mainly to the two million ton steel plant now under construction in Kangson area, a major steel production district of Korea.

The builders have finished in the main the groundwork of the boiler and generator rooms and the construction of the chemical refinery, the generator control room and the coal storage in a short span of time.

They have completed the ten odd km railway bed between the Kangso district coal mining complex and the plant.

They are shortening the period of the project by introducing new building methods. In the assembly of the equipment of boilers, for instance, the daily quotas are overfulfilled by 20 percent.

The generating equipment for the power plant is provided by the Taean heavy machine complex.

SKNDF Representative in Syria Interviewed

SK1403102990 (Clandestine) Voice of National Salvation in Korean to South Korea 0300 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] In an interview with a PANA news agency reporter on 25 February, Pak Kwang-ki, representative of the South Korean National Democratic Front [SKNDF] mission in Syria, recently disclosed the deceitful nature of the United States in closing down its three U.S. Air Force bases in Korea and of gradually withdrawing its 2,000 non-combatant personnel.

Representative Pak indicated that this was a strategy to misinform the people of the world, to continue to maintain the U.S. troops in Korea, and to further strengthen the U.S. and Korean forces.

He also revealed that the reason the United States is recently spreading rumors that the U.S. troops are going to be withdrawn from Korea is a deceitful propaganda to effectively deal with the recent situation among the Korean people who have enhanced the anti-U.S. sentiments and who desire detente and disarmament.

Representative Pak claimed that the United States have nothing to expect in the discussions on the issue of disarmament [as heard] and indicated that the Korean people must not delay the anti-U.S. struggle.

South Korea

No Tae-u Replaces 15 of 28 Cabinet Ministers

SK1703014690 Seoul YONHAP in English 0128 GMT 17 Mar 90

[By Hong Sang-pyo]

[Text] Seoul, March 17 (YONHAP)—President No Tae-u replaced 15 of the 28 ministers in the South Korean Cabinet, including the deputy prime minister, on Saturday in the first major reshuffle of his government since the merger of the ruling and two opposition parties into the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) last month.

DLP Rep. Yi Sung-yun, a former finance minister and a strong advocate of growth-first economic policy, was named deputy prime minister and economic planning minister. He succeeds Cho Sun, a proponent of the stability-oriented school of thought who had held the economic portfolio for 18 months.

An Ung-mo, first deputy director of the Agency for National Security Planning [NSP], was made home minister, succeeding Kim Tae-ho, and Chong Yong-ui, superintendent of the Board of Securities Supervision, became finance minister, replacing Yi Kyu-song.

Former Prosecutor-General Yi Chong-nam was named justice minister and DLP Rep. Chong Tong-song the new sports minister.

Prime Minister Kang Yong-hun retained his post along with NSP Director So Tong-kwon and 11 other Cabinet members, including Foreign Minister Choe Ho-chung, Education Minister Chong Won-sik, Information Minister Choe Pyong-yol and First State Minister for Political Affairs Pak Chol-on, Presidential Spokesman Yi Su-chong announced.

It was the second largest Cabinet reshuffle since No took office in February 1988.

No also reorganized his secretariat, replacing Presidential Secretary-General Hong Sung-chol with No Chae-pong, special presidential adviser for politics and former

political scientist at Seoul National University. Hong moves to national unification minister, succeeding Yi Hong-ku, who was given No's post of presidential adviser.

Rep. Yi Hui-il, a DLP lawmaker from Kim Chong-pil's former party and agriculture, fisheries minister under President Pak Chong-hui, was brought in as energy and resources minister while Pak Pil-su, president of Hanguk University of Foreign Studies and a former economic technocrat, was appointed trade and industry minister, replacing Han Sung-su. Yi Hui-il succeeds Yi Pong-su as Energy and Resources Minister.

No named Rep. Kang Po-song and Rep. Kim Chong-su, DLP lawmakers from Kim Yong-sam's former opposition party, agriculture, forestry and fisheries minister and health and social affairs minister, respectively. Kang and Kim succeeded Kim Sik and Kim Chong-in, who was made senior presidential secretary for economic affairs, replacing Mun Hui-kap, who resigned the post to run in a by-election in Taegu against independent Chong Ho-yong.

Kim Chang-sik, secretary-general of the Advisory Council for Peaceful Unification Policy and a former vice home minister, was named transportation minister, succeeding Kim Chang-kun, and Yi Yun-taek, senior presidential secretary for administrative affairs, was named government administration minister, replacing Kim Yong-nae.

Chong Kun-mo, a nuclear scientist who heads the Korea Science Foundation, was made minister of science and technology, replacing Yi Sang-hui, while Yi Kye-sun, president of the Federation of Korean Women Voters, a social organization, became second state minister for political affairs with special responsibility for policies on women. Yi replaces Kim Yong-chong.

Choe Sang-yop, deputy prosecutor-general, was appointed legislation minister, replacing Hyon Hong-chu, who is expected to be given an ambassadorship.

Announcing the roster of the new Cabinet, presidential spokesman Yi Su-chong said the reshuffle was designed to "renovate the atmosphere for state affairs and actively push forward with a policy that the people want on the solid foundation of the political realignment."

No's replacement of eight of his 11 economy-related ministers—retaining only the construction, labor and communications ministers—reflects No's determination to revive the sluggish economy and may indicate a basic policy change from Cho's accent on stability, analysts said.

Yi also said, "President No has especially taken into consideration the view that the government should concentrate all its efforts on overcoming the current economic difficulty and instil cooperation between the economic ministries to effectively carry out economic policy."

No replaced the security-related home and justice ministers in order to signal that he will get tough on crime, which has become a major national problem and is causing mounting public uneasiness over the government's apparent inability to halt a wave of crimes, they said.

Five ministers, including the new deputy premier, were recruited from the DLP, indicating the party will retain its strong influence on the government, the analysts said.

No carried out his first Cabinet revamp in Dec. 5, 1988, when 20 ministers, including the prime minister, were replaced. The second was July 19, when he replaced the NSP director, as the result of public outrage over a series of unauthorized visits by South Koreans to North Korea, and seven other Cabinet ministers. No filled four newly created Cabinet posts in January this year.

In addition, former lawmaker Hyon Kyong-dae was named secretary-general of the Advisory Council for Peaceful Unification Policy, a non-Cabinet post.

Seoul Mayor Ko Kun, a political appointee who is not a Cabinet member but attends Cabinet meetings, retained his post.

The Cabinet reorganization will be followed by a shakeup of vice-ministerial posts and the presidential secretariat, spokesman Yi said.

No, who is out of Seoul on a weekend retreat, met with his two co-leaders in the DLP, Kim Yong-sam and Kim Chong-pil, on Saturday morning to explain the reshuffle, Yi said.

Ministers kept on include Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun, Construction Minister Kwon Yong-kak, Labor Minister Choe Yong-chol, Communications Minister Yi U-chae, Culture Minister Yi O-ryong, Environmental Minister Cho Kyong-sik and Patriots and Veterans Affairs Minister Yi Sang-yon.

YONHAP Profiles Ministers

SK1703074590 Seoul YONHAP in English 0654 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Seoul, March 17 (YONHAP)—Rep. Yi Sung-yun, vaulted into the limelight as South Korea's new top economic planner by a Cabinet reshuffle Saturday, is considered a strong advocate of the growth-oriented policy that brought about Korea's economic takeoff in the 1960s and 1970s.

The 59-year-old three-term lawmaker was chief policymaker of the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) until it was dissolved and replaced by the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) in a political realignment last month and was finance minister under former President Chon Tu-hwan.

Yi was a professor at Seoul's Sogang University and has a doctorate in economics from University of Wisconsin, the United States.

He champions a policy of "fair distribution of wealth through growth," suggesting that Korea's new deputy prime minister may shift policy emphasis to growth from well-being, price stability and equitable distribution of wealth.

New Home Minister An Ung-mo, 60, a self-made bureaucrat who began his career as a policeman, has been deputy director of the Agency for National Security Planning, national police chief and governor of South Chungchong Province. He also was Chon's senior secretary for political affairs.

Yi Chong-nam, 54, the new justice minister, earned his laurels as the head of the Supreme Prosecutors Office by tactfully handling investigations into allegations that there were large-scale financial irregularities during Chon's rule.

Replacing the security-related home and justice ministers is seen as an expression of No's firm determination to get a handle on a crime wave that has got the public worried.

Chong Yong-ui, 59, the new finance minister, was a technocrat in the finance ministry for 27 years until being shifted from vice finance minister to governor of the Korea Development Bank (KDB) in 1988.

He has headed the Board of Securities Supervision since January and he has a reputation for his planning ability.

New Trade and Industry Minister Pak Pil-su, president of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, was one of the economic technocrats who spearheaded the export-driven policies of President Pak Chong-hui. He served as assistant trade and industry minister before he became director of the Korea Monopoly Office, now the Korea Tobacco and Ginseng Corp.

His recruitment may be an indication that the government will revive the Pak-era economic policy.

Rep. Yi Hui-il, the new Energy and Resources Minister, was Agriculture and Fisheries Minister and senior presidential secretary for economic affairs under Pak Chong-hui in the late 1970s. He built his bureaucratic carrier mostly in the Economic Planning Board and worked as assistant foreign minister in charge of economic affairs.

Yi was elected to the National Assembly as a member of the opposition party led by Kim Chong-pil, prime minister under Pak Chong-hui. Kim's party merged with the ruling party and Kim Yong-sam's party in January.

Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Minister Kang Po-song and Health and Social Affairs Minister Kim Chong-su, both former members of Kim Yong-sam's party, are seen as having been given their posts as a reward for Kim's agreement to join the ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP).

Kang, a two-term legislator, is the only Cabinet member from the Province of Cheju, the southernmost island of the Korean peninsula. Kim, a three-term lawmaker and former pharmacist, has served on the assembly Health and Social Affairs Committee.

Rep. Chong Tong-song, 51, the new sports minister, was DJP floor leader before the creation of the DLP. The four-term lawmaker headed the assembly Home Affairs Committee and served as DJP secretary-general under Chon Tu-hwan.

Transportation Minister Kim Chang-sik, 61, was secretary-general of the Advisory Council for Peaceful Unification Policy and vice home minister. He was also governor of his home Province of South Cholla and is one of three Cabinet ministers from the Cholla provinces, along with Labor Minister Choe Yong-chol and Government Administration Minister Yi Yun-taek.

The Cholla provinces are opposition leader Kim Tae-chung's political bastion, which critics claim has been left out in the cold by the governments of former Presidents Pak and Chon.

Yi Yon-taek, 54, has served as senior presidential secretary for administrative affairs.

Chong Kun-mo, 50, the new science and technology minister, is a nuclear scientist with a doctorate from Michigan State University in the United States. He headed the Korea Science Foundation and is a consultant to the Korea Electric Power Corp.

Unification Minister Hong Song-chol, 64, is No's trusted aide and one of the best-known public officials. He served as home and health and social affairs ministers under Pak Chong-hui and was chief secretary to the prime minister. He has been presidential secretary-general since No took office in February 1988.

Yi Kye-sun, 63, the new second state minister for political affairs, especially women's affairs, is a professor of English at Seoul National University's Education College and the only woman in the Cabinet.

Well known as an activist in support of women's liberation and their participation in social and political life, Yi heads the Korean Federation of Women Voters, a social organization.

Legislation Minister Choe Sang-yop, 53, was deputy prosecutor-general and is considered a front-runner in the race to become justice minister.

Presidential Secretary-General No Chae-pong, 54, was a professor of political science at Seoul National University before he became special presidential adviser for politics. He is one of the architects of the political restructuring that brought the huge majority DLP into existence and has a doctorate in political science from the State University of New York.

Rep. Kim Chong-in, 50, the new senior presidential secretary for economic affairs, was an economics professor at Seoul's Sogang University before being elected

on the DJP ticket from the national constituency. He was health and social affairs minister before taking on the influential presidential post.

Yi Hong-ku, 56, the new special presidential adviser for politics, is a well known ideologue on matters concerning reunification and international politics.

The former professor of Seoul National University has served as national unification minister and has a doctorate from Yale University in the United States.

Interview With New Deputy Prime Minister

SK1703063690 Seoul YONHAP in English 0620 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Seoul, March 17 (YONHAP)—Deputy Prime Minister Yi Sung-yun, shortly after being named to the top economic post in the Cabinet, said Saturday his first task will be to totally re-evaluate the economic policies pursued by his predecessor, Cho Sun.

"I will first review the effectiveness of past economic policies and examine if they were pursued in time and in such a way as to promote balance," Yi said following the announcement that 15 ministers had been replaced in a major Cabinet reshuffle that saw the departures of eight economy related ministers.

Yi, a strong advocate of growth-oriented economics, said timeliness and balanced development are the most important factors in establishing economic policies. Yi, who also inherits the post of economic planning minister, said in an interview that the new economic team will pursue strong policies to boost the sagging economy.

"I will announce comprehensive measures to save the economy from its difficulties in the near future, after consulting with my fellow economic ministers," he said.

Measures to reinvigorate exports and investments will be devised, the 58-year-old deputy premier said.

"In the past, the nation achieved three economic goals—growth, price stability and improvement in international balance—at the same time. However, there is a substantial problem in growth while price stability has been shaken since last year and the surplus in international balance of payments dropped considerably," he said.

Yi, a finance minister in former president Chon Tu-hwan's Cabinet, hinted he will carefully study whether to postpone or implement economic reforms the government has embarked on, such as the real-name financial transaction system and limits on land ownership.

"I have to carefully think whether to continue or postpone the reforms begun by the government because they have an enormous impact on the economy," Yi said.

Asked if the new economic team will follow growth-oriented policies, the top economic planner said there should be no misunderstanding concerning his emphasis on growth.

"The growth policies of the 1950s and '60s meant quantitative development to escape from absolute poverty. However, the growth policies to be pursued by this economic team will mean qualitative development based on development of high technology," he said.

Yi said he would seek maximum cooperation among the ministries. He declined to forecast the future of inter-Korean economic relations, saying that he lacked sufficient information.

Opposition Reacts to No's Cabinet Reshuffle

SK1703085390 Seoul YONHAP in English 0823 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Seoul, March 17 (YONHAP)—A major restructuring of the South Korean Cabinet on Saturday invoked a mixed response in political and economic quarters.

The sole opposition Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) headed by Kim Tae-chung said the shakeup fell far short of the people's expectations of a new Cabinet that would reflect their aspirations for democratic reforms and economic and social stability.

Rep. Kim Tae-sik, PPD spokesman, said, "We are concerned about the future rather than expecting something from the reshuffle, which apparently goes against the times.

"The reshuffle is a failure since it has not replaced Prime Minister Kang Yong-hun and other hard-line ministers responsible for the current political and social instability and has appointed growth-oriented economic ministers favored by business conglomerates."

In stark contrast, economic organizations welcomed the transformation and hoped for a revitalized economy with the installation of a new economic team, headed by Deputy Premier Yi Sung-yun.

The Federation of Korean Industries commented, "We expect the new economic team to put priority policy emphasis on invigorating the economy and improving international competitiveness of Korean goods."

The Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry said, "It is hoped that the government will regain people's credibility through economic policies reflecting reality, since the government has so far got lost in the process of institutional reforms and policy decisions."

New Cabinet May Favor Growth Over Stability

SK1703083890 Seoul YONHAP in English 0810 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Seoul, March 17 (YONHAP)—By giving old-timers with a propensity for "growth-first" policies the plum economic seats in his new Cabinet, President No Tae-u has signaled that after two years of an uphill battle he is ready to scrap his government's economic policies and start all over again.

Viewed from the perspective of economic policy, the Saturday reshuffle may be a sign of No's intention to make a 180 degree turn in his economic program since the new ministers mostly champion growth-oriented policies, in stark contrast with the outgoing economic team, which staked its fate on efforts to correct the adverse side-effects of the growth-oriented policies pursued by previous administrations.

Most of the new economic ministers served in previous administrations, under Pak Chong-hui or Chon Tu-hwan.

Yi Sung-yun, the new deputy prime minister and economic planning minister, is the man who triggered a heated debate earlier this year by confronting outgoing Deputy Prime Minister Cho Sun on whether to put emphasis on stability or growth.

A finance minister from the Chon era, Yi has frequently denounced Cho in ruling party-government policy meetings for his refusal to take active measures to revitalize the economy and adheres to the theory that "less growth means less wealth to distribute."

Grabbing attention is No's choice of Kim Chong-in as his senior economic adviser. Kim was one of the leading economic brains in the ruling party who openly opposed economic reforms. The economic expert, who witnessed the failure of a real-name financial transaction system in West Germany while studying there, opposed the adoption of a value-added tax in the early 1970s. Kim differs sharply from his predecessor, Mun Hui-kap, in that he fiercely opposes introduction of a system calling for all financial transactions to use real names and all the land reforms that have been actively sought by Cho's economic team.

Finance Minister Chong Yong-ui and Trade-Industry Minister Pak Pil-su both had key posts in the economic ministries when President Pak energetically pursued economic growth. The two were in a position to increase their knowledge of business while working in a finance company and the Korea productivity center, respectively, since they left public office several years ago.

Now the "conservatives" have returned to reign over economic policy, the early prediction is that the government will backpedal on major economic reforms. Deputy Prime Minister Yi has already hinted at the need for a wide "review" of the merits and demerits of past economic policies.

Soon after the announcement of the new Cabinet Saturday, Yi told reporters that he would have "an overall review" of whether to push ahead as scheduled with the new land and financial transaction systems "considering that the reforms would inevitably have immense impacts on the national economy."

Three separate laws, based on the so-called concept of public ownership of land, have been enacted this month, but the new economic team could nullify them by revising their implementation decrees.

The real-name financial assets transaction system, which is slated to go into effect next year, is more likely to be affected by the advent of Yi's team since the government has not yet worked out even a draft bill for it.

The government is expected to employ more active measures in its bid to boost business activity, including lowering interest rates, which was regarded by Cho's team as a taboo. It may ease regulations that force companies to sell real-estate holdings to solve their financial difficulties without bank help.

From a political viewpoint, the reshuffle of the key economic ministers might be regarded as inevitable to refresh the economic atmosphere created by the merger into a massive new ruling party. But many doubt whether Yi's team will be able to step away from the reforms, widely welcomed by the public, even though the business sector claims they have caused such adverse side-effects as capital flight and serious dampening of investment interest.

* Survey Shows People Favor Two Party System

902C0110A Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean15 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by Yi Kyu-chin]

[Text] Since an absolute majority of the respondents sees the need for a political reform, the present four-party system with a small ruling party and larger opposition parties poses a serious problem.

According to a telephone poll conducted by a CHUNGANG ILBO survey team, the younger the people the stronger they favor political reform, (81.3 percent of the people in their twenties; 68.2 percent in their thirties; 59.3 percent in their forties; and 54.4 percent in their fifties and over), and the higher the educational level the stronger they are in favor of a political reform, (84.1 percent of the people with a college education or higher; 78.6 percent of college students; 70.2 percent of the people with a high school education; 58.3 percent of those with a middle school education; and 39 percent of those with an elementary school education or below).

On the question of the direction and form that the political reform should take, half of the respopndents (50.9 percent) wish to see a reform on the basis of ideology and policies which transcends partisan interests, that is to say, either an alliance of conservatives or some type of a conservative-progressive system.

By sex, male respondents showed a stronger support for this type of reform with 54.8 percent compared to female respondents with 47 percent.

The higher the educational level of the respondents the clearer the tendency becomes: (57.2 percent of those with a college education, 54.8 percent with a high school

education, 48.4 percent with a middle school education, and 37 percent with an elementary education).

Looking at partisan support, 53 percent of those who support the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) and 56.6 percent of those who support the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) are in favor of an alliance of conservative forces. Those supporting the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) are somewhat reserved in their support of this idea with 48.8 percent and the Party of Peace and Democracy (PPD) supporters are least interested in it with 39.4 percent.

It is interesting to note that the expressions of their views correspond somewhat to those positions taken by the parties.

On the question of the need or the reason for political reform, those respondents who favor the "rise of new leaders and a generational change of guards" are more than twice (52.6 percent) the number of those simply interested in the four-party system with a small ruling party and large opposition parties (21.4 percent). This might be interpreted as an expression of strong dissatisfaction with the present politics revolving around one No, three Kims.

The support for a generational change of guards is stronger as the age of the respondents gets younger (57 percent of those in their twenties, 54.7 percent in their thirties, 54.9 percent in their forties, and 43.7 percent in their fifties and over), and as the educational level of the respondents reaches higher (68.1 percent of those with a college education, 62.5 percent of collge students, 53.2 percent with a high school education, 44 percent with a middle school education, and 37.7 percent with an elementary education).

On the question of interparty merger, that is, the way of pairing the parties, 33.2 percent of the entire respondents are in favor of the merger of the opposition parties, the PPD and RDP. This reflects the belief of the respondents that these two parties share a common root.

On the idea of the merger of the RDP and NDRP, which has recently been much talked about is favored even less, with 12.7 percent, than the DJP-NDRP merger which is favored by 15 percent of the respondents. This reflects that the respondents are still clinging to the perception that the NDRP has its roots in the ruling party.

By age, it is interesting to note that the younger the respondents the stronger they support the merger of the PPD and RDP (40.6 percent of those in their twenties, 37.3 percent in their thirties, 28.9 percent in their forties, and 24.1 percent in their fifties and over), and in contrast, on the idea of the DJP-NDRP merger, the older the respondents the more they support that idea (17.5 percent of those in their fifties, 17.6 percent in their forties, 14.3 percent in their thirties, 11.8 percent in their twenties). The RDP-NDRP merger is most strongly supported by those in their thirties with 15.9 percent.

But on the possibility of the merger of the PPD and the RDP, more than half of the respondents (54.2 percent) said "not possible." This means that they do not see much hope in a rapprochement between Kim Tae-chung and Kim Yong-sam. Especially, of 665 respondents who see the need for political reform, 57 percent were pessimistic about it.

On the idea of the merger of the two Kims, Cholla and Chungchong Provinces hold some hope for it with 43.7 percent and 38.3 percent respectively. In contrast, it might be concluded that Kyonggi, Seoul, and the Kyongpuk regions are thoroughly pessimistic about it with 61.9 percent, 61.5 percent, 60.3 percent, and 57.9 percent, respectively. Looking at this by party, those supporting the PPD are the only people still holding high hopes for the merger with 44.4 percent, and conversely, 63.5 percent of those supporting the RDP hold a pessimistic view.

As to the two-party system, male respondents are more in favor of it than females, and the younger the people the more they support the multiparty system. The higher the educational level of the respondents, the more they favor the two-party system (64.4 percent of the respondents with a college education or higher, 54.2 percent with a high school education, and 38 percent with a middle school education, and 25.3 percent with an elementary education or lower).

As to the question of Chon Tu-hwan, 39.8 percent of the respondents are in favor of sparing him a judicial proceeeding and allowing him to live in Seoul. Those respondents in favor of this idea are more numerous than those favoring subjecting Chon to a judicial proceeding (25.4 percent), or those favoring sparing him a judicial proceeding but continuing to restrict his freedom to choose a residence (19.6 percent). The level of reliability of this public opinion poll is 95 percent, and the margin of error is plus or minus 3.1 percent.

* PPD Leadership Reviews Three-Party Merger

902C0120A Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean 24 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by reporter Kwak Pyong-chan: "Amid a Crisis Atmosphere, a Show of Confidence in Boosting Support Base; Call for 'Grand Coalition With Pro- Democracy Forces' Remains a Minority Opinion]

[Text] Contents of the PPD joint session of its national assemblymen group and the party Executive Directorate:

—The Party for Peace and Democracy [PPD] has but a limited range of options in dealing with the "dinosaur ruling party" which is about to come into being. Pulling itself out of the conservative camp is the only resort. The PPD National Assembly Members General Meeting and the PPD Party Executive Directorate at a joint session on 23 January approved a plan to launch a campaign for 10 million signatures after the February extraordinary session of the National Assembly.

The plan graphically demonstrates the limits of options available to PPD. The new party that is being formed by the merger of the three parties—DJP, the Reunification Democratic Party and the New Democratic Republican Party—is expected to command at least a three-quarters majority in the National Assembly, creating the possibility of rendering parliamentary activity of the PPD, a less-than-a-quarter minority, totally insignificant. The judgement and decision of the "new party" will possibly control activity of the National Assembly in its entirety, ranging from a constitutional revision to minor cases of legislation.

This extreme situation prompted PPD to propose on 22 January a resignation en bloc of National Assembly members and holding of by-elections to seek a new mandate of the people. As the proposal was brushed aside by the "mammoth ruling party" side as an empty political slogan, PPD was forced to resort to the only way left and declare on 23 January that "we will launch a national movement unless our demand for an early general election is met."

—The joint session, however, produced a "strange phenomenon" with a majority of participants—except party President Kim Tae-chung and some other leadership members, the coalition faction and the younger group—showing a perception the situation that was neither so alarming nor so dramatically heroic but rather optimistic by stressing the advantage of PPD as the sole opposition party. Despite the fact that the Kim Tae-chung "decision of an out-of-parliament struggle" amounts to an acknowledgement of PPD being "weak-kneed in parliament," most of the PPD assemblymen appeared to view the three-party merger as a "God's blessing" for the PPD.

In his address to the session, mainly devoted to denouncing the three parties' grand collusion and explaining the PPD policy of out-of-parliament, full-scale confrontation, Kim Tae-chung repeatedly revealed the crisis atmosphere within his party by saying, for instance, "Although the current difficulty may trigger a crisis, we can turn the adversity into prosperity." At the same time, he stressed his "self-confidence" so excessively that he seemed betraying his present anguish.

Kim Tae-chung's true feelings were better expressed when he said, "Like the honeysuckle that blooms ahead of other flowers after enduring the long winter, we will prevail over this difficult situation."

This assessment of the situation was backed up by assemblymen of the coalition faction with whom Kim Tae-chung is not very happy. Assemblyman Yi Sang-su defined the present situation as a crisis brought on by an attempt of the antidemocratic forces to remain in power, repressive challenges against the rights to existence of the masses of people, and a plot to tie down PPD as a regional party. He maintained that the three parties are trying to isolate totally the PPD and make it wither and die, or to keep it down as an "insignificant, bridesmaid-type splinter party," and that the present chronic regional sentiments among the people make their plans feasible.

However, Assemblyman Yi Chan-ku came up with a more optimistic view, likening the upcoming mammoth ruling party to an "empty can" and saying that "many of those democratic forces who have been sitting on the fence will now come to the side of PPD." Assemblyman Chae Yong-sok resorted to self-praise by saying that the "PPD has now become the sole, genuine opposition party." "Under the present circumstances," he added in a tone full of self-confidence, "people can put their faith nowhere but in the PPD."

—Due to the conflicting judgments and assessments, the session showed considerable confusion over future PPD measures to cope with the situation. Although a majority of assemblymen urged unity centering on the PPD and the party president, some younger assemblymen, while agreeing to the need for solidarity as a prerequisite, came up with a plan asserting that PPD should make a bold decision to abandon its prerogatives and thereby create an opportunity for a coalition of pro-democracy forces. In the confrontation between the demand for unity of democratic forces under Kim Tae-chung and the call for a PPD decision to facilitate a grand coalition of pro-democracy forces, the latter eventually ended up as a minority opinion in the face of the former's overwhelming numerical superiority. Assemblymen Yang Song-su and Yi Sang-su maintained: "The opinion calling for solidarity based only on the PPD is not realistic; therefore, we should be prepared to yield our prerogatives and form a new party if necessary." In a rebuttal, Assemblymen Chae Yong-sok and Yi Hyop warned against a "plot to oust party President Kim lurking behind the coalition demand by some party members." Many others also argued that the coalition demand could very well lead to PPD's disintegration.

—Kim Tae-chung, while indicating his confidence in popular support and, on that basis, stressing his belief in victory in the national movement and the upcoming local elections, took a strong position against the coalition demand by the younger assemblymen group, which he said has no merit except aggravating intra-party division and helping anti-PPD operations by the ruling circles. At the same time, he expressed his conviction that the grass-root supporters of the opposition will after all back up PPD. He expressed his confidence by saying that "Seoul and other major cities have never failed in their obligation to give the opposition their strong support since the Liberal Party days." He also put a strong brake on the coalition movement by saying that "there exist no pro-democracy forces other than PPD," and that "people often fail to look deeply into the situation at an important historic moment, only to realize their mistake later when it is too late."

Countering, assemblymen of the coalition faction argued that "if the PPD should wage a national movement, or anything similar, without firm assurances of support by pro-democracy forces, it would only deepen the PPD's political and regional isolation and gain nothing but playing into the hands of the ruling camp. It is therefore a pressing task for the PPD to assume the posture of sacrificing itself for a greater cause and, by doing so, secure the solidarity of all the pro-democracy forces and overcome the party's regional limitations."

At the same time, however, the faction made its position clear that discussing the question of having Kim Tae-chung step down at this point of time is inappropriate because his retirement could lead to the loss of a rallying point, cause the ruling camp to intensify its anti-PPD operations and considerably weaken leadership for pro-democracy forces.

* PPD Reshuffle Aimed at Absorbing Opposition

902C0130A Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean 30 Jan 90 p 3

[By Chong Tong-chae: "Gambit for Merger Is To Dig In and Counter"]

[Text] As a means of countering the emergence of the mammoth opposition party, the Democratic Liberal Party (temporarily name), and the pressure for a pan-opposition merger, PPD [Party for Peace and Democracy] President Kim Tae-chung has reshuffled three executive posts of his party, namely, those of secretary general, floor leader, and Policy Committee chairman, as a demonstration of his readiness to shift his party to a collective leadership system. In order to shift to a collective leadership system, the party has to revise its by-laws at the party convention scheduled for 16 March. In the remaining one and one-half months before the convention, the PPD plans to step up its efforts to enlist new members from among other parties and dissident groups.

The problem is to what extent this idea of the PPD president will meet the expectation of public opinion for a merger of the whole opposition camp and what response it will draw from the splinter RDP [Reunification Democratic Party] group which has refused to join the new ruling party, from those leading RDP parliamentarians who may bolt the new ruling party in the future, and from dissident figures outside the establishment.

Commenting on PPD President Kim's announcement on a collective leadership system, Assemblyman Kim Chong-kil, one of the PPD parliamentarians who refused to join the new ruling party, immediately branded it as a "political gesture." He said, "in order for President Kim to lay a foundation for the merger of the pan-opposition camp, he should sacrifice himself." Assemblyman No Mu-hyon, on the other hand, said: "For a merger of the opposition camp, President Kim Tae-chung's role is necessary for a certain period of time. But, ultimately he should withdraw into the second line."

Independent Assemblyman Yi Chol said that "in order to create an atmosphere favorable for the merger of the pan-opposition camp, it is desirable to refrain from making remarks hurting each other," adding that "as times passes, President Kim will come up with another card." Thus he termed the proposed collective leadership system as a step forward. Assemblyman Yi Sang-su, the standard-bearer of the PPD faction in favor of opposition merger, also said that President Kim's idea may not be sufficient to satisfy the PPD remaining group immediately. But, he said, if depending on circumstances, President Kim turns up his successive trump cards, it may provide a new momentum for a pan-opposition merger.

Members of the authoritarian faction within the PPD is saying that President Kim's idea about collective leadership amounts to the "Maginot line" for an opposition merger. This is to say that under no circumstance will President Kim retire to the second line.

They seriously fear that if President Kim's position becomes shaky, it may cause a schism in the party's support base in the Honam area. The PPD leadership is seized with the sense of crisis, fearing that even if a medium-size electoral district system is adopted for local and National Assembly elections, the party would not be able to survive unless the party sweeps all the contested seats. It believes that President Kim's secured position offers the only guarantee for the unity of the Honam area.

However, with regard to the "successive trump cards," some in the party expect that if the quality and number of outsiders joining the party reach a satisfactory level, President Kim may offer to relegate himself to the post of a supreme council member, moving down from the party presidency.

According to them, the possibility of President Kim withdrawing to the second line will depend on whether the party will succeed in enlisting the big guns from the Yongnam area at the March party convention.

If Kim Tae-chung becomes the representative Supreme Council member and holds onto his post as party head, the issue of a pan-opposition merger will be withheld until after the local elections, and the outcome of these elections will determine the scope of President Kim's manageability.

Reportedly, the plan contemplated by President Kim is to bring the inside-establishment political forces in the Yongnam area together around the RDP remaining group and integrate diverse opposition groups outside the establishment, and when this is done, to organize a new pan-opposition party in the form of a three-way merger with the PPD.

A leading PPD assemblyman foresees that when it is determined that the time for a three-way merger

becomes ripe, President Kim will present his third trump card, without insisting on retaining the name PPD for the new party.

It is a fact that paradoxically, President Kim's status is such that he is regarded at once as the center for an opposition merger and as a stumbling block. His future status will depend on how he will demonstrate his political finesse by falling back to the second line as a matter of formality but still exercising practical power in substance.

On the other hand, President Kim's reshuffle of three executive party posts is interpreted as being aimed at refreshing the sinking atmosphere within the party which is associated with the move for organizing a new opposition party through a three-way merger, as well as at solidifying the internal unity.

Particularly, the appointment of Kim Yong-pae and Cho Se-hyong, both National Assembly members from the Seoul area, as floor leader and Policy Committee chairman, is interpreted as a visible effort on the part of the PPD to shed its old shell as a parochial party.

On the other hand, some point out that former Floor Leader Kim Ki-won, who up to now served as a sole contact man in negotiations with the ruling party, has been replaced due to his failure to keep tabs on the move for political restructuring, and former Secretary General Yi Chae-kun due to his weak links with the ruling camp.

Mun Hui-kap Elected Head of DLP Taegu Chapter

SK1803025090 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 18 Mar 90 p 2

[Text] Taegu—Mun Hui-kap, former senior presidential secretary for economic affairs, was elected as chairman of the chapter of Taegu So-Kap constituency of the governing Democratic Liberal Party [DLP] yesterday.

Keen attention in political circles is drawn to the forthcoming April 3 by-election in Taegu in which Mun is to compete with former ruling party big wig Chong Ho-yong who is running as an independent.

Chong Ho-yong's Wife's Suicide Attempt Reported

SK1703010690 Seoul YONHAP in English 0048 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Seoul, March 17 (YONHAP)—Kim Suk-hwan, the wife of former ruling party lawmaker Chong Ho-yong, took an overdose of sleeping pills and slashed her left wrist in an apparent suicide attempt Friday. Kim reportedly failed to sever any major blood vessels and was released from hospital early Saturday morning. She was found sprawled on the floor in her bathroom by a housekeeper at noon and rushed to hospital, where she was visited four times by her husband.

Chong, running as an independent in the April 3 by-election in Taegu in a bid to regain the seat he gave up last year after the opposition linked him to the use of troops to crush pro-democracy protests in Kwangju in 1980, is due to give a news conference Saturday morning. Chong has been under pressure by the government to give up his hopes of regaining the National Assembly membership. His opponent in Taegu is ruling Democratic Liberal Party candidate Mun Hui-kap.

Kim left two suicide notes, one addressed to President No Tae-u and the other to her family.

Chong Vows To Remain in Race

SK1803025490 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 18 Mar 90 p 2

[By staff reporter Sin Hak-lim]

[Excerpt] Taegu—Despite the alleged suicide attempt by his wife, Chong Ho-yong made it clear that he would not back off from the by-election.

Meeting with the press, he said he has yet to find out the real motivation of the shocking action of his wife. This was his answer when asked his opinion whether she slit her wrist just to help his election campaign or to provide an excuse for him to ease out of the race. [passage omitted]

Jiang Reportedly Promises No Ties With ROK

SK1803052890 Seoul SEOUL SINMUN in Korean 18 Mar 90 p 2

[Text] Beijing/Tokyo, REUTER, AFP, AP, YONHAP—CPC General Secretary Jiang Zemin, who returned home on 16 March after his three-day visit to North Korea, is reported to have confirmed the traditional and close relations of friendship during his stay in Pyongyang.

News organizations in China and North Korea reported that during his stay in Pyongyang, from 14 through 15 March, Jiang Zemin had discussed bilateral and international issues with North Korea's President Kim Il-song in two rounds of talks he had with the latter, and agreed to defend the socialist ideology and on further deepening their bilateral relations.

According to diplomatic sources in Beijing, Jiang Zemin seems to have made a promise that China would not establish diplomatic relations with South Korea despite the active trade with it, which exceeds that with North Korea.

Jiang Zemin's Visit to Pyongyang Analyzed

SK1803031590 Seoul SEOUL SINMUN in Korean 17 Mar 90 p 2

[Editorial: "The Adherence of North Korea and China to Socialism"]

[Text] Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CPC, has wound up his three-day visit to North Korea. The

attention of the world, as well as ours, was focused on Jiang's visit to North Korea in light of a meeting between China and North Korea—two countries that persistently reject the worldwide tenor of democratization and reform in the communist bloc. We also focused on the meeting in view of the fact that Jiang paid his visit at a time when Kim Chong-il's ultimate succession to power was being predicted.

As in the past, details of the talks have not been brought to light. However, we pay attention to noteworthy differences between Chinese leaders' past visits and Chinese General Secretary Jiang Zemin's visit to North Korea this time. These differences are that his visit was open, that North Korea's welcome of Jiang Zemin was unusually colorful, and that details of his activities—except for important contents of the talks—were immediately reported by Chinese and North Korean mass media in a vociferous manner. Also, the marked activities of Kim Chong-il, who showed up at functions and talks and was seen warmly embracing Jiang Zemin, was worth paying attention to.

After all, it can be said that Jiang's visit was primarily aimed at strengthening mutual ties and cohesion and at extricating themselves from the predicament of isolation even a little by demonstrating their enhanced ties and cohesion. At the same time, his visit also was designed to pacify the complaints of the two peoples by convincing the world and the peoples of the fact that China and North Korea adhere to the socialist lines of the present communist party-led dictatorship despite the tenor of democratization and reforms in the Soviet Union and East Europe. Also, North Korea showed that it was fully taking advantage of the occasion to strengthen Kim Chong-il's status.

What has been clearly confirmed through Jiang's visit to North Korea is that, despite all the optimistic speculation, China and North Korea have no intention of democratization and reforms at least for the time being. An analysis of the speeches of Jiang Zemin and Kim Il-song shows that they clearly expressed their will to firmly cleave to the present lines of socialism. In his arrival statement, Jiang declared that "China has decided to advance along the path of socialism without deviation." In his welcoming speech, Kim Il-song pledged to "fight for socialist construction with the Chinese people without being shaken at all."

What we want to emphasize is the method of defending socialism. There can be many ways of doing this. The present method of the Communist Party-led dictatorship is not wise as is being confirmed in the Soviet Union and East Europe. They are exploring a new way for reforms. It is thought that Gorbachev has laid down another model of socialist reforms which is different from that of East Europe.

We do not think that China and North Korea are immune to the tenor of democratization and reforms in the communist bloc. It is believed that pushing ahead with reforms in a gradual and orderly manner is the only way for China and North Korea to survive. It is considered that Gorbachev is showing a good example of human socialist reforms—orderly democratic reforms.

The biggest weakness of a communist dictatorship lies in the lack of legitimacy in power and consequent difficulties in a reasonable succession of power. Gorbachev has solved this problem. It would be wise for North Korea to learn a lesson from Gorbachev instead of hastening its dangerous succession.

Beijing Sports Delegation Leaves Seoul 16 Mar

SK1603123290 Seoul YONHAP in English 1220 GMT 16 Mar 90

[Text] Seoul, March 16 (YONHAP)—A 12-member delegation of the Beijing Asiad Organizing Committee left Seoul Friday [16 March] after winding up a week-long consultation with South Korean officials on mutual cooperation for the staging of the Asian Games in Beijing this year.

The Chinese sports mission, led by Huang ji-cheng, secretary-general of the Beijing Asiad Organizing Committee, had a series of contacts with government officials, sports leaders and industrialists to discuss ways to promote a publicity campaign for the Asiad in South Korea and encourage South Korean private businesses to respond to China's effort to recruit supporters among foreign enterprises. The Chinese officials reportedly showed interest in using on lease some high-tech equipment employed in the 1988 Seoul Olympics and asked for South Korea's support with regard to some technical problems.

A government official here did not rule out the possibility that China may sound out the South Korean Government about its direct financial support should South Korean business circles' participation turn out to be disappointing.

Meanwhile, official sources here said that China and South Korea have agreed to have a South Korean attache stationed in Beijing and let him act as a link between the Asiad Organizing Committee and the South Korean Asiad team. An official said the South Korean Government will dispatch a Foreign Ministry official of director-general level to Beijing at latest early next month. He said the attache will keep the Governments of China and South Korea in touch with each other.

South Korea originally avoided contacts with China as long as they are related to Beijing Asiad for reasons of its talks with North Korea aimed at forming a single Korean team at the 1990 Asiad. It, however, stepped up contacts with Beijing in the wake the inter-Korean sports talks broke down early February.

The South Korean Government sent a survey team comprising representatives of foreign, sports, transportation ministries and sports associations to China at the

end of February to discuss preparations for the Asian Games and efforts to improve multilateral relations between the two countries, according to the sources. The Korean delegates, who stayed in China from Feb. 26 through March 3, are known to have discussed with Chinese officials ways to open direct air route prior to the Asiad and launch special shipping service between the two countries during the Asiad period.

Navy Reportedly Tracks Soviet Submarine 17 Mar

SK1703075790 Seoul YONHAP in English 0743 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Seoul, March 17 (YONHAP)—The South Korean Navy announced Saturday that a Soviet submarine cruising southward in the East Sea is being shadowed by its patrol boats and aircraft.

The 2,500-ton Foxtrot class submarine, which is diesel-powered, was spotted steaming southward in international waters some 40 miles east of Ulnung Island in the East Sea at 11 a.m., the Navy said.

A Foxtrot with a crew of 75 can cruise at a speed of 16 knots.

Gorbachev Considers Recent Contacts 'Favorable'

SK1803070790 Seoul Television Service in Korean 1200 GMT 16 Mar 90

[Text] In a press conference with domestic and foreign reporters held after his inauguration, Soviet President Gorbachev suggested the possibility of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and the Soviet Union in a considerably affirmative manner. Correspondent O Kwang-kyun reports from Moscow:

[Begin recording] In a press conference held for the first time after his election as president, new Soviet President Gorbachev, announcing tasks which arise in managing the Soviet state affairs, declared that his rapid economic plan should not be delayed any longer. Responding to a question on the possibility of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and the Soviet Union, President Gorbachev also said: "I evaluate the recent developments, including frequent contacts, which are taking place between Korea and the Soviet Union as very favorable [maeu choun kossoro]."

An official of the Korean Consular Department in Moscow, pointing to the fact that the Soviet Union side has not strongly avoided our government's recent stand of hoping for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, said that "even such brief remarks by Gorbachev are encouraging one." [end recording]

[Begin recording of the Korean Consular Department official] Even experts on Asian affairs said that they could not repress surprise over their president's remarks. At any rate, however, we think that such positive remarks deserve a welcome. [end recording]

[Begin reporter O Kwang-kyun recording] As the Soviet Union side's stand that needs economic cooperation for prestroyka and our government's northern policy have been grafted together, the two countries alike have recognized the need for exchange between them. However, it is difficult to conclude that the problem of establishing diplomatic relations between Korea and the Soviet Union, the final stage for exchange between them, will be achieved at an early date. This is because some obstacles caused by the unique situation on the Korean peninsula still remain. [end recording]

Ministry Reacts to Statement

SK1703121990 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 17 Mar 90 p 1

[Text] Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev suggested the possibility for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and Soviet Union in a press conference at a Supreme Council office Thursday, Korean and American television broadcasts reported yesterday.

When a Korean correspondent asked him about his evaluation of the perspectives for the setup of the diplomatic ties, the Soviet leader replied after a pause, "I... I evaluate it as very positive," Seoul's MBC and CNN of the United States reported.

It was the first mention by a Soviet official about the possibility of diplomatic ties between Korea and the Communist superpower which has remained reluctant to accept Seoul's repeated calls for ambassadorial-level relations.

The MBC correspondent was admitted to the press meeting with an identification card issued by the Soviet authorities.

In an unofficial comment, a spokesman at the Foreign Ministry said, "The remark by Soviet President Gorbachev is assessed to be encouraging for the Korea-Soviet relations."

Kim Yong-sam Leaves for Tokyo, Moscow

SK1903025890 Seoul YONHAP in English 0234 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Seoul, March 19 (YONHAP)—Kim Yong-sam, a co-leader of the ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), left Seoul for Moscow on an eight-day visit Monday morning.

Kim, making his second trip to the Soviet Union but his first as a leader of South Korea's Government party, will make a stopover in Tokyo and arrive in Moscow on Tuesday. During his stay until March 27, he is scheduled to meet with top Soviet officials including Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev, a top foreign policy adviser to President Mikhail Gorbachev, and Yevgeniy Primakov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

Kim is expected to discuss with the Soviet leaders ways to improve relations and expand economic cooperations between the two countries, which have promoted non-political ties especially in economy and trade, officials said. It is uncertain if Kim will meet with Mikahil Gorbachev, they said.

The DLP leader is to deliver a speech before a committee of the Supreme Soviet, or parliament, March 25 on "the South Korea-Soviet relationship and peace in Northeast Asia." He will also give an address at Moscow University.

In a news conference before his departure, Kim said his visit to the Soviet Union is to positively cope with drastic changes in the world situation, seek ways to lower tension on the Korean peninsula and to promote economic relations with the Soviets. He said he could not say whether he would meet the Soviet executive president.

Kim was invited to Moscow when he was still head of the opposition Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) by the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), but is making the trip in his capacity as one of three co-leaders of the ruling DLP, which was created last month by the merger of his RDP and another opposition party with the then-ruling party.

Kim is accompanied on his trip by First State Minister for Political Affairs Pak Chol-on, an influential Cabinet member who was the architect of President No Tae-u's "northern policy" designed to improve relations with the Soviet Union, China and other communist countries. Also in the 11-member entourage are DLP lawmakers Hwang Pyong-tae, Chong Chae-mun, Kim Yong-chae, Pak Chong-yol, Mun Chung-su, Kang Sam-chae and Pak Hui-tae, the DLP spokesman, leading businessmen Kim Sang-ha, president of the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and Ku Pyong-hui, standing adviser to Lucky-Goldstar Business Group, and former RDP Rep. Kim Su-han. The eight-term lawmaker, Korea's longest-serving incumbent politician, also has over 10 people with him in an unofficial entourage.

High on the agenda of his talks with leading Soviet figures are upgrading ties between the two nations to an official level, easing tension and bringing peace on the peninsula, signing an investment protection agreement and repatriation of Koreans living on the Soviet island of Sakhalin, the officials said.

Some government and party officials expect Kim to make substantial progress in improving ties with the communist country. Korea opened a consular department in Moscow last month as the first step toward opening formal diplomatic ties. The Soviet Union is expected to take a similar action soon in Seoul.

Kim is to meet with Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and Japan Socialist Party Chairwoman Takako Doi while in Tokyo.

Hyundai To Join Siberian Petrochemical Venture

SK1303021190 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English 13 Mar 90 p 1

[Text] The Hyundai Business Group plans to participate in the construction of a $5 billion petrochemical complex in the Soviet Union with a U.S. company, Hyundai founder Chong Chu-yong said yesterday.

"The Soviet minister for petrochemicals asked Hyundai to participate in the Soviet-U.S. project of constructing a petrochemical complex in Siberia," Chong said upon his arrival at Kimpo International Airport from his two-week tour of the Soviet Union. The Hyundai founder said he agreed on Hyundai's participation in principle with the Soviet minister.

For consultations with the U.S. participant, Combustion Engineering [CE], Chong said he will visit Los Angeles April 2. He said he is scheduled to meet with CE Chairman Charles Hugal to discuss Hyundai's participation in the petrochemical project. The CE chairman discussed Korean participation in the project when he met with Minister of Trade and Industry Han Sung-su and Chong in Seoul last November.

Hyundai, which plans to make a small equity investment in the project, is expected to be awarded the construction contract. More than half the total investment will be spent on construction, he said. The proposed petrochemical complex will cost $4 billion to $5 billion—$2 billion for the first phase of the complex. The first-phase construction, he said, is expected to start next year and to be completed in three and a half years. Some of the plant will be manufactured in Korea for installation at Tobolsk in Siberia, he said. Hyundai will be paid in dollars for two thirds of the contract money with the Soviet government-guaranteed loans from Western banks and the rest with rubles, he said.

In addition to participation in the petrochemical project, he said, Hyundai will conduct a feasibility study of tapping underground natural gas in Siberia. Depending on the results of the study, he said, Hyundai will produce natural gas in a joint venture with the Soviet Union. The feasibility study, which will last for one year, will start soon, he said.

Government Sets Up East Bloc Economic Team

SK1803111690 Seoul YONHAP in English 0943 GMT 18 Mar 90

[Text] Seoul, March 18 (OANA-YONHAP)—South Korean Government has recently launched a special economic team to expand economic cooperations with the East bloc countries as ambassadorial level diplomatic ties with Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria are likely to be opened within this month, a government source said Saturday.

The special economic team, headed by Assistant Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs Yi Ki-chu, is now

studying various ways to make inroads into the East European countries, such as establishing joint ventures, making joint investments and increasing exports, said the official who declined to be named.

The East bloc countries not nonly have great economic potentials for future markets, but also will be able to provide some footholds for the European Economic Community (EEC) markets in prepartations for the coming EEC market integration in 1992, the official said. Setting up joint ventures in the East bloc countries is now under serious consideration as a most effective means to make a detour to the EEC markets, into which the East bloc countries are also surmised to be integrated by mid 1990s, he said. In an initial stage, the joint ventures will aim turning out such consumer electronic goods as color televisions and refrigerators.

Meanwhile, the South Korean Government, which opened full diplomatic ties with Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia last year, has come up with systematic measures to advance and help the economic cooperations with the East bloc countries. With Hungary, the South Korean Government has concluded agreements for guaranteeing investment, trade and economic cooperations, prevention of double taxation and air sevice since late last year. With Poland, it signed agreements for trade and guaranteeing investment, and initialed an agreemnt on prevention of double taxation. Consultations are also under way to conclude those contracts with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.

Seoul Announces Decision To Join OECD in 1993

SK1703053690 Seoul YONHAP in English 0511 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Seoul, March 17 (YONHAP)—South Korea, ending years of wavering, will join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1993, the Economic Planning Board said Saturday. Korea will vigorously seek membership in OECD organizations over the next couple of years and then win full membership of the powerful organization of 24 industrialized nations in 1993, a board official said.

The three-year wait was fixed because joining requires opening the service and capital markets, the official said. Opening of the service market is currently under way and the government plans to open the capital market in 1992. As a prior step, Korea will join the OECD Working Party for Shipbuilding, one of the most powerful panels, and other OECD agencies.

The decision to join the world body follows years of deliberations by government agencies. Economic ministers last month decided Korea should join the economic body of the Western economies in the mid-1990s. Korea has long been invited by the OECD to take part in its activities. OECD requests for Korean participation have been steadily made since October 1978, when Korea was asked to join OECD's Trade Committee as an observer. The government has been delaying, citing the weak foundation of the Korean economy. The OECD began last year to mount pressure on Korea to join, making a series of requests that Korea join the Nuclear Energy Agency, Shipbuilding Working Party and committees on industry, science and technology, and capital market.

Government officials say joining the OECD is inevitable and will promote the internationalization of the Korean economy. Economic experts, however, point to drawbacks and worry that entry into the OECD could bring more pressure from the world to open up Korea's markets and that the environment for capital market liberalization is not ripe.

Korea's full participation in the OECD is expected to be a major topic at an OECD workshop to be held in Seoul on Tuesday and Wednesday, according to board officials. About 50 representatives of the 24 OECD member nations will attend the workshop, titled "The International Trading Environment: Issues and Policies" and co-hosted by the OECD Secretariat and the Korea Institute of International Economic Policy. Representatives of the six "dynamic Asian economies"—Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Thailand—will also participate in the session.

On Monday, Rober Cornell, OECD's deputy secretary general, will give a lecture on "The OECD and the New Architecture of International Economic Cooperation."

Overseas Investment Soars During Early 1990

SK1703084490 Seoul YONHAP in English 0833 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Seoul, March 17 (OANA-YONHAP)—Overseas investment by South Korean businesses has soared in the first two months of this year due to global protectionism and cost increases caused by wage hikes at home, the Bank of Korea (BOK) reported Saturday. During the January-February period, overseas investments approved by the government leaped 147.6 percent in value to 251 million U.S. dollars and 78 percent in number to 73 projects, the bank said in a report, titled "Movements of Overseas Investment in February and January 1990."

The manufacturing sector topped the list with 46.6 percent of the total, putting 153 million dollars into 34 projects. Trading accounted for 35.6 percent and miscellaneous others for 6.8 percent. Southeast Asia took the largest number of investments with 37 projects (80 million dollars), followed by North America with 20 projects (152 million dollars) and Central and South America with nine projects (12 million dollars).

Approved investments by small- and medium-sized companies in the same period totaled to 32 million dollars in 40 projects, up 90.5 percent in number and 28 percent in value over the same period last year.

Pakistani Air Route 'Tentatively' Approved

SK1403100290 Seoul YONHAP in English 0951 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Text] Seoul, March 14 (YONHAP)—Pakistan and South Korea tentatively agreed Wednesday to allow Korean Air (KAL) to open a Seoul-Islamabad route and to make a concerted effort to secure the Chinese Government's approval for the airline's bid to link the two cities via Beijing, the Korean Embassy in Islamabad reported to the Foreign Ministry here.

Members of the two countries' joint committee also agreed to finalize the issue in June through talks between KAL and Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), according to the report. The committee met for the second day Wednesday.

The Pakistani Government expressed its willingness to have formal contacts with its Chinese counterpart in the near future to discuss matters concerning KAL's bid to have right to fly through Chinese air space, a Korean official present at the meeting was reported as saying. The two sides also agreed to award PIA beyond rights from seoul to North America.

"China has not taken a definite position on our request to begin regular flights to Beijing," the embassy quoted the official as saying.

He, however, did not rule out the possibility that KAL is allowed to open Seoul-Islamabad air service by way of Beijing in the second half of the year on the strength of a Pakistani effort to secure Chinese approval for the air route. Pakistan has been on good terms with China.

Negotiators of the two sides also exchanged ratifications of an investment guarantee agreement that was concluded in 1988.

Burma

Democratic Front Chairman Delivers Speech

BK1703105590 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese 1400 GMT 15 Mar 90

[Speech by U Chit Maung, chairman of the Democratic Front for National Reconstruction; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] Dear people, voters: Please allow me to present to you briefly the views of our Democratic Front regarding the soon to be held multiparty democratic general elections, the key reasons we have entered the elections, the present political journey and milestones, the structure of the new state, and our special appeal.

1. There are four points regarding our attitude toward the elections. First, we regard it as an extension of the 1988 democratic revolution that is bound to come to a successful conclusion. Second, we consider it an effort to construct a new national democratic state. Third, we consider it a vast organizational field at the national level in which to unify all national democratic forces in the country. Fourth, since the establishment of a new state is a very important turning point in history, we intend to celebrate that turning point as the victory of the masses.

2. The key reasons why we have entered the elections:

A. Our main goal is to build a new national democratic state that is peaceful and fully democratic, where building national unity and developing the national economy are possible, and which positively contributes to world peace and cooperation and promotes the interests of the democratic forces—the workers and peasants, the middle class, the national industrialists and capitalists, the patriotic entrepreneurs, the nationality groups, technicians and intellectuals, youths and students, and women.
B. In order to ensure that our main goal is realized and in accordance with the policy of our [late] national leader, General Aung San, we intend to establish a united national democratic front made up of these social classes, strata, and democratic forces.
C. We intend to establish a united national coalition government that is responsible to that united national front.

3. The present political journey and the milestones:

Immediately following the successful holding of the multiparty general elections, the first milestone that must be put in place is the establishment of a People's Assembly that wields the power of the nation. In order to do so, political parties representing the forces within the Parliament and the SLORC [State Law and Order Restoration Council] authorities must coordinate and work in harmony. The second milestone is for the People's Assembly to elect, on the basis of democratic traditions, an interim president and an interim united national government that broadly represent the forces within the Parliament.

The third milestone is for the newly formed People's Assembly to coordinate and prepare the first draft of the constitution under the supervision of the interim united national government by following in the footsteps of Gen. Aung San in separating the tasks of the 1947 Constituent Assembly and later, to pass that draft with a majority vote of the People's Assembly representatives. The fourth milestone is to convene a national political convention [preceding three words rendered in English] under the leadership of the interim united national government to deliberate on the first draft of the constitution and obtain suggestions. The fifth milestone is for the interim united national government and the constituent assembly to prepare the second draft of the constitution by reviewing the deletions, additions, and suggestions made at the national political convention. The sixth milestone is for the constituent assembly to present the constitution to the nation and obtain suggestions from the people. The seventh milestone is to prepare the third draft of the constitution before passing it with a plebiscite.

Once a new constitution emerges through such a gradual democratic process, the interim constituent assembly will become a legislative assembly. Should the new constitution provide for a bicameral system, elections must also be held for the Chamber of Nationalities. Once both chambers are in place, a new president and government must be installed.

4. Prescribing the structure of the new nation:

We, the Democratic Front for National Reconstruction, believe that in the same way we should not be working for the emergence of a capitalist-landlord nation which only benefits a handful of people, we should also not be taking great leaps forward to transform the country into a socialist state. This should be kept in mind in drafting a new constitution and in building a new nation in accordance with the prevailing conditions of the world as well as with the law of social development in Myanmar [Burma].

We of the Democratic Front for National Reconstruction profoundly believe that the building of a new national democratic state should be viewed as a great historic task if we are to advance to the world of tomorrow and revive Myanmar in the shortest time possible under the prevailing local and world conditions. What does a national democratic state mean? By national it means that the country opposes imperialism, capitalism, neocolonialism, feudal-landlordism, and apartheid. By democratic, it means that democracy in the political, economic, and social fields will not merely serve the interests of the minority but the interests of the majority of the people and that such a democracy must not affect the interests of the workers, peasantry, and urban poor. In other words, it means a new form of

national democratic state that will serve the interests of all democratic forces—the middle class, the national industrialists and capitalists, the patriotic entrepreneurs, the nationality groups, technicians and intellectuals, youths and students, and women.

The new national democratic state shall have the following type of politics, social relations, administration, economics, national defense, national unity, and international relations:

Politics:

A. To establish a multiparty democratic system that emphasizes the political role of the working class and peasantry, both of which represent the majority of the people.
B. To give priority to the building of peace, democracy, and national unity in the new national democratic state.
C. To form a united national democratic front by uniting the four primary social classes—the workers and peasantry, the middle class, the national industrialists and capitalists, the patriotic entrepreneurs—with the other four democratic forces—the nationality groups, technicians and intellectuals, and youths and students, and women—and to formulate a central national democratic policy with a majority decision to politically guide the country.
D. Arrangements will be made to ensure that democratic rights embodied in the United Nations' Declaration on Human Rights are granted fully.
E. A people's democratic and human rights protection commission directly appointed by the People's Assembly will take action to correct the wrongs in cases where democratic rights are violated.

Administration:

A. A general public administration system will be set up with ward, village, township, district, and divisional people's administrative committees freely elected by the voting public.
B. In order to ensure a general administration system that is clean, free from corruption, and just in all respects, people's committees will supervise and maintain control.
C. Administrative and judiciary powers must be totally independent of each other.

Economics:

A. A national democratic state will have four separate economic sectors:

1. The public sector,
2. The cooperatives sector,
3. The private sector, and
4. The local and foreign joint ventures.

B. The four sectors of the national democratic economic system, of which the public and the cooperatives sectors are the leading sectors, shall cooperate with and complement each other.
C. Laws will be legislated so foreign investments and joint ventures conducted with foreign interests do not affect the sovereignty of the state and the national economy.
D. Financial and commercial relations will be established with all countries on the basis of mutual benefit. However, we shall be aware of and be prepared against the threats arising from neocolonialism.
E. Efforts will be made to remove the nation from the list of least development countries.
F. Foreign trade will be placed under the control of the State Foreign Trade Board and all four economic sectors will engage in trade proportionately.

Social Sector:

A. The promotion of literature, culture, and arts, and the building of a new life in the national democratic state will be in accordance with three major features reflecting nationalism, science, and the choice of the majority.
B. To give emphasis to reviewing the current education system and to build a modern education system based on science and vocational arts.
C. A national educational campaign will be launched on corruption since it is necessary to correct the situation beginning at the school and university levels.
D. To give priority, wherever possible, to sending state scholars abroad and to disseminate locally what they have learned, particularly on the subjects of science, engineering, and technology.

National Defense:

To build a modern Defense Force that has the respect and love of the people and that is loftily undertaking all national defense tasks in accordance with the National Defense Force programs outlined by the policy of the [late] national leader, Gen. Aung San.

National Unity:

A. To build a new national democratic state with a federal system based on three major principles—of equality, of residing together with kindred love for each other, and of cooperating and prospering together.
B. To build a federation with eight major states that are fully autonomous but have no right of seccession.
C. The sovereignty of the state will lie with the federal parliament.

International Relations:

A. The state will pursue its traditional foreign policy, that is, an independent and active foreign policy based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence and the 10 Bandung principles.
B. It will have equal and mutually beneficial relations and give particular emphasis to friendship with neighboring countries.
C. Myanmar will not participate in any military bloc, sign a military pact with any country, or in any way permit military bases on its soil.

D. It will make positive contributions to international relations as a member of the United Nations.
E. Arrangements will be made to rejoin the Nonaligned Movement.

A special appeal to the voters:

The forthcoming general elections is an historic and most significant turning point for Myanmar. The work of building a new nation is an enormous burden on the shoulders of each citizen. To faithfully carry out this task, every citizen should cast a vote for the pro-democracy forces, a gesture that is tantamount to eliminating the forces opposed to democracy. It will also be necessary to study all forces generally within the pro-democracy movement to find out if they genuinely and traditionally favor democracy. Only after that should the people courageously cast their priceless votes.

My profound request to the voting public is that they enthusiastically cast their votes for the People's Assembly candidates representing the four mass and class organizations and the Democratic Front headed by the veteran NUF [National United Front] political leaders, including I. "Vidura" [nicknamed after a minister known for his wisdom in Buddhist Jataka tales] Thakin Chit Maung—people who have made selfless sacrifices and braved all sorts of difficulties to be on the side of the people thoughout our nation's history.

Information Committee Holds 81st News Conference

BK0903111490 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese 1330 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Excerpts] The Information Committee of the State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC] held its 81st news conference with local and foreign journalists at 1300 today in the reception hall of the Ministry of Defense. [passage omitted] At the news conference, the committee explained the Myanmar [Burmese] attendence at the 17th special United Nations General Assembly session on narcotics and its gift of a tapestry with a picture of Lokanat [God of Peace] to the UN for display in the UN Security Council meeting hall. The committee also explained the right of political parties to explain their party policy, concepts, and programs on the Voice of Myanmar and Myanmar Television Service. The information committe said the UN session on narcotics was held in New York from 20 to 23 February and that its aims were to issue a political declaration and global program of action on narcotics control. The delegation was headed by U Ohn Gyaw, director general from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [passage omitted]

After attending the session, the delegation went to Washington and met the deputy chief of the Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA] under the Department of Justice. The deputy chief apologized that the DEA chief was unable to meet them as he was having a meeting with President Bush. He then held a meeting with our delegation. U Ohn Gyaw, head of the delegation, explained our stand on narcotics control work and programs for fighting narcotics. U Ohn Gyaw stressed that they had not come to ask for help from the U.S. but had come to explain the progress made in narcotics control being carried out within the budgetary limit of our country. The deputy chief replied that there was more understanding after the explanation. The next day, the Myanmar delegation, accompanied by Myanmar Ambassador U Myint Aung, held a cordial meeting with Mr. Charles B. Rangel, Democrat, member of the House of Representatives, and chairman of the Congressional Committee on Narcotic Drugs and Mr. Lawrence Coughlin, a leader of the Republican Party in Congress.

The congressional members initially appeared not to have a clear view of the aims of the visit, but after our explanation of Myanmar's stand and program on narcotics, they became more friendly and were able to understand the programs being carried out by our country. Representative Mr. Rangel was totally unaware of the development scheme along the border regions initiated in Myanmar but said that he had a clear view after the delegation's explanation. He said they would like to know how assistance could be rendered. He said he would contact us through the Myanmar ambassador after he had consulted with the U.S. State Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

During the meeting the Myanmar delegation presented a picture showing U.S.$410 million worth of narcotics and heroin being burned on 13 February in Yangon [Rangoon]. Representative Mr. Range appeared very surprised at the picture because he did not know about the burning of narcotics. He said he appreciated the delegation's explanation and wanted them to come again to give similar explanation. [passage omitted]

Next the Information Committee members replied to questions from journalists. In response to a question from a REUTER correspondent, they said beginning 12 March election candidates will deliver campaign speeches on the Voice of Myanmar and the Myanmar Television Service. The date and time of campaign speeches alloted to parties will be announced in radio and television programs in the newspapers. In response to a question from a JI JI correspondent, the Committee said the Elections Commission has arranged for 15 political parties to deliver their campaign speeches on radio and television and that beginning 12 March, representatives from two political parties will deliver campaign speeches each day on the radio and television. The summary of the speeches will be carried in the newspapers the next day. [passage omitted] In response to a question from MYANMAR NEWS AGENCY, the Committee said that as explained in previous news conferences, eight persons from political parties had been called in for interrogation. Out of the eight, five have been released and three are being interrogated. These three will be released if they do not infringe the law. The news conference ended at 1400.

Delegation Leaves for Border Talks in Thailand

BK1203141890 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese 1330 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Brigadier General Maung Aye, member of the State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC] and commander of the Eastern Military Command of the Union of Myanmar, accompanied by U Ohn Gyaw, director general of the Foreign Ministry's Political Department, and 21 other delegation members left by a special military plane this morning to attend the third meeting of the Myanmar-Thai border committee in [name indistinct], Thailand. The delegation was seen off at Yangon airport by Brig. Gen. Khin Nyunt, secretary-1 of the SLORC; Brig. Gen. Myo Nyunt, commander of the Yangon Military Command; high-ranking military officials; U Nyunt Swe, Myanmar ambassador to Thailand; Colonel Ba Hein, military attache to Thailand; U Ko, director general of the Office of the Cabinet; and responsible officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Returns 19 Mar

BK1903160090 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese 1330 GMT 19 Mar 90

[All military titles as received]

[Text] A Myanmar [Burmese] delegation headed by Major General Maung Aye, member of the State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC] and commander of the Eastern Military Command of the Union of Myanmar—which has U Ohn Gyaw, director general of the Foreign Ministry's Political Department, and 21 others as delegation members—returned to Yangon [Rangoon] by a special military plane this evening. The delegation attended the third meeting of the Myanmar-Thai border committee in Phitsanulok, Thailand. The delegation was welcomed back at Yangon airport by Maj. Gen. Tin U, secretary-2 of the SLORC; Maj. Gen. Myo Nyunt, commander of the Yangon Military Command; U Kyaw Aye, director general of the Office of the SLORC; U Ko, director general of the Office of the Cabinet; high-ranking military officials; and responsible officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Army Commander Meets Thai Military Delegation

BK1903155190 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese 1330 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Excerpts] General Than Shwe, deputy commander in chief of the Defense Forces and Army commander in chief, received Lieutenant General Thawon Rattanawadi, assistant chief of staff for intelligence of the Royal Thai Army, and his wife and delegation at the Dagon Yeiktha of the Ministry of Defense at 0900 this morning. Also present on the occasion together with Gen. Than Shwe were Lt. Gen. Tin Tun, commander in chief of the Air Force; Brigadier General Min Thein, joint adjutant general; Colonel Than Tun, deputy director of the Defense Services Intelligence; and Col. Ba Hein, Myanmar [Burmese] military attache to Thailand. [passage omitted] Earlier this morning, the visiting Thai general, wife, and delegation toured the Shwedagon Pagoda.

At 1630, the Thai visitors left Yangon [Rangoon] by air and were seen off at Yangon airport by Major General Myo Nyunt, commander of the Yangon Command; Brig. Gen. Min Thein, deputy adjutant general; Brig. Gen. Sein Ya, director of military training; Brig. Gen. Kyaw Min, commander of the 55th Light Infantry Division; Brig. Gen. Tin Hla, commander of the 22d Light Infantry Division; Col. Than Tun, deputy director of the Defense Services Intelligence; and high-ranking military officials.

Cambodia

Activities in Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Reported

BK1603120390 Phnom Penh SPK in English 1100 GMT 16 Mar 90

[All figures as received]

[Text] Phnom Penh SPK March 16—In the five months to February 28, the government Armed Forces of Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province, 360 km northwest of Phnom Penh, put out of action 8,069 enemy troops, including 510 killed, 385 wounded and 95 others forced to surrender. They seized 252 guns of various calibers, a walkie-talkie and a good quantity of military gears. This came from a report presented at a recent meeting in the province to review its dry-season military campaign.

The report further said that 255 enemy troops from the three Khmer opposition factions deserted their ranks and reported themselves to the provincial authorities, bringing along 252 rifles and a quantity of other war materials. The province also unmasked 209 enemy underground agents and captured 42 guns.

Success of Phnom Penh Forces in Kampot Reported

BK1203012990 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 12 Mar 90 p 6

[By James Pringle]

[Text] Kampot—They killed four oxen, and emptied dozens of bottles of White Horse Scotch whisky. There were buxom Cambodian wenches, and singing and a Cambodian rock group. They also danced the traditional ramwong. You could hear the sound of the revelry blocks away, local people recalled later.

The "victory" banquet attended by some 200 Communist Party officials and military officers of the Hanoi-installed regime of Premier Hun Sen at the stadium in this small Cambodian port last week went from 4 p.m. until midnight—well past the 9 p.m. curfew. But for these people, the elite in the southern province of Kampot, it didn't matter. They are the ones who set the rules. They were celebrating a successful week-long operation

against the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge forces during which Phnom Penh troops smashed an important base camp on jungle-covered Creeper Mountain (Phnom Voar) 19 kilometres northeast of here. One of the star guests was a Khmer Rouge defector who may be Cambodia's answer to Rambo. The base had been there for ten years and the Khmer Rouge had resisted four attacks by Hanoi's army before it withdrew (at least from this province) last September. "We did what the Vietnamese army could not do," one local official boasted later.

While international public opinion fears that the Khmer Rouge, who are said to have killed up to a million Cambodians when they were in power from 1975-79, are poised to take over Cambodia again, here in Kampot, the Hun Sen forces seem to be more than holding their own following months of attack and counter-attack. "I am surprised at the success we have had," Kampot Governor An Heng said in an interview. "The people of the province are also very pleased." The Khmer Rouge seized the initiative after the Vietnamese pullout last September. They briefly occupied a cement-making plant just north of Kampot, holding the area for a few days before being driven out. Then, on January 30, Pol Pot's forces launched a kind of mini "Tet offensive," hitting nine villages in the valley of Chumkiri, a vulnerable area at the foot of the Elephant Mountains, a traditional Khmer Rouge base area. The government forces wobbled. But it was then that the one-eyed giant Thong San stepped in.

A problematical figure, who twice left the Khmer Rouge to join the side of the Hun Sen regime and also once left Hun Sen for the Pol Pot forces, Thong San was so highly thought of by the Khmer Rouge that they once sent him to China to have a glass eye fitted. "When the Khmer Rouge attacked, they were shouting 'Kill Thong San,' because they regard him as a turncoat," province official Khuy Sien said afterwards. "But Thong San stood up, firing a weapon from each shoulder. A Khmer Rouge launched a B-40 rocket at him, but he side-stepped it. "Though shrapnel damaged his left arm, he charged forward and gave new courage to our own troops." Thong San—because of his near legendary prowess here he might be called the "Rambo of Kampot"—rallied the Hun Sen forces in the Chumkiri villages and they drove the Khmer Rouge out. "They could not hold any of the villages for a single day," An Heng noted.

On February 23, the Hun Sen forces went on the offensive. Their target: Creeper Mountain, a base camp from which Kampot's Khmer Rouge chief, known by his radio call-sign Peth 77, had launched attacks since 1980. Vietnamese troops had been unable to capture the camp, as had two previous attempts by the Hun Sen forces, largely because of lethal mine-fields. This time, they dragged a couple of artillery pieces up to a neighbouring mountain and began shelling. "Peth 77 sent four of his men to reconnoitre our positions, and we captured them," said Khuy Sien later. "They told us how the Khmer Rouge were deployed and led our forces through the minefields." They did not avoid all the mines, however. Regular soldier Sok Soeun, 32, was advancing behind two colleagues when they stepped on a mine and were killed. Sok Soeun was wounded in the leg and as he went to find a medic he stood on a second mine. This week, he was in Kampot Hospital, being tended by British nurse Gilliane Barker. One leg had been amputated below the knee.

When the Hun Sen forces eventually reached the base, Peth 77 and most of his men had pulled out. But six Khmer Rouge had been killed, and ammunition and important documents captured. The Phnom Penh troops burned down 236 huts. It was regarded as a significant victory, justifying the later banquet, to which Thong San was also invited. An Heng, who vehemently denies that any Vietnamese soldiers have returned to this province, as they reportedly have to western Cambodia ("technicians" is the word used), is confident his forces can continue to hold the line. "I believe that the Khmer Rouge can never seize any piece of land in Kampot," he says. This correspondent, driving 136 km from Phnom Penh to Kampot along Highway 3 after an absence of six months, was surprised to find that not only is the road still open but that it is being improved. After the Vietnamese withdrew last September, the Khmer Rouge might have been expected to succeed in cutting off Kampot. "We are not only able to control the road and maintain it, but actually to rebuild it," An Heng said.

At the same time, Khmer Rouge strength has not been smashed—it may even have grown. There are now from 450 to 600 Khmer Rouge in the province—a year ago the figure was 400. Yet the Pol Pot forces have been able to do little—not even blow up a bridge on Highway 3. Peth 77 and the Number 2 Khmer Rouge in Kampot, Peth 62, are far from being put out of action. And the Pol Pot forces make implacable foes. As An Heng says: "Even if there is only one of them left, the Khmer Rouge will try to do something against us." But, at least for the present, the Pol Pot forces are no longer on Creeper Mountain. And Thong San has not changed sides again.

Article Examines Question of Vietnamese Troops

BK1703014490 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 17 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by James Pringle in Phnom Penh: "Vietnamese Troops in Cambodia: Fact or Fiction?"]

[Text] They wear Cambodian army uniforms with the right sleeve rolled up to show they are really Vietnamese troops in disguise, people here say. They are driven in trucks through Phnom Penh after midnight, long after curfew, to avoid detection—Vietnamese have lighter skins than Cambodians.

Vietnamese mercenaries earning a reputed US$100 (2,500 baht) a month—a massive sum here where regulars make only two or three dollars—are operating in the hills beyond Kompong Speu, a key town on the outer defence perimeter of the Cambodian capital, locals there say. It would make sense if they were there, despite the

fact that all Vietnamese troops were supposed to have been withdrawn from Cambodia last September. Kompong Speu is the most vulnerable spot on the so-called "red belt" or defence positions around Phnom Penh, with a mountain spur from the Thai border providing a convenient infiltration route for the Khmer Rouge. About 600 guerrillas are active here. However, there is no independent confirmation that there are any Vietnamese troops in the province, and Mr Yim Sokhon, a local party official, says before being asked: "There are no Vietnamese troops here."

In Kampot town, 85 miles south of here, a woman at the railway station says: "There are rumours that Vietnamese soldiers have returned to the province to fight the Khmer Rouge, though no one has seen them." Yet Kampot Province Governor Mr An Heng bristles when asked about it. "There are absolutely no Vietnamese troops in Kampot," he insists. In Phnom Penh, "spot the Vietnamese" has become the most popular game in town. One Cambodian says he saw two men in Cambodian military uniform speaking Vietnamese to each other; another claims the Vietnamese are moved down the Mekong River from Vietnam. For their part the Khmer Rouge maintains there are 50,000 Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, resistance leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk says there are 20,000, some Western diplomats in Bangkok make it 10,000, while East European envoys here say 5,000—pick your figure.

None of these claims can be substantiated, and in ten days of travelling inside Cambodia this correspondent did not see, as far as he was aware, a single Vietnamese soldier. However, there is no doubt that, as first reported by Belgian journalist Jacques Bekaert, a special correspondent for the BANGKOK POST, Vietnamese soldiers are back—perhaps they did not all leave Cambodia in the first place. Most of these phantom soldiers are operating against the Khmer Rouge and the non-communist resistance in Cambodia's western province of Battambang, though some are in Phnom Penh itself.

As far as this correspondent can establish, from talks with diplomats, officials of the Vietnam-backed Hun Sen regime, international relief agency workers and ordinary Cambodians, many of the Vienamese are performing such mundane tasks as repairing tanks and maintaining artillery pieces, and training Cambodian soldiers in using specialist weapons. There are others, however, who are playing a more direct role, while not being involved in actual combat. Qualified government sources say that at least some of the Vietnamese troops are taking part in long-range reconnaissance patrols. Their task: to go into the mountains and jungles, seek out the Khmer Rouge then call for elite units of the Hun Sen army to attack them. Other sources indicate there are artillery spotters, who infiltrate into areas controlled by the Khmer Rouge and the non-communist resistance and radio back map coordinates of targets to the gun positions—where there are also Vietnamese supervising the firing of weapons like the Soviet 130mm artillery piece. "The artillery firing patterns suddenly seem accurate," said one well-informed diplomatic source in Bangkok. Thai officials along the Thai-Cambodian border are also picking up Vietnamese voices on their field radios, the source said.

The Vietnamese troops, who may even number less than 1,000, are believed to belong to Special Forces units based in Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province, bordering Cambodia. Soviet Ambasssador Mr Rashit Khamidulin in Phnom Penh says Hanoi has no combat troops in Cambodia, but adds that some Vietnamese military personnel are attached to the command structures of the Phnom Penh government forces. "Their role is to organise the coordination of military action and assist the general staff," he says. Mr Khamidulin indicates the Vietnamese role is not so significant. Let's assume there are 100 men or even 1,000," he says. "That would not change the military picture in Cambodia." Another senior Soviet diplomat notes: "If Vietnamese troops were involved in the fighting, that would be plain silly—and we know the Vietnamese are not that." Mr Ngo Dien, the Vietnamase ambassador, does not seriously deny there are Vietnamese troops here, saying: "It is not true that there is a presence of Vietnamese combat troops in Cambodia, but we are assisting the Cambodians in every appropriate way." Other Vietnamese envoys in the region admit there are "advisers and technicians" in Cambodia.

Western diplomats in Bangkok believe the Vietnamese were reintroduced into Cambodia to give what one calls "some sorely needed backbone to what had been the obviously crumbling effort of the Hun Sen troops." Increased reports of their arrival came shortly before the launching in February of an offensive by Hun Sen troops that recaptured the town of Svay Chek in western Cambodia. "This shot in the arm solidified the Phnom Penh forces at just the right time," noted one Bangkok-based Western envoy recently. The mystery to many diplomats is why the Vietnamese should jeopardise their diplomatic position by bringing back troops after claiming last September that they had all left. "The stakes were too high," noted one East European diplomat in Phnom Penh. "Without the Vietnamese, the Hun Sen forces were in danger of seriously giving ground." Noted a more cynical Bangkok-based Western envoy: "No one outside a few fellow-travellers really believed all the Vietnamese had really gone in the first place."

KPNLF Reports Civilian Casualties in Shelling

BK1803031290 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 18 Mar 90 p 2

[Excerpt] Aranyaprathet—At least 70 Khmer civilians were killed or wounded when Phnom Penh forces shelled a civilian area in a "liberated" zone in western Cambodia on Friday [16 March], a resistance leader claimed yesterday. Maj-Gen [Major General] Duong Sokhon, a field commander of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front [KPNLF], claimed the 70 were victims of

intense artillery and mortar fire on Thmar Puok by Heng Samrin forces. The shelling was reported to his unit by KPNLF military units providing security for the civilians. The attack was 20 kilometres north of the strategic town of Svay Chek, opposite Ta Phraya district of Prachin Buri Province. The shelling caused panic among civilians, who moved towards the Thai border for safety. The wounded were sent to field hospitals at the border.

Meanwhile, the KPNLF soldiers and the Phnom Penh force have engaged in heavy fighting across the border for control of the strategic village of Treas. The fighting took place after the KPNLF force launched a counterattack to retake the village, which fell under the control of the Phnom Penh force following heavy fighting on Thursday. Treas is considered a strategic position for the non-communist resistance force because it could be used by the Phnom Penh force as a forward artillery base. [passage omitted]

KPNLAF Captures 2 Positions Near Svay Chek

BK1703041490 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 17 Mar 90 p 2

[Text] Forces of Cambodian nationalist leader Son Sann yesterday said they had attacked and captured two Heng Samrin troop positions near the strategic western Cambodian town of Svay Chek. A statement by the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF) said elements of the 1st Brigade "launched surprise attacks" on Heng Samrin troops at Treas and Ta Pho. Treas is located about 4 km southeast of Svay Chek while Ta Pho is about 9 km northeast of the town. The KPNLAF said about 13 Heng Samrin troops were killed, of which six were allegedly Vietnamese in Heng Samrin uniforms. The spokesman of the KPNLAF High Command, Ok Serei Sopheak, said resistance forces suffered 15 wounded in the attack.

Indonesia

Editorial Views Need for U.S. Bases in Asia

BK1903092990 Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 27 Feb 90 p 4

[Editorial: "Why Does Asia Hope the U.S. Military Bases Remain?"]

[Text] Everybody can easily see that the dramatic changes in Europe last year and early this year, which have brought about fundamental changes in the continent's political structure, have decreased the role of NATO as a military pact. NATO's role as counterbalance the military might of the Warsaw Pact is now viewed as irrelevant.

Therefore, the presence of U.S. military forces in Western European is also becoming meaningless. In this context, the reduction of the U.S. military budget as demanded by the U.S. Congress will involve more troop withdrawals from foreign bases, especially in Western Europe.

Should the removal of U.S. military bases and personnel outside Europe, especially in Asia, follow the same pattern?

In his two-week Asian tour, U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney tried to sound out public opinion on the issue of U.S. military bases in the region, but he seemed to have come to a different conclusion.

The U.S. role in Asia itself has been greatly reduced because the aggressive nature of international communism has lost its steam. The situation in Eastern Europe has changed and the Soviet Union no longer behaves as before. However, the U.S. military presence in Asia in the Asian context is in fact very different from that in Western Europe.

It is indeed rather unpleasant to hear, especially if it is stated explicitly, that Asia still needs the U.S. military presence for reasons far removed from communist aggression.

The reduction of tense relations between Asian countries and the Soviet Union has not affected the stand adopted by these countries, which secretly allow the U.S. military presence in Asia for reasons which have nothing to do with the cold war. This is despite the fact that the United States wants to reduce by at least 10 percent its 120,000-strong force in the Asia-Pacific, excluding Guam and Hawaii.

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney discovered the following factors: First, the existing threat against South Korea—a threat not affected by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact; second, disruption of stability because of possible upheavals in countries like North Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Cambodia, and the PRC which may be caused by internal problems related to the authoritarian nature of the old-guard leadership in those countries; third, the possible growing rivalry between India and the PRC for a position of dominance in Asia; fourth, the existence of several regional conflicts which may erupt into bigger ones, such as the current Kashmir problem; and fifth, the proliferation of guided missile and nuclear technologies, which are no longer the monopoly of superpowers like the United States and the Soviet Union. All these factors give the U.S. military presence in Asia reasons other than those in Europe.

At present, it is true that the United States should reduce its role because of growing aspirations in Asia. In South Korea, the government wants Korean generals to play a more prominent role in the command of joint defense.

In Japan, the United States itself has asked Japan to increase its defense spending to safeguard Tokyo's economic success. Because of its continued trade deficit, Washington wants to pull much of its forces out of Japan.

In the Philippines, President Aquino refused to meet Dick Cheney because she was offended by the latest U.S. policies toward Manila.

Even though Dick Cheney's arguments on the need for the U.S. military presence in Asia were correct, he did not directly discuss what could have been easily understood by Asians.

While it is true that the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Asia will create a power vacuum which is capable of provoking bigger conflicts, most Asian nations observe the contradictory attitude of the United States in urging Japan to increase its defense spending because the true reason is that the United States wants to reduce its own defense spending, which is largely responsible for its almost $120-billion trade deficit.

While Japan's own defense spending is now still under one percent of its GNP, many other countries' defense expenditures are above that margin. Japan has no problem in increasing its defense spending to one percent of its GNP, but once it does, it will become the world's third most powerful country after the United States and Soviet Union.

With the memory of Japan's military adventure in World War II still fresh in the minds of many Asian nations, people in this region view Japan's projected military role and current economic clout as a terrible threat. Taking into account this thinking, people view the U.S. military presence in Asia as more rewarding than the presence of an economic giant with an unrivaled war machine.

However, it is rather difficult for Asian leaders to express this view publicly because it may contradict their national aspiration as well as create domestic problems. Many Asian leaders whose administration is heavily dependent on the United States, like President Aquino, naturally dare not express this view.

This is one of the dilemmas Asia has to face in its relations with the United States, or vice versa.

Alatas Leaves for Tunisia for Three-Day Visit

BK1603125490 Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian 1?00 GMT 16 Mar 90

[Text] Foreign Minister Ali Alatas today left for Tunisia for a three-day visit at the invitation of his Tunisian counterpart, Ismail Khelil [title as heard].

A press release from the Tunisian Embassy in Jakarta today said that relations between the two countries are good at present and that Tunisia will never forget Indonesia's support to Tunisia's struggle for independence.

Apart from sharing the same views on various matters in international forums, the two countries are also members of the Nonaligned Movement and the Islamic Conference Organization. To date the Tunisian Government has provided five scholarships to Indonesian students at the Muhammadiyah Islamic College.

The trade volume between Indonesia and Tunisia in 1989 reached about $45 million, with the balance of trade in Indonesia's favor. Tunisia's main export commodities to Indonesia are phosphate and phosphoric acid, while Indonesia imports are coffee, tobacco, sawed timber, and cocoa.

Laos

Phoun Sipaseut Gives Interview on Cambodia

BK1703152590 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao 1200 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Interview with Phoun Sipaseut, vice-chairman of Council of Ministers and minister of foreign affairs of Lao People's Democratic Republic, by unidentified PASASON correspondent on the Jakarta meeting on Cambodia; date and place not given—read by announcer]

[Text] [Correspondent] Would you please tell us about the outcome of the recent Jakarta informal meeting on peace in Cambodia?

[Phoun Sipaseut] As everyone knows, after being conducted in a very energetic atmosphere, the informal meeting on Cambodia closed on the evening of 28 February 1990.

1. Participating in the Jakarta informal meeting on this occasion were the various Cambodian factions; the Indochinese and the ASEAN countries; Roland Dumas, French foreign minister and cochairman of the Paris conference on Cambodia; Ahmad, deputy UN secretary general as special envoy of the UN secretary general; and Evans, Australian minister of foreign affairs and trade, who presented an initiative proposal paving the way for a breakthrough in the Paris conference stalemate leading to the achievement of a settlement of the Cambodian problem through political means.

2. Through the contribution of views and consultations both in and out of the meeting, we have come to understand clearly the aspirations of the representatives of various countries who want to see the Cambodian problem comprehensively settled through political means. They have clearly shown their creative and compromising attitudes and have refrained from mentioning issues that might lead to arguments. They have together sought appropriate and just means to crown the meeting with success in order to march forward to another round of the Paris conference at an early date. The opposite side, in particular the Khmer Rouge, still adheres to the old attitude and remains unprepared to solve the problem.

3. Many countries maintain different attitudes. Some want the United Nations to simultaneously maintain

high, decisive roles in three aspects—the control and supervision of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia, the holding of free, equitable, and democratic elections, and the maintenance of civil administrative power during the transitional period with a view to doing away with the old, political and military status quo in Cambodia. Others want the Cambodian issue under the management of both a national supreme council and the United Nations. Still others want a large number of UN peace-keeping forces to be stationed in Cambodia.

Nevertheless, all countries participating in the meeting jointly discussed in detail the draft document of the cochairmen by considering the proposal of Australia and the revised views of various committees. Following the discussion, they unanimously agreed to have the United Nations play a role in settling the Cambodian problem. They also discussed in depth various methods for settling the problem. It is generally seen that all countries want the Cambodian problem politically settled at an early date. Unfortunately, (?the Khmer Rouge) [words indistinct] repeated Prince Norodom Sihanouk's five-point proposal, which has already been raised [words indistinct] in various conferences on Cambodia. As a result, the meeting again failed to achieve success, thus causing disappointment to the various countries participating in the meeting, particularly the host country and Australia which have exerted great efforts in creating mutual understanding to march forward toward a permanent settlement of the problem at an early date. They [the Khmer Rouge] still hope to settle the problem through the use of the military forces fighting along the Thai-Cambodian border. This method seriously opposes the desire of the international community, which concentrates on comprehensively settling the situation in Cambodia.

Our side—Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam—unanimously agreed that the settlement of the Cambodian issue must be done step by step as follows: Maintain the political status quo, that is the two governments in Cambodia; set up a national supreme council; allow the Cambodian people to exercise their rights to self-determination to settle the problem and determine their own destiny through free, fair, and democratic elections in order to build Cambodia into a peaceful, independent, neutral, and nonaligned country in the framework of peace, stability, and cooperation in the Southeast Asian region; put an end to foreign military assistance to Cambodia; and prevent the genocidal regime from returning to power.

Laos and Vietnam also fully supported the principled stance and political policy of the delegation of the State of Cambodia as represented by Hun Sen, chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of foreign affairs of the State of Cambodia. This stance is to maintain the status quo on the two governments, establish a national supreme council as noted in the Hun Sen-Sihanouk statement in Bangkok to serve as a symbol of sovereignty and reunification of Cambodia, accept an appropriate role of the United Nations on the basis of the respect for Cambodia's independence and sovereignty, and carry out work to fulfill roles and responsibilities in accordance with the agreement to be reached following the meeting. During the meeting, our Lao People's Democratic Republic delegation proposed the following five principles for building Southeast Asia into a region of peace, stability, friendship, neutrality, and cooperation as already proposed at JIM-1 and JIM-2 [first and second Jakarta informal meetings] and the Paris conference:

1. Respect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and prestige of all countries.
2. Refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries; do not threaten to use force or resort to force in bilateral relations.
3. Refrain from joining or establishing military alliances with any country, inside or outside the region, with the purpose of opposing each other and opposing countries outside the region; refrain from using other countries' territory and from allowing any country to use territory to oppose other countries.
4. Settle various disagreements and disputes through peaceful means.
5. Promote bilateral or multilateral cooperation in many forms—such as economic, scientific, technical, cultural, information, sports, and other fields—with countries both inside and outside the region—regardless of differences in political and social systems—on the basis of equality, mutual benefits for the prosperity of each country and for progress in the entire region.

This proposal was accepted to be included in the draft document of the cochairmen of the meeting. Though the meeting failed to achieve success, the countries participating in the meeting widely discussed the various proposals included in the draft document as presented by the cochairmen. They agreed on most of the significant issues raised for discussion and deemed it necessary to comprehensively settle the Cambodian problem through political means to enable the Cambodian people to determine their own destiny through free, fair, and democratic elections organized under the supervision of the United Nations. In sum, it can be said that forward steps were achieved in the meeting as compared to the previous meetings and that these steps will serve as the basis for consultative meetings in the next stage.

PASASON Article Views Lao-Thai Relations

BK1303052690 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao 0000 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Undated PASASON article: "The Ties of Fraternal Neighborliness Between Laos and Thailand"]

[Text] Laos and Thailand are independent and sovereign countries and neighbors sharing a common border over 1,700 kilometers long. The Lao and Thai people share similar languages, culture, traditions, and faith. They have maintained good relations from ancient times. This is why they regard this relationship as ties of fraternal

neighborliness and occasionally call it a bloodline relationship. As everyone knows, the relationship is not always smooth. However both in times of estrangement and harmony, the two countries have worked together to find solutions to problems that may have arisen from misunderstandings. The Lao and Thai peoples have come to realize that it is necessary to further strengthen and safeguard their friendly ties by developing brotherly affection. Based on this perception and on the spirit of the 1979 Lao-Thai joint communique signed between the governments, as well as on the implementation of the joint communique of 25 May 1988, Lao-Thai relations have expanded and advanced into a new phase. Bilateral relations and cooperation in economic, trade, social, cultural, technical, and other areas have made new progress.

There are still some weaknesses and shortcomings, but both sides have been endeavoring to overcome them on the principles of equality and mutual interests. For example, the enhancement of fraternal neighborliness in the past few years, conforms with the requirements of the new regional situation, and the aspiration and interests of the Lao and Thai peoples. The Lao people always want to maintain and promote fraternal neighborliness with the Thai people on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and cooperation in developing the economy and culture for their common interests, so they can live in happiness and prosperity forever.

U.S.-Funded Rural Development Project Begins

BK1403101590 Vientiane KPL in English 0916 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Text] Vientiane, March 13 (KPL)—The initial stage of the Lao-U.S. cooperation project for rural development in the northern Houa Phan Province is set in motion.

The cutting [as received] of a 60-km road linking Hiam and Son District has achieved 23 km. Another road building project between the municipal town of Houa Meuang and Pakhanaleng hamlet has just started.

The project has taken shape following the agreement between Laos and the U.S.A. in Vientiane on September 30, 1989. According to the agreement, the U.S.A. has agreed to grant 200,000 U.S. dollars worth of initial funds for the road building, the installation of a communications system, and the collection of socioeconomic data in Son and Houa Meuang Districts of Houa Phan.

Philippines

Aquino Stresses Military Professionalism

HK1703061790 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan in Tagalog 0400 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Speech by President Corazon C. Aquino at the second convention of the National ROTC Alumni Association (NARAA) at the Commissioned Officers' Clubhouse, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City—live in English—italicized passage in Tagalog]

[Text] Brigadier General Romulo Yap, General Renato de Villa, Undersecretary Feliciano Gacis, Brig. Gen Gerardo Protacio, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, participants of the National ROTC Alumni Association convention, honored guests, ladies and gentlemen:

I am pleased to extend my congratulations to you, members of the National ROTC Alumni Association, on your second anniversary and the opening of your second annual national convention. I understand that this convention aims to address some key concerns of the association. I am sure that you will remember to look at the key concerns of the nation as you deliberate on the association's direction.

As many of you know, I met last February 16 with Gen. Gerry Protacio who was installed as the new commanding general of the Philippine Air Force several days later as well as Brig. Gen. Romy Yap and other officers of the Naraa. We had the most candid exchange of views and perceptions and I had a better opportunity to know the sentiments of our reserved officers as well as those integrated into the regular force of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Your organization's goal and objectives as outlined to me are certainly helpful in nation-building. I am glad that you have organized yourselves primarily to harness the will and ability of all reserved officers and integrees in the service of nation and people. Surely your secondary objective, to promote your common interest, will fall in line with the foremost objective of your association. Your purpose certainly can contribute to the strengthening of the military establishment. I congratulate you for rising to the needs of our times.

Needless to say, you have my support and that of the Filipino people. We all cherish noble ends such as the ideals of your association to build a more professional armed forces. I urge you therefore to continue with your initiative to enhance the fair, just, and equitable application of the law on regulations and policies governing your profession.

Along this line, you are probably aware that I issued in December 1986 executive order number 79 to ensure the security of tenure of deserving reserved officers who have accumulated ten or more years of continuous active commission service. In effect, reserved officers today can look forward to a lifetime career in the military without requiring them to apply individually for an annual extension of their services and thus paving the way for planning a long-term commitment to the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Congress, too, is concerned about you. Filed at the Senate is Senate Bill 769 or the AFP Active Force Commissioned Officers Personnel Management Act intended to remove any residual inequities with respect to the status of reserved officers within the organization.

I understand the bill is being readied for first reading. I am awaiting the Senate's action so that I may also do my part to hasten the approval of this bill.

It is my concern that the leadership of the Armed Forces of the Philippines be continuously drawn only from the best and brightest of its officers' corps, regardless of source of commission. In pursuit of this objective, we must develop a free competitive climate to allow the rise to position of leadership of those qualified on the basis of individual merits, performance and potentials.

In this regard, I assure the members of Naraa that senior officers being cosidered for key assignments and promotions to general and flag rank are now made to undergo a most stringent process of evaluation. That process includes no less a personal interview by the commander in chief. [applause] Generals Protacio, Yap and other general officers promoted in my time can attest to this.

It would be well for everyone to be reminded that an officer must be able to stand on his own in competition with his peers within the parameters established for advancement or promotion to higher responsibilities and ranks. For every officers should be confident enough in his ability to compete with others on the basis of his own track record, his credentials, and the system itself. There can be no other avenue for anyone to move up in the higher echelons of our Armed Forces. It is good that your association is directing efforts toward the creation of an atmosphere to make sure that only those eminently and manifestly qualified can assume positions of high leadership in our military organization.

I call upon all of you, officers and members of Naraa, to dedicate yourselves to the further professionalization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to contribute your individual and collective energy toward its strength and unity.

My warmest felicitations to all of you on your anniversary and my hope that you will carry on.

Good afternoon to all and thank you very much. [applause]

Aquino Urges Approval of Energy Standby Fund

HK1503073190 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog 0700 GMT 15 Mar 90

[By Gabby Salcedo—italicized passage in English]

[Text] President Aquino is not in favor of any oil price increase at this time. In this connection, she has urged Congress to legislate the bill creating the Energy Standby Fund that would support the Oil Price Stabilization Fund [OPSF]. Mrs. Aquino's statement was communicated through Presidential Spokesman Adolf Azcuna. She was also reacting to reports that some oil firms, except the state-owned Petron Corporation, are bracing to ask for a new round of increases in petrol rates. Here is the president's statement read by Mr. Azcuna:

[Begin recording] *It is the Energy Regulatory Board that considers and decides petitions for increases in the price of petroleum products. I am for avoiding some increases at this time if possible and [word indistinct] for taking all possible measures to minimize its adverse impact on our people.*

There is a standby fund to replenish the OPFS and provide the alternative or the cushion to subsidize the increase. I am, therefore, pressing our legislators to enact this urgent measure now as I had requested. [end recording]

Aquino Views Oil Standby Fund, Other Issues

HK1603095990 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog 0900 GMT 16 Mar 90

[Italicized passage in English]

[Text] President Aquino said a decision has not yet been reached about the sale of government properties in Fujimi, Japan. She reacted to Vice President Laurel's statement, saying that former President Jose Laurel owned these properties.

The president again made an appeal to the Senate to approve the resolution seeking for the oil standby fund.

On another issue, she said the military is studying whether former Marcos loyalist Vicente Puyat knew that rebel soldiers were staying in his house in Del Monte, Bulacan. Captain Wilhelm Doromal was arrested there.

[Begin recording] *As you all know the secretary of justice was sought to determine the legal feasibility, one of several options, being considered by the committee. That is the use of a portion of the proceeds of that property for the construction of the chancery and the ambassador's residence in another property without congressional appropriation. Furthermore, the request, as well as the opinion itself, was made before the Supreme Court [words indistinct] to the case involving the Roppongi property. The opinion is dated February 15, 1990. No final decision has yet been made on the Fujimi property.*

Number two, I am reiterating the urgent need to pass the energy standby fund legislation if we are to avoid price increases in petroleum products at this time. I hope that Congress will respond positively to these needs.

Number three, the military is assessing the evidence against Mr. Vicente Puyat. [end recording]

That was Mrs Aquino's statement read by presidential spokesman Adolf Azcuna.

Senate President To Run for President in 1992

HK1703061990 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan in Tagalog 0600 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Senate President Jovito Salonga announced that he will run for president in 1992 regardless of whether or

not the President runs for reelection. He added that the Liberal Party will begin working on its political agenda by mid-1991.

Salonga, who is chairman of the Liberal Party, has long been considered a leading presidential candidate even before he made his announcement.

Enrile Charged for Harboring Honasan During Coup

HK1703074290 Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 17 Mar 90 p 18

[By Aris R. Ilagan]

[Text] The Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued yesterday another warrant of arrest for Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile for allegedly harboring former Army Lt. Col. Gregorio Honassan and about 100 heavily armed rebel soldiers during the December failed coup attempt.

But even before the warrant of arrest was served on Enrile, the senator personally gave himself up to Makati RTC Judge Ignacio Capulong at noon yesterday.

His lawyers, led by Renato Cayetano, immediately posted P[peso]50,000 bail as recommended by government prosecutors for Enrile's temporary release.

Military Chief Says Rebels 'Incapable' of Coup

HK1703073790 Hong Kong AFP in English 0733 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] Manila, March 17 (AFP)—The chief of the Philippine armed forces Saturday warned that rebel soldiers were poised to launch bombing and assassination attacks but said they were incapable of launching a new coup attempt.

"We don't believe there will be another coup. What's only possible now is some terroristic activities like bombings," General Renato de Villa told reporters. "Their forces have continuously been diminished but we acknowledge that they are still capable of terroristic activities like assassinations, bombings and other forms of harassment," he added.

At least 119 people died and 400 others were wounded in December when rebel troops launched the sixth and the bloodiest coup attempt against President Corazon Aquino since she became president in 1986.

Gen. de Villa said he expects rightwing rebel leaders to agitate the people to work against the government, which was being asked by oil firms to raise the prices of petroleum. "(Rebel leaders) will certainly be exploiting any issue especially if it's something emotional in order to agitate the people," he said. The December coup attempt was launched a day after the government raised petroleum prices. "We speculated last year after the oil price increase there could be a coup and we can expect them to exploit this issue once again," Gen. de Villa added.

Rebellion Charge Against Businessman Considered

HK1703043790 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan in Tagalog 0420 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] President Aquino ordered the Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP] to examine carefully the evidence on hand to decide on whether rebellion charges can be filed against businessman Vicente Puyat. The military claimed that more evidence was gathered when Major Wilhelm Doromal was captured in the house of Puyat. Doromal is an explosives expert who is wanted for his role in the aborted coup d'etat.

AFP chief of staff General Renato de Villa has said that rebellion charges will be filed against Puyat because Doromal was arrested in his house in Bulacan.

Rebel Military Officers Escape From Hospital

HK1603071290 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog 0700 GMT 16 Mar 90

[Text] Two rebel military officials who participated in the failed December 1989 coup have escaped from hospital. According to the Armed Forces of the Philippines' V. Luna Hospital spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Renato Maligaya, Marine Captain Ariel Querubin and Army 1st Lieutenant Jener del Rosario were discovered missing during this morning's patients' roll call. Querubin and Rosario were both wounded in the firefight at Camp Aguinaldo last December.

Development Authority Approves Seven Projects

HK1403135390 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog 1300 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Italicized passage in English]

[Text] The regular NEDA [National Economic and Development Authority] board meeting today approved seven more projects to be implemented between 1990 and 1997. A total of 17.9 billion pesos will be allocated for the projects expected to promote development in the country's rural areas. The biggest projects are the 5.6 billion pesos geothermal plant program and the 2.1 billion pesos fresh water supply, sewerage, and sanitation project.

Meanwhile, Press Secretary Tomas Gomez III stated that NEDA's priority at the moment is the development of General Santos City.

[Begin Gomez recording] *Seven projects to be implemented in different parts of the country plus the star of the show, the third special development project centering in General Santos City. This is a special development project [SDP], first of the five SDP's to be funded by the Philippine Assistance Program. Do you remember that the first model is in Samar, the second one is in Panay? Now, President Corazon Aquino commended the performance of Chito Ayala, Attorney Jesus Chito Ayala because the General Santos City special development project was initiated by Region 11.* [end recording]

'Indicator' Notes Fewer Strikes in Jan-Feb

HK1403032190 Manila BUSINESS STAR in English 14 Mar 90 p 2

["Indicator" column by Conrado M. Diaz Jr: "Continued Strike Downtrend Noted in 1st 2 Months of 1990"]

[Text] There were less strikes which marred the labor front during the first two months of the year but the number of workers who got involved was greater than year-ago levels, latest data from the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) indicate.

Per advance estimates of the labor department-attached body for the period Feb. 1 to Feb. 28, declared strikes numbered 18 nationwide. But reckoned on the basis of the record of first two months this year, from Jan. 1 to Feb 28, the number of actual strikes declared throughout the country was 33, which is 19.5% less than the 41 cases monitored during the same period in 1989.

February this year's strikes added to seven cases carried over from last year. This brought the total number of actual strikes inside and outside Metro Manila to 25 during the period. But again, on the longer Jan. 1 to Feb. 28 time period, the figure is greater, at 45, but still less 5 cases compared to the 50 recorded during the same period last year.

Of the total 45 work stoppages which occurred the first two months this year, 27 were in Metro Manila while 18 were in the provinces. Comparatively, of the 50 monitored last year, 26 were in Metro Manila while 24 were in the provinces.

This only means that workers in Metro Manila so far, are more militant than their provincial counterparts.

But while declared strikes decreased this year, the number of workers who spearheaded them rose, by 103%, on a first two months' reckoning, from 9,541 in 1989 to 19,365.

Striking workers this year were most numerous in Metro Manila, at 15,442. This, the NCMB attributed to the strike held by the 12,000-strong daily-paid workers of the San Miguel Corporation (SMC) sometime late February. This was at about the same time the number of striking workers was monitored as having grown to 12,134 between Feb. 23 and 28 from only 900 between Feb. 1 and 7 this year. Consequent of the rise in worker participation in actual strikes this year, total mandays lost increased, from 141,000 to 185,000.

In terms of the issues which triggered the strikes, unfair labor practices remained the principal one. In fact, of the 33 actual strikes during the first two month period, 28 were cased by unfair labor practices.

Complaints included illegal dismissal and suspension of union officers and membeers, discrimination against and harassment of union members, refusal to bargain or bargaining in bad faith, and violation or non-implementation of collective bargaining agreements (CBAs).

Collective bargaining deadlocks were also major strike triggers, as evidenced by 19 cases which erupted on account of such an issue.

Unions in the manufacturing sector, meanwhile, dominated the strike scene during the period under review, with 21 cases or 64% of the total.

Strikes also hit the wholesale and retail sector, with 4; agriculture, fishery and forestry, 3; community, social, recreational and personal services, 2; and, one each in the mining and quarrying, electricity, gas and water services, and transport, storage and communication sectors.

Most of these strikes occurred in Metro Manila, at 18, while the rest occurred in Region IV (Southern Luzon), 5; Region III (Central Luzon), 3; Regions X and XI (Northern and Southern Mindanao), 2 each; and, Regions V, VIL and XII (Bicol, Central Visayas and Central Mindanao), one each.

ACTUAL STRIKES/LOCKOUTS DECLARED AND WORKERS INVOLVED, PHILIPPINES: 1989 AND 1990 (JAN. 1 - FEB. 28)

	1989 (Jan. 1-Feb 28)		
Indicator	Total	Metro Manila	Outside M. MLA
Pending beginning of period	9	4	5
Actual strikes/lock-outs declared during the period	41	22	19
Total, to date	50	26	24
Workers involved in actual strikes/lockouts declared during the period	9,541	7,192	2,349
	1990 (Jan. 1-Feb 28)		
Indicator	Total	Metro Manila	Outside M. MLA
Pending beginning of period	12	9	3
Actual strikes/lock-outs declared during the period	33	18	15
Total, to date	45	27	18
Workers involved in actual strikes/lockouts declared during the period	19,365	15,442	3,923

	February Update *a/				
Indicator	1-7	8-15	16-22	23-28	Total
Pending beginning of period	7	6	10	15	7
Actual strikes/lockouts declared during the period	1	8	6	3	18
Total, to date	8	14	16	18	25
Workers involved in actual strikes/ lockouts declared during the period	900	828	492	12,134	14,354
*a/advance estimates					

Thailand

Sitthi Views Cambodian Talks, Refugee Camps

BK1703050490 Bangkok THE NATION in English 17 Mar 90 p 3

[By Kunlachada Chaiphiphat]

[Text] Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila said yesterday that he objected to a proposal for Thailand to host Cambodian peace talks with representatives from China, Vietnam and ASEAN countries. Sitthi said such a meeting ran counter to an ASEAN principle that the Cambodian people should have the right of self-determination

China and Vietnam, direct partners in the Cambodian conflict, have never met to resolve the issue in any forum, whether it be the informal Jakarta meetings or the peace conferences in Paris. But earlier this week, China hinted at the possibility of participating in a meeting with Vietnam. A meeting between China and Vietnam was proposed on March 5 by Prince Norodom Sihanouk after peace talks in Jakarta failed to produce a solution.

Speaking to reporters after his return from a tour of Eastern Europe, Sitthi said the proposed meeting was "unsound," given ASEAN's call at the UN General Assembly for a comprehensive settlement which includes Cambodians' right of self-determination and not "an imposition of a solution" by China, Vietnam or Thailand. "The Prince may accept it (an imposition of a solution), but I am not sure if the three other Cambodian factions would agree to that," added Sitthi.

The minister said he would seek China's views on the proposal when he visits that country for a week beginning March 27. During the meeting, Sitthi said he will discuss the latest developments toward a settlement including progress made at a conference in Paris of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Sitthi also spoke on Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan's proposal to establish neutral camps in Thailand for Cambodian refugees now living in border camps controlled by the three resistance factions. Sitthi said the issue needed to be studied by all Thai agencies concerned with establishing the camps. "Wherever the camps are located, the people, according to the ASEAN principle, should be free from any military and political influences by all the warring factions," he said.

Chawalit Postpones SRV Trip; May Not Resign

BK1703050090 Bangkok THE NATION in English 17 Mar 90 p 2

[Text] Acting Supreme Commander Gen [General] Chawalit Yongchaiyut said yesterday he had decided to postpone his trip to Vietnam late this month because he is not yet ready for it.

Gen Chawalit did not give any further explanation on the abrupt change and Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff Gen Sunthon Khongsomphong, in a separate interview, only said that the supreme commander must take into consideration the "right timing" for such a visit, originally scheduled to take place shortly after March 20. Speaking with reporters after a function to mark the 50th anniversary of the Supreme Command's establishment, Gen Sunthon said that Gen Chawalit had to take into consideration the fast-changing political situation.

After playing golf with Communications Minister Montri Phongphanit at the army's golf course, Gen Chawalit refused to commit himself on Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan's offer for him to join the coalition Cabinet. "How can I say whether I will join or not when I have not entered my resignation just yet," he said. Gen Chawalit had earlier pledged that he will resign shortly after a royal ceremony in which His Majesty the King will confer on him and other military officers Ramathibodi medals on March 27.

In a surprise statement, Gen Sunthon said that Gen Chawalit's resignation plan was not "definite." "Gen Chawalit cannot decide on his resignation alone because he needs approval from his superiors (Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan) in his capacity as defence minister," Gen Sunthon said, adding that Gen Chawalit may even stay on until his term expires in 1992. He did not elaborate.

Committee Raises Minimum Wage; Employers Upset

BK1703044490 Bangkok THE NATION in English 17 Mar 90 pp 1, 2

[By Khongchet Phromnamphon, Charoenkit Sisuksai]

[Excerpt] The Wage Committee yesterday fixed a new daily minimum wage for Bangkok and major provinces at Bt [baht] 90, a 15 percent increase, satisfying labour unions but not employer groups.

All 10 labour and government representatives in the tripartite panel voted in favour of the Bt12 increase, while the five representatives of employers abstained during the voting, which followed a heated debate. THe new rate will take effect on April 1 and affects Bangkok, Nonthaburi, Nakhon Pathom, Samut Prakan, Samut Sakhon and Phuket provinces.

The Wage Committee also increased the minimum wages for the rest of the country by nine baht: Bt84 for Ranong and Phang-nga; Bt79 for Saraburi, Chon Buri, Nakhon Ratchasima and Chiang Mai and Bt74 for the 70 other provinces.

The committee rejected a proposal by the unions to further raise the minimum wage in October to Bt95. The five employer representatives walked out of the meeting at the Labour Department when a vote was called on the proposed wage, while the government side abstained.

Labour leaders, who had pushed for a Bt95 minimum wage, seemed satisfied with the Wage Committee's decision. [passage omitted]

Editorial on 'Distressing Trend' in Drug Trade

BK1903040590 Bangkok THE NATION in English 19 Mar 90 p 9

[Editorial: "A Distressing Trend"]

[Text] Last week's events clearly showed that Thailand has indeed become the primary conduit for heroin smuggled from the Golden Triangle to the world, notably to markets in the US and Western Europe. Consider the following evidence:

—10 kilos of heroin were seized from nine Nigerian drug smugglers preparing to leave Bangkok for Lagos on Wednesday;
—20 kilos of heroin hidden in two golf bags were smuggled out of Bangkok but detected in Manila on Wednesday when an X-ray was run on baggage being loaded on an airline bound for San Francisco;
—9 kilos of heroin were seized from a Thai about to board a flight bound for Zurich on Thursday;
—100 kilos of heroin were found hidden in a truck whose Thai driver intended to take it to Malaysia on Friday.

This is a distressing trend. Something in our drug enforcement system must have gone seriously wrong. But what was it?

Melvyn Levisky, US assistant secretary of state for international narcotics matters, says corruption is the prime factor hampering Thai enforcement efforts. He points out that the Golden Triangle had an exceptionally good year for opium cultivation last year. A surge in the supply of heroin, which is refined from opium tar, is to be expected this year.

Attorney General Richard Thornburgh has even singled out Khun Sa, commander of the Shan United Army, an ethnic minority rebellion movement in Burma, as the "largest dope pusher" in Southeast Asia. The US official has had Khun Sa indicted for smuggling and attempting to smuggle tons of heroin into the US—including the 1,086 kilos of heroin hidden in rubber bales seized at Khlong Toei port in 1988.

The US is worried because nearly half of the heroin seized in the US comes from the Golden Triangle. Unfortunately, the Bush administration is no longer in a strong position to influence the situation in Southeast Asia. Its relationship with Rangoon has not been good since General Saw Maung seized power in a bloody coup in September 1988. Just last week, the Saw Muang regime refused to cooperate with Washington in going after Khun Sa.

Washington's ties with Vientiane have improved slightly in recent years but their bilateral anti-drug programmes are small in scale and slow-going. The US has been more successful in helping Thailand reduce the cultivation of opium in the northern provinces through crop substitution and occupation training programmes.

Since not much can be done to reduce narcotics production in the Golden Triangle, more efforts should go into stopping the flow of drugs from the area where the borders of Burma, Laos and Thailand meet. More manpower, better equipment and closer international cooperation, etc , are needed for enforcement authorities to keep up with the drug dealers and smugglers.

But first of all corruption in the Thai enforcement system must be rooted out. A police colonel in the North was recently arrested for drug trafficking. A police major general has been under investigation since the US Drug Enforcement Administration accused him of involvement in smuggling heroin into the US.

We are afraid, however, that it will not be easy to stop corruption since so much money can be made from dealing in narcotics. The price of heroin in Bangkok is about ten times that in the Golden Triangle and the price in the US is about ten times the price of heroin in Bangkok. The lure of profits is too strong for many to resist.

The US must therefore try harder to reduce demand so that the price will fall and hopefully make it no longer highly profitable to invest in this deadly "business."

At present a large number of drug couriers, most of them Nigerian men, are employed by drug dealers in the US to smuggle heroin from Bangkok into the US. During the last five months, nearly 180 of these couriers were arrested. Yesterday two more Nigerians were arrested in possession of nearly 3 kilos of heroin.

One widely-used method of transporting the drug is ingesting it. These couriers swallow about 1 kilo of heroin each, engough to kill them many times over if the condoms they have packed the drug in burst, and can easily walk through airport customs clearance. Since

their employer is willing to pay their air tickets, hotel bills, and other expenses, he must be able to sell each kilo of heroin for a rather high price to cover the investment and still make a handsome profit. And undoubtedly the employer must also have good connections in Bangkok where their couriers can get the heroin.

If this distressing trend continues, soon all our prisons will be overcrowded with drug convicts, many of whom are desperate foreigners from poor countries trying to make some money by working as drug couriers. Thailand will also be branded with a notorious reputation as the primary springboard for a large share of the world's heroin.

Narcotics smuggling is a serious threat that must be dealt with without delay. Since profits represent the foremost motive in this "business," it is time that Thailand introduce legislation to confiscate the assets of convicted drug dealers.

Vietnam

Reported Return to Cambodia Called 'Fabrication'

BK1703110490 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0015 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Station commentary by Van Luyen: "A Discordant Chorus"]

[Text] After the Jakarta informal meeting on Cambodia concluded without adopting a final document due to Khmer Rouge sabotage, a number of foreign news agencies have chimed in with the Khmer Rouge in chanting a discordant chorus about a theoretical return by Vietnamese troops to Cambodia. We reject this ill-intentioned fabrication.

Why did such groundless reports surface after the Jakarta meeting at a time when many countries and international organizations are repeatedly offering new initiatives for a comprehensive political solution to the Cambodian issue? As everyone knows, the Armed Forces of the State of Cambodia are dealing painful blows to the Khmer reactionaries and preserving a peaceful life for the Cambodian people. The prestige of the State of Cambodia is growing, and the country is gaining more sympathy from other countries around the world. It still stands firm on its own feet in the cause of national defense and construction six months after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.

By spreading news about a return by Vietnamese troops to Cambodia, the Khmer reactionaries and other hostile forces have attempted, on the one hand, to damage the image of the State of Cambodia while, on the other hand, to confuse public opinion—which is demanding that the genocidal clique be brought before the bar of justice—and to create skepticism about Vietnam's goodwill toward a political solution to the Cambodian issue. Spreading reports on a return by Vietnamese troops to Cambodia, the Khmer reactionaries have also attempted to use this as a screen to hide their setbacks and to create imaginary victories so they can get more international aid reserved for the refugee camps located along the Thai-Cambodian border, which are likely to be neutralized under international control as recently suggested by the Thai prime minister.

Vietnam has done all it can to promote a political solution in Cambodia. Vietnam stands to gain nothing in prologing the civil war in Cambodia. Our stance has been clearly expressed at various international forums on Cambodia. At the recent Jakarta meeting, under the framework of a comprehensive political solution, Vietnam held that the United Nations also has the responsibility to monitor, supervise, and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign troops and the non-reintroduction as well as non-introduction of foreign troops into Cambodia. Isn't this evidence of Vietnam's goodwill? This is all undeniable fact. Those chimming in with the Khmer Rouge in chanting the discordant chorus will only lend a helping hand to the genocidal clique in prologing the civil war, causing more suffering to the Cambodian people and creating conditions for the Khmer Rouge to achieve their ignonimous schemes to prevent a successful political solution in Cambodia.

Thailand's Chawalit Visit Called 'Turning Point'

BK1903113390 Hanoi International Service in English 1000 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] General Chawalit Yongchaiyut, acting supreme commander of the Armed Forces of Thailand, will start a visit to Vietnam on 20 March. Here is our commentary on the recent development of Vietnamese-Thai relations:

Recent periods saw a fine development in the Thai-Vietnamese relations. Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan, General Chawalit Yongchaiyut, and other senior leaders of Thailand have had good remarks on Vietnam. In late February this year, the top leader of the Bangkok government affirmed that Thailand will consolidate and develop its friendship and cooperation with Vietnam. Meanwhile, General Chawalit Yongchaiyut said that the government and people of Thailand have never considered Vietnam an enemy. Thailand regards Vietnam as a good friend. Thailand can discuss the regional peace issue with Vietnam, and Vietnam understands that stance of Thailand. Thailand has not only expressed its goodwill toward Vietnam by words but also by its actions. Thailand has been setting up a technological and trading center with Laos and Cambodia. The Bangkok government allows Thai businessmen to trade with Vietnam. Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan called on Western countries to invest and give aid to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to turn this area into a center of economic development in Southeast Asia.

Thailand's position on Cambodia has had positive changes. From confrontation against the Phnom Penh

government, Thailand has held talks and virtually supported the State of Cambodia. General Chawalit Yongchaiyut himself initiated and arranged the four visits to Bangkok of Cambodian Chairman Hun Sen. In particular, after the unsuccessful Informal Meeting on Cambodia in Jakarta, Thailand continued its positive actions in finding a solution to the Cambodian issue. The top leader of the Thai Government put forward a new proposal on the closing down of Cambodian refugee camps in Thailand. The Thai prime minister also said that his government dissociates with the self-styled Coalition Government of Democratic Cambodia. In the future, Thailand will officially recognize the Phnom Penh government, he added.

These actions of Thailand have made great contributions to improving the relations between Vietnam and Thailand. The peoples of Vietnam, Thailand, and other countries in the world are elated at the development of the relationship between the two countries and believe these relations will be further developed in the future. The visit to Vietnam of General Chawalit Yongchaiyut this time will certainly create a turning point in the relations between the two countries. People hope that with Thailand's [word indistinct] of and goodwill toward Vietnam, the visit will be a success.

New Envoy to China on Wish for Normalized Ties

BK1603162490 Hanoi VNA in English 1534 GMT 16 Mar 90

[Text] Hanoi VNA March 16—The Vietnamese Government and people have always treasured the long-standing friendship between the two peoples of Vietnam and China and wished the relationship between the two countries would be normalized soon and the friendship and cooperation between the two countires be restored and developed in the interests of the two peoples and of peace and stability in South East Asia and the world.

This was stated by Vietnamese Ambassador to China Dang Nghiem Hoanh while presenting his credentials on March 16 to President of the People's Republic of China Yang Shangkun. He also conveyed to the Chinese leader best regards from State Council President Vo Chi Cong.

For his part, President Yang Shangkun said now the friendship between the two countries should be improved for it is in the interests of the two peoples.

Le Quang Dao Greets Supreme Soviet President

BK1603161890 Hanoi VNA in English 1532 GMT 16 Mar 90

[Text] Hanoi VNA March 16th—National Assembly Chairman Le Quang Dao has sent his congratulations to Anatoliy Lukyanov on his election as president of the Supreme Soviet of USSR.

The Vietnamese leader expressed his belief that the fraternal Soviet people, under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, would overcome all difficuties and trials, taking their restructuration forward, bringing a new strength to socialism in the Soviet Union and positively contributing to peace and progress in the world.

12-13 Mar Paris Meeting on Cambodia Reported

BK1603053490 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 15 Mar 90

[Text] According to foreign sources, representatives of the five big powers participating in the International Conference on Cambodia held their third vice foreign ministerial meeting in Paris on 12 and 13 March to continue an exchange of views on the various aspects of a political solution to the Cambodian issue. At the end of the meeting, the representatives released a report on the contents of their discussions. They agreed to meet again in New York in mid-May.

Public Views on Party's Mass Mobilization Work

BK1503152590 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 11 Mar 90

["Voice of Vietnam editor's review of opinions contributed by people of all walks of life through the Voice of Vietnam to the draft program of the party Central Committee's Eighth Plenum"]

[Summary] Dear friends, since the draft program of the party Central Committee's Eighth Plenum on renovating and intensifying the party's mass mobilization work and truly developing the people's right to mastery was made public more than a month ago, our listeners throughout the country have sent hundreds of letters to the Voice of Vietnam to contribute their opinions to the draft program. Many listeners have also called on the station editorial staff to express their opinions. In addition, our station correspondents have interviewed representatives of peasants, workers, intellectuals, youths, women, clergymen of various faiths, and retirees, and participated in discussions held by various units, public organs, work sites, schools, and mass organizations.

Worthy of note first of all is that the great majority of views expressed are constructive and sincere. This shows that our people of all strata still firmly trust the party and hope that the party will continue the cause of renovation, which has brought about initial results, and continue to rectify shortcomings and deficiencies in order to fulfill its historic mission. No one has questioned the party's leadership over the cause of socialist construction in our country at present. Many people reject the raising of the issue of a multiparty system or political pluralism on the grounds that since each country is in a different situation, we need not compare our country with others or copy them. The majority of peasants and workers hold that it is thanks to our party that Vietnam has become known throughout the world. If the party performs some tasks unsatisfactorily and even makes mistakes, together with the people it can make rectifications. The people trust the party, and vice versa. In our country, there

should be only one people and one party. Because of this, however, many suggest that the party should step up the renovation process.

All welcome the party's solicitation of public suggestions to the draft program of the party Central Committee's Eighth Plenum, considering this a fine manifestation of the restoration of an old tradition recently neglected. In the opinion of many, the party is distanced from the people and thus loses their trust because the working mechanism of party and state organs is bureaucratic and unpopular. More than a few party cadres at different levels have abused their authority, looking down on and oppressing the people. With their grievances unresolved, the people lose their trust in the party. Many suggest that the party should respect the role of mass organizations and assign capable persons instead of those who are about to retire, who are inept, who are under disciplinary action, and who lack respect for the masses to work at these organizations. Regarding this, some note that special attention should be given to activities of the mass media, which can promptly and openly reflect the people's feelings and aspirations.

One of the issues that has been most frequently discussed is social equity. Many retirees—including party and state cadres and military persons—and elderly people in the countryside suggest that organizations be set up to enable retirees, many of whom are still physically fit, to bring their experiences into play and create wealth for society. Workers at construction worksites, factories, and agricultural cooperatives point out that there is currently too big a gap in their income and that of those of the service and trade sector and a small number of cadres of position and power. Many propose that to win the masses' support, the party should strictly and justly deal with cadres and party members who harm the party's interests by oppressing the masses, engaging in corrupt practices, receiving bribes, and living in luxury.

Dear friends, our listeners' suggestions reveal the truth that the Vietnamese people are closely attached to the party. Some people, however, may feel indifferent only because at certain times and in certain places many party members have kept their distance from the people and failed to live like the people do, thus weakening the party's vitality. Everyone's most ardent wish is for the party to purify its internal ranks immediately to carry out its mass mobilization policy satisfactorily.

Review of March Issue of Army Journal

BK1603100390 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2330 GMT 11 Mar 90

[Summary] In its March 1990 issue, TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN carries an article by General Doan Khue entitled "Enhance Training Quality in Basic Units." This is followed by views expressed by the journal's political section in a number of meetings to contribute opinions to the eighth party plenum's draft platform.

In this issue, the journal introduces a series of articles by a number of army officers as follows: "Renovating Party Leadership Over Youth and Work Related to Youth in the Armed Forces" by Lieutenant General Le Kha Phieu; "Military Training and Training of Reservist Officers in Colleges and Vocational Training Schools in the Seventh Military Region" by Colonel Dinh Xuan Nghiem; "Meeting with the Comrade Provincial People's Committee Chairman During a Local Defense Exercise in the Province of Son La" by Major General Nguyen Phu Khuat; "Some Thoughts about the World-wide Trend of Detente and Our National Defense at Present" by Lieutenant General Nguyen The Bon; "War and Politics: A New Thinking" by Lieutenant General Le Hong Quang; "Military Facts and Vietnam's Military Science in the New Situation" by Colonel Ngo Chi Cap, "Some Opinions on Building the Air Force in the New Situation" by Major General Pham Thanh Nhan; "Some Problems Concerning the Development of Military Air Defense Science" by Colonel Ho Si Huu; "How To Organize Armed Forces Schools and Train Military Cadres" by Major General Do Phu Vang; and "Some Opinions on Scientific and Technical Research in our Armed Forces at Present" by Colonel Ho Thanh Minh.

The journal then carries the contents of an exchange of views between its correspondents and the management board and party secretariat of National Defense Enterprise A-34 concerning the efficiency of party-building activities and political work in the armed forces. In the final part of this issue, the journal runs a commentary by Tran Trong entitled "Panama: A War of Aggression Waged by the United States in the Framework of its NIC [Newly Industrialized Countries] Doctrine," an article by Duong Van Ky entitled "Renovating Thinking About Documentary Information," and an essay by Tran Ninh under the headline "Concerning the Soviet Concept of Maintaining Just Enough Numerical Strength for National Defense."

Correction to U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy

BK1603025590

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "Article Views U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy," published in the 15 March East Asia DAILY REPORT, pages 51-52:

Page 51, column two, paragraph two, sentence three, reads: It consists of 50,000 U.S. troops stationed in some 100 military bases in Japan and 350,000 soldiers of the Japanese Defense Force. (correcting figure 350,000)

Australia

Government Regrets Iraqi's Execution of Journalist

BK1603005890 Hong Kong AFP in English 1728 GMT 15 Mar 90

[Text] Canberra March 15 (AFP)—The Australian Government deeply regretted the execution in Iraq of Iranian-born journalist Farzad Bazoft who worked for Britain's OBSERVER newspaper, a foreign affairs official said here Thursday [15 March].

"We are very saddened by this," the official said.

"The Australian Government does not support capital punishment anywhere in the world."

Mr. Bazoft was executed after being found guilty of spying, despite British pleas for mercy to Iraq's President Saddam Husayn.

Hawke Blasts Peacock on Japanese High-Tech City

BK1803103890 Hong Kong AFP in English 1017 GMT 18 Mar 90

[Text] Sydney, March 18 (AFP)—Prime Minister Bob Hawke on Sunday blasted as "dangerous nonsense" a rejection by opposition leader Andrew Peacock of a joint Japanese-Australian plan to build a city of the future in Australia. But the Conservative Mr. Peacock, who said he opposed the creation of "enclaves," denied Sunday that race had prompted his stand—which has triggered the biggest row in a lacklustre campaign ahead of general elections March 24.

Mr. Hawke told reporters in Melbourne that Mr. Peacock turned down the opportunity for a detailed briefing on the proposed city, which would feature high-tech industry, communication and leisure facilities. Mr. Hawke said his opponent had "opportunistically and very dangerously misrepresented" the proposed city as "a Japanese enclave," adding that "Mr. Peacock ... knows that he is talking dangerous nonsense."

The Labour prime minister accused Mr. Peacock of exploiting the issue in a last-ditch effort to reverse the fortunes of his trailing Liberal Party.

Mr. Peacock said in a statement Friday he saw the proposed city as a potential enclave that "would be socially divisive and risk a backlash against foreign investment and immigration generally." But in a televised interview Sunday the Conservative leader stressed that financial considerations were the basis for his opposition to the proposed "multi-function polis." "You'll have a negative impact on trade for about 20 years," he said. "There is a cost—maybe borne by the private sector, but money that could be used elsewhere—of 13 billion dollars (9.8 billion U.S.), and no guarantee of technology transfers."

Mr. Peacock vehemently denied that he was injecting racism into the campaign. He said the enclave notion was an "additional argument" against the 1987 Japanese proposal but told his interviewer: "Under no circumstance would I take a decision on the basis that you are putting to me."

Australia's Labor government has embraced the plan to build an international city of up to 200,000 people but said it would not proceed without significant involvement of other countries in addition to Japan. Industry, Technology and Commerce Minister John Button said Sunday that a study on the feasibility of the proposal was due by June 30 and that six months of public consultation would begin in April.

Treasurer Paul Keating on Saturday called Mr. Peacock's comment that the city could become an enclave as "ill-judged" and wrong. "I see it basically as a remark to offend our largest trading partner, which can do nothing to help the sale of farm produce," Mr. Keating told reporters.

Asian immigration has been a delicate issue since Conservatives, backed by Australia's influential war veterans group, two years ago suggested curbing Asian immigration if it jeopardised social harmony here. They backed down after the suggestion provoked widespread resentment in the region.

The Retired Servicemen's League (RSL) moved Friday to reopen the debate, accusing the major parties of ducking the isssue and calling for a referendum on the racial mix of immigrants. RSL President Brigadier Alf Garland expressed concern about the multi-function polis, saying "some of us believe that it's just another way of overcoming the immigration program and getting people in through the back door."

Helen Caldicott, anti-nuclear activist and independent candidate for Parliament, said the high-tech city would be populated by Japanese who would "teach us to run our health care and our education policy." "I do really resent foreigners coming in to take over our country and our land," Ms. Caldicott told a local radio station in the eastern city of Tweed Heads, mentioned as a possible site for the city.

New Caledonia

Kanak Separatists To Form New Political Front

BK1903072790 Hong Kong AFP in English 0659 GMT 19 Mar 90

[Text] Noumea, March 19 (AFP)—An extremist New Caledonian party has decided to set up a new pro-independence political movement to accommodate people unsatisfied with the country's main separatist group, the Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS).

The new force, to be named the Anti-Neocolonialist Front, will be formed to group "those disappointed with the Matignon Accords after realising that the FLNKS is

doing nothing," leader of the Kanak Socialist Liberation (LKS) Nidoish Naisseline said. The June 1988 Matignon Accords provide for a 1998 referendum on self determination for the French-ruled South Pacific territory. Both the FLNKS and the LKS are signatories of the accord. "We will not necessarily create another political party, perhaps a structure parallel to the FNLKS or a coordination bureau for the different independentist forces hostile to the policies of the FNLKS," Mr. Niasseline said.

The LKS is not a member of the FLNKS and Mr. Niasseline has accused FLNKS leaders of "favouring political camaraderie instead of competence."

The LKS and the United Kanak Liberation Front (FULK), both extremist parties which have turned hostile to the Matignon Accords, took 23 per cent of the votes, against the FLNKS' 45.35 per cent, during the municipal elections on Ouvea Island last month. The two parties submitted candidates under the Anti-Neocolonialist Front label during the polls.

Papua New Guinea

Opposition Wants Premier Ousted Over Coup Bid

BK1603103390 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0803 GMT 16 Mar 90

[From the "International Report" Program]

[Text] Papua New Guinea's Prime Minister, Mr. Rabbie Namaliu, has survived a bungled and drink-inspired attempted coup on Wednesday [14 March] night, but he soon faces the possibility of a legitimate overthrow.

Sean Dorney reports from Port Moresby that the opposition is planning to introduce a vote of no confidence in the current sitting of the Papua New Guinea Parliament.

[Begin recording] Papua New Guinea's opposition leader Mr. Paias Wingti was just as worried as Prime Minister Namaliu about what might happen last Wednesday night. Like the prime minister, he was whisked away from his official residence when word of what it is now fairly obvious was a drink-inspired coup circulated. Mr. Wingti spent the night at the home of another opposition member where they listened with some apprehension to the broadcast by the now sacked Police Commissioner Paul Tohian over police radio.

Mr. Wingti and the deputy opposition leader, Sir Julius Chan, called a news conference after the prime minister's address to Parliament yesterday, reportedly to condemn the police commissioner's action. But while that was the subject that began the conference, both Mr. Wingti and Sir Julius very quickly attempted to turn the (?issue to) political advantage. They said that they did understand the frustrations of the security forces about how the Bougainville crisis had been handled. They accused Mr. Namaliu of weak and indecisive leadership and claimed the government needed to be changed, but by legitimate means.

The opposition's record of public statements on Bougainville has been far from consistent. While Mr. Wingti and Sir Julius yesterday agreed that the security forces should never have been pulled out of Bougainville, that is not what many members of the opposition were saying three weeks ago before the cease-fire began. The opposition has chopped and changed almost as much as official government policy during the 16 months of the guerrilla war. Nevertheless, Mr. Wingti claimed the situation would never have got so far out of hand under him, and he said it is time for the Parliament to remove Prime Minister Namaliu. The way to do that is through a vote of no confidence. Indeed, that was the way Mr. Namaliu replaced Mr. Wingti as prime minister in 1988, and the way Mr. Wingti replaced the prime minister before him, Mr. Somare, in 1985. It was also the way Sir Julius Chan became prime minister way back in 1980. Under the Constitution, a motion of no confidence sits before Parliament for seven days before the vote is taken. Notice has not been given yet. But three weeks of this session remains and Mr. Wingti has indicated that there will be a move to get rid of Mr. Namaliu by constitutional means before the session is over. [end recording]

Solomon Islands

Government Rejects Proposal To Devalue Currency

BK1403081390 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0500 GMT 14 Mar 90

[Text] The Solomon Islands Government has rejected a proposal by the country's Central Bank to devalue the Solomon dollar, saying that such a move would be disastrous. The Central Bank of Solomon Islands had suggested that the Solomon dollar, now worth 40 U.S. cents, be devalued by 20 percent.

Solomon Islands' prime minister, Mr. Mamaloni, said that although such a devaluation would benefit exporters, it would wipe out the savings of low paid workers, discourage foreign investment, and fail to help the country's loan repayments.

Mr. Mamaloni said that instead his government was looking to gradually revalue the Solomon dollar from next month.